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Abstract 
Actions are the translation of internal states such as intentions into overt 
gestures and goals. Actions are communicative, because by observing 
another’s overt behaviour we can infer that person’s internal states. Infants’ 
abilities to execute actions are limited by developing motor processes. Their 
capacity to make inferences from others’ behaviour is hindered by their 
inability to engage in perspective-taking and other advanced social cognitive 
processes. Nonetheless, extensive evidence shows that infants perceive 
actions as goal-directed sequences that are meaningful, and that they 
respond to observed actions with motor resonance. The aims of this thesis 
were to determine how semantic and motor processing of observed action 
develop in infancy, whether these processes develop separately or in 
conjunction with one another, and how infants’ abilities to execute and plan 
actions affects ability to detect semantic and motor differences between 
actions. These aims were achieved by studying how infants processed 
grasping actions that varied on different dimensions. In Chapter 1, the 
literature on infant action perception from social, motor and semantic 
perspectives is reviewed and the objectives of the thesis are described. In 
Chapter 2, the ability of 16-month-olds to discriminate between the uses of a 
novel tool when motor simulation processes are uninformative was 
investigated. In Chapter 3, the attentional and semantic neural correlates of 
processing of observed grasps were measured in 9-month-olds, 11.5-month-
olds, and adults. In Chapter 4, motor activation in 10-month-old infants in 
response to motorically similar but semantically distinct grasping actions was 
related to infants’ action planning skills. The results of these experiments 
show that there is a complex interplay between motor and semantic 
constituents of the action processing system, and that this interplay is 
developmentally dynamic. The implications of the results for understanding 
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Abstract 
The widespread use of EEG methods and the introduction of new brain 
imaging methods such as near infrared spectroscopy have made cognitive 
neuroscience research with infants more feasible, resulting in an explosion of 
new findings. Among the long-established study of the neural correlates of 
face and speech perception in infancy, there has been an abundance of 
recent research on infant perception and production of action and concomitant 
neurocognitive development. In this review, three significant strands of 
developmental action research are discussed. The first strand focuses on the 
relationship of diverse social cognitive processes, including the perception of 
goals and animacy, and the development of precursors to theory of mind, to 
action perception. The second investigates the role of motor resonance and 
mirror systems in early action development. The third strand focuses on the 
extraction of meaning from action by infants and discusses how semantic 
processing of action emerges early in life. Although these strands of research 
are pursued separately, many of the findings from each strand inform all three 
theoretical frameworks. This review will evaluate the evidence for a 





Human infants are born at an earlier stage of motor and brain development 
than might be expected when compared with the newborns of other primate 
species (Bard et al. 2011; Miller et al. 2012) and consequently are dependent 
on their caregivers to fulfil their needs and wants. Actions are a means of 
forming an interface between those needs and wants and the external world. 
Although neonates and very young infants appear unable to act except 
reflexively, it is probable that some volition underlies their behaviour (Meltzoff 
and Moore 1997; van der Meer et al. 1995; Rochat and Hespos 1997; von 
Hofsten and Fazel-Zandy 1984) and by 3 months of age they will act with 
intent, for example, to reproduce a salient outcome (Hayne and Rovee-Collier 
1995). By 6 months, infants perceive actions as goal-directed (Woodward 
1998). There has been a raft of recent research exploring how infants 
perceive and engage in intentional interaction with the external world. By 
examining how the ability to act is acquired and improved in its earliest stages, 
developmental action research is changing not only how we approach early 
social and cognitive development but also how action is conceptualised 
across the lifespan. 
Actions are distinct from reflexive movements. They are purposeful and 
internally generated (von Hofsten 2004). It is commonly known that 
pronounced motor developments such as the acquisition of walking, crawling 
and pincer grasps occur during infancy, but motor proficiency is not the sole 
component of action. Action production and perception involve cognitive and 
higher-order perceptual processes in the forms of object recognition (Hunnius 
and Bekkering 2010), goal maintenance (Csibra et al. 1999; Luo and 
Baillargeon 2005), and problem solving (Barrett et al. 2007; Elsner and Pauen 
2007). There is also some evidence that competence in motor planning and 
execution is beneficial for both perception and production of action (Daum et 
al. 2011; Loucks and Sommerville 2012; van Elk et al. 2008b). The goal of 
developmental action research is to understand how infants develop the ability 
to perceive and produce purposeful actions of different levels of complexity, 
how other processes affect action development, and how action development 
3 
 
might be related to the emergence of other processes, such as language 
(Brooks and Meltzoff 2005; Oudgeneog-Paz et al. 2012; Reid et al. 2009) or 
visuo-spatial reasoning (Johnson 2010; Soska et al. 2010). 
The cognitive neuroscience approach to action development predominantly 
adopts one of three distinct but related theoretical perspectives. One approach 
comes from the social cognitive tradition (Striano and Reid 2006), which 
emphasises the impact of social cues and observation on learning. There has 
already been much research investigating infant neural responses to social 
stimuli, including social action stimuli (Grossmann and Johnson, 2007). A 
second approach derives from work investigating the ontogeny of the mirror 
system. As a known correlate of action perception, changes in the infant’s 
EEG response to observed action can be used as a marker of action 
perception (Nyström et al. 2011). Furthermore, the known similarities in the 
EEG representation of performed and observed actions can be used to 
understand how the ability to perform an action influences the perception of 
that action (van Elk et al. 2008b). Finally, action is also viewed an element of 
the world that is interpreted via semantic information processing, with a focus 
on how actions are processed in this way during development (Cummings et 
al. 2008; Pace et al. 2013; Reid and Striano 2008; Reid et al. 2009) and how 
the emergence of action perception may be linked to the emergence of other 
forms of semantic processing (Brooks and Meltzoff 2005).  
The insights into action development gleaned from research using 
neuroscience methods and through adopting one of the three outlined 
perspectives will be discussed in this review. More crucially, the overlaps 
between the perspectives will be identified, along with contradictions. These 
perspectives are not mutually exclusive yet they are not treated as such in 
extant literature. This is potentially because of the novelty of these 
approaches. Behavioural research has shown that infants make inferences 
about ongoing actions, that they anticipate goals, and that movements without 
goals are not perceived as purposeful actions (Csibra et al 2003; Woodward 
1999). The adoption of EEG methods has uncovered the processes that 
underlie this goal-oriented perception of action. For example, EEG frequency 
analyses in the mu band have shown that the motoric representation of 
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viewed actions is elicited only when the action is discernibly goal-directed 
(Nyström et al. 2011; Southgate et al. 2010). Similarly, the presence of an 
N400 response to actions in 9-month-olds (Reid et al. 2009) indicates that 
infants’ inferences about action are based in an early developing semantic 
framework, which goes beyond infants’ pairing of objects and outcomes 
simply because they always appear simultaneously. This review proposes a 
framework in which social, motor resonance and semantic views on action 
development are integrated. 
1.2 Social cognition 
The social cognitive perspective is becoming increasingly prevalent in 
neuroscience research as it becomes evident that specific brain regions and 
neurophysiological processes are particularly responsive to social stimuli such 
as faces, voices and bodies (e.g. Kanwisher et al. 1997; Lloyd-Fox et al. 2011; 
Vuilleumier et al. 2001). An infant is dependent on others, and therefore, the 
early environment is highly social. It is well established that infants have an 
innate or early emerging preference for faces, voices and movements 
(Bertenthal et al. 1987; Blasi et al. 2011; Morton and Johnson 1991). 
Consequently much of infant development is influenced by the presence of 
social stimuli (e.g. Pascalis et al. 2002).  
One means of studying action development from a social cognitive 
neuroscience perspective is to look at how established social cognitive 
processes influence action perception in infancy. Eye gaze is often studied in 
this regard, using event-related potentials (ERPs). Neonates discriminate 
between direct and averted gaze, and by at least 4 months of age, this 
discrimination is reflected in the N170 component of the response to human 
faces, which has a higher amplitude for direct than averted gaze (Farroni et al. 
2002). Sensitivity to gaze is an important aspect of early action development, 
as it allows infants to detect what others are paying attention to (Reid and 
Striano 2007; Striano and Reid 2006), facilitating learning about the external 
environment. Presented with a scene with two objects, 4-month-olds will direct 
their attention to the object an adult is gazing at (Reid and Striano 2005). In 
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the same paradigm, the infant Nc and positive slow wave (PSW) ERPs, which 
index attention and memory encoding, respectively, differ in morphology for 
objects previously cued and uncued by an adult’s gaze (Hoehl et al. 2008). 
The Nc component of the infant’s evoked response to an object is also of 
greater amplitude in joint attention contexts, when a live adult engages the 
infant in mutual gaze and then uses her own gaze to cue the infant to the 
object, than when the infant views the object with no preceding joint attention 
interaction (Striano et al. 2006). This shows that infants’ attention to objects in 
their environment is facilitated and enhanced by social interaction. It also 
shows that infants are sensitive to the relationships between other people and 
objects in the environment, which may be a precursor to action perception. 
Social cues other than gaze have been shown, behaviourally, to contribute to 
the development of action perception. A number of studies show that infant 
preference for looking at objects and acting on objects is influenced by adults’ 
emotional responses to those objects (Repacholi 2009; Repacholi and 
Meltzoff 2007; Flom and Johnson 2011). The neural correlates of infant 
responses to adult emotional action cues are open for investigation but 
existing research suggests that infants can use social cues to learn about 
actions and outcomes. 
Another social cognitive approach is to investigate action in the same manner 
that faces, bodies and voices have been studied in the past and to find if there 
is something “special” about viewing actions as performed by a conspecific, or 
if the perception of actions performed by others is just one application of a 
more domain-general cognitive ability (e.g. making probabilistic inferences 
about outcomes based on outcomes often previously seen; Gopnik et al. 
2004; Paulus et al. 2011b). Woodward (1998) showed that 5- and 6-month-
olds perceive reaching as an object-directed action. Infants of this age also 
perceive the difference between non-purposeful contact (contact with the back 
of the hand) and intentional contact (grasping) with an object (Woodward 
1999). Hunnius and Bekkering (2010) used eye-tracking techniques to show 
that from 6 months, infants predicted how an actor would use a familiar object. 
For example, the infant looked to an actor’s ear when an actor picked up a 
phone. Processing of goals is often taken to mean that some form of social 
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cognition is occurring, though there is also the possibility that a more general 
form of probabilistic or associative learning is taking place. 
There are additional challenges to and findings in favour of action perception 
as a specifically social cognitive process. One favourable finding is that infants 
below one year of age do not expect a mechanical claw to keep grasping the 
same object unless they know that a human actor operates the claw (Hofer et 
al. 2005). There are also studies with results that challenge the idea that goals 
are attributed to conspecifics. However, these studies differ on how “human” a 
non-human object has to be for 5- to 7-month-olds to perceive it as acting in a 
goal-directed manner. Kamewari et al. (2005) showed that humanoid robots 
but not boxes are perceived to have goals, whereas Luo and Baillargeon’s 
(2005) infants did attribute a goal to a moving box. An early negative ERP in 
8-month-olds discriminates between point-light walkers with normative and 
abnormal human body configurations, while a late positive ERP discriminates 
between biomechanically possible and impossible actions (Reid et al. 2008). 
This further suggests that an action can be perceived and processed by 
infants even if the observed organism is not human. 
Perception of agency may be contextual, as Pauen and Träuble (2009) found 
that 7-month-olds attribute self-propelled movement to a ball when it is 
presented alone but not when it is presented with an animal-like object. Kaduk 
et al. (2013) found that infants show a larger Nc response in the visual ERP to 
scenes in which a ball moves without animacy (i.e. it is stopped by obstacles) 
than scenes in which the ball moves with animacy (i.e. it stops and jumps over 
obstacles). This shows again that infants make a distinction between 
movement from an organism and incidental movement that is based on 
nuanced, contextual cues and not on the “humanity” of the actor. 
In spite of inconsistencies, these behavioural and ERP results indicate that 
infants by 12 months have well-developed abilities to predict the actions of 
certain types of agent and can perceive animacy on the basis of motion and 
context. Such results are not definitive, however, as they do not show whether 
the predictions are really social-cognitive inferences about goals or whether 
they arise from domain-general processes used to predict outcomes. By 
studying action prediction at a neural level, it may be possible to identify 
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specific brain regions or ERPs involved in the perception of action as 
performed by agents. In this way, the social-cognitive aspects of action might 
be dissociated from domain-general factors. 
Actions are the infant’s first exposure to the intentions of others. It has been 
proposed that this is a social cognitive process – that the infant perceives 
similarities in another’s actions and their own, and is able to attribute a goal to 
the other actor based on their own experience (Meltzoff 2007). Action 
experience promotes social cognitive processing of action, as 3-month-old 
infants with experience of reaching are more capable of detecting the goal of 
another’s reaching action than those with no such experience (Sommerville et 
al. 2005). Infants’ attention to goal-directed action (Woodward 1999), and their 
tendency to imitate an actor’s goals but not his means (Gergely et al. 2002), 
suggests that some form of social cognitive inference is being made by infants 
during action observation. Recent work suggests that by predicting actors’ 
goals, infants may be engaging in implicit reasoning about beliefs, which is a 
precursor to theory of mind (Sodian 2011; Thoermer et al 2012). Engaging the 
gaze of an adult while observing an unusual action at 20 months predicts 
theory of mind ability at 44 months (Charman et al. 2000), showing clear links 
between action understanding and theory of mind. 
False-belief reasoning has been associated with a late slow wave ERP that 
differs between children who can and cannot perform false belief tasks 
(Meinhardt et al. 2011), and between adults and children (Liu et al. 2009). This 
component distinguishes between trials in which an actor holds a true versus 
a false belief, and is observed in adults as they passively observe stimuli 
(Geangu et al. 2013). Using this passive paradigm, the development of social 
cognitive action understanding and theory of mind precursors can be 
investigated in infants. Studies like those of Meinhardt et al. (2011) and 
Geangu et al. (2013) illustrate one of the benefits of using neuroscience 
methods with infants. It is difficult to elicit overt behaviour from preverbal 
children that shows whether or not they understand an actor’s false belief. 
However, the presence (or absence) of an ERP similar in morphology to the 
ERP elicited in adults by false belief tasks could allow us to infer the ability of 
an infant or toddler to engage in false belief reasoning. Similarly, changes in 
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the morphology of that ERP could be linked to changes in behaviours related 
to false belief understanding occurring in a similar timeframe. 
There remain many questions about action processing as a social cognitive 
process. For example, it is still unclear whether the processing of human 
action differs from the processing of non-human action. Hopper and 
colleagues (2010) showed 3- to 5-year-old children a task performed on a 
novel object. Children who were given a demonstration performed by an actor 
were more successful at performing the task than children who were shown 
the novel object moving in the same way, but without an actor causing the 
movement. This shows that social modelling of action is of benefit for learning 
about action in childhood and infancy (e.g. Hofer, Hauf & Aschersleben, 
2005). However, it remains unclear whether infants’ predictions of adult 
actions are the result of social cognitive inferences and if the ability to make 
such predictions is a precursor to theory of mind. Beyond this context, findings 
from infancy research can be used to address questions such as whether 
action perception is a specifically social or a domain-general process. 
Conceptualising action understanding in infancy as a social cognitive process 
is a logical step, given the huge contribution of social cues and context to 
many other forms of perceptual and cognitive development (Grossmann and 
Johnson 2007). Action perception by definition involves more varied 
information than the perception of emotion or of direct eye gaze. It appears 
that these social cues contribute to action understanding (Repacholi and 
Meltzoff 2007) and that action perception in turn contributes to making social 
cognitive inferences (Meltzoff 2007). The more fundamental, automatic 
processes underlying action processing will be discussed in the remainder of 
this review.  
1.3 Motor Resonance 
A recent focus on motor resonance has occurred due to the rise of mirror 
system research in adult and infant populations. The mirror system refers to 
human brain responses that are similar for the performance of actions and for 
the perception of the same actions as performed by others (Gallese et al. 
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2004). Although activation of the mirror system is elicited by the actions of 
others and may in some senses be “social”, it is also elicited by stimuli in 
which objects move but no actor is present (Southgate and Begus, 2013). Two 
markers of this activity in humans are the mu or sensorimotor alpha and beta 
rhythms, distinctive oscillatory rhythms within infant EEG from 4 to 10 Hz and 
12 to 25 Hz. Four to 10 Hz is a lower frequency than adult mu, but the 
topography and function of this range in infants justify its characterisation 
(Marshall and Meltzoff 2011), and infant EEG frequencies are lower than 
adults’ across all bands. These rhythms index motor activation by becoming 
desynchronised during action performance and perception. The 
desynchronization or decrease in alpha power in infants is generally smaller 
than of that of adults by a factor of 5 or 6, depending on the stimulus (Marshall 
and Meltzoff 2011). ERPs and changes in blood oxygenation in motor areas 
(as captured by near-infrared spectroscopy or NIRS) can also be used as 
markers of mirror system activity. Motor resonance is a more broad term than 
mirror system (Uithol et al. 2011), referring to motor activation elicited by any 
percept, such as a tool, hand or word (Chao and Martin 2000; de Lange et al. 
2006; Yang and Shu 2011). Mirror system activity is distinctive because it is 
thought to involve semantic processing of the action as well as motor 
simulation (Uithol et al. 2011).  
The relationship between the perception of action and the acquisition of new 
motor abilities can be addressed by determining whether the neural correlates 
of action performance and perception in infancy are similar, and by studying 
how these correlates change as new actions are acquired. Marshall and 
Meltzoff (2011) have identified some of the theoretical and practical questions 
that must be addressed, such as whether the desynchronization found during 
action perception and production arises from the same neural source. 
Findings indicate that the infant brain is discriminately responsive to actions 
over non-action motion and that much of this activity originates from primary 
motor cortex. For example, using NIRS, Shimada and Hiraki (2006) found a 
significantly larger response in the sensorimotor area of 6- and 7-month-olds 
to an adult directly manipulating a toy than the toy being moved with no visible 
manipulation. Nyström (2008) showed infants stimuli depicting static and 
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moving dots, and goal-directed and non-goal-directed human action, and 
found a late positive ERP (about 700ms after stimulus onset) that was 
significantly larger for the goal-directed action than all other stimuli.   
Nyström’s (2008) study found motor desynchronization during action 
observation in adults but not infants. Power changes in the mu and beta 
rhythms of infant EEG have been found in action studies with older infants. 
Marshall et al. (2011) found mu desynchronization in 14-month-olds during 
execution and perception of the same action. In 8-month-olds, Nyström and 
colleagues (2011) found desynchronization of the mu rhythm in premotor 
cortex in response to observed action, with greater power decreases found in 
response to goal-directed action when contrasted with non-goal-directed 
action. The presence of a desynchronization effect in 8- but not 6-month-old 
infants suggests that the mirror system is not fully functional at birth but 
develops over time. In support of this interpretation, it has been shown that 
adults exhibit a larger mu rhythm power decrease than infants in response to 
the same stimuli (Marshall et al. 2011). It must be noted that differences in the 
power of infant and adult EEG or in the morphology of infant and adult ERPs 
do not relate only to functional differences. The large scale of neural 
development occurring in infancy means that infants tend to show more 
interindividual variability in their EEG activity and ERPs than adults (Hoehl and 
Wahl 2012). Their EEG activity is quite different overall from adults’. Delta and 
theta activity, seen only in adults in deep sleep, is seen in infants’ waking 
EEG. With these limitations borne in mind, there is still much that can be 
inferred from differences in infant EEG activity and ERPs across development. 
Nyström et al. (2011) found mu desynchronization in 8-month-olds’ EEG 
activity in response to goal-directed action, but not in response to a stimulus 
with the same outcome but without a goal-directed action. Although this kind 
of specific, goal-detecting response might suggest that some kind of social, 
intention-detecting process is being undertaken, it is possible that the process 
is related to a prediction of outcomes that is not necessarily social in nature. 
Behavioural research has shown that infants are proficient at predicting the 
goals of familiar actions (Hunnius and Bekkering 2010). This predictive ability 
is reflected in mirror system function. In 9-month-olds, mu desynchronization 
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in response to goal-directed grasps is seen before the grasp is completed 
(Southgate et al. 2009b). The same effect is found for the ERP component 
identified by Nyström (2008). The 9-month-old’s mirror system is responsive 
only to action with an outcome that the infant can predict – hands in non-
grasping postures and hands that reach for empty space do not elicit mu 
desynchronization whereas hands reaching to grasp a goal object do, even if 
the goal object is hidden (Southgate et al. 2010). It has also been shown that 
the goal-directed action does not need to be performed by an agent to elicit 
mu desynchronization – 9-month-olds show this response to an object being 
picked up and moved, even if no visible actor performs the action (Southgate 
and Begus 2013). 
These results affirm that the mirror system is driven by goal-directed 
behaviour, likely because actions with goals are easy to predict and simulate. 
While mu desynchronization indexes the processing of predictable actions, 
actions that are goal-directed but violate predictions elicit even greater power 
decreases in the mu rhythm. Stapel and colleagues (2010) found greater mu 
desynchronization in 12-month-olds when they were shown unusual actions 
versus ordinary actions (e.g. bringing a cup to the ear versus bringing it to the 
mouth). The authors propose that when a prediction about an action turns out 
to be untrue, the motor cortex is increasingly recruited in order to simulate the 
new stages of the action. This relates to Kilner et al.’s (2007) 
conceptualisation of the mirror system as a predictive coding system, wherein 
frontal predictions about how an action will proceed are fed back to 
subordinate levels, which then identify prediction errors and signal these back 
to frontal cortex. The non-grasping gestures in Southgate and colleagues’ 
work (2010) did not elicit this kind of escalated mirror system activity, perhaps 
due to the movement being perceived as incidental, rather than as an action 
with an unpredictable outcome. 
The conceptualization of mirror system function as a predictive rather than a 
social process is not entirely straightforward. Shimada and Hiraki (2006) 
showed that infants process live actions differently to video action, and that 
motor cortex activity discriminated between stimuli in which an object was 
moved by an actor, and stimuli in which it moved alone, suggesting that by 6 
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months of age, the mirror system is more responsive to actions with a visible 
actor. Perhaps this is due to an early preference for attending to social stimuli, 
or alternatively it is because the outcome of the action used by Shimada and 
Hiraki was less salient than the outcome used by Southgate and Begus 
(2013), and was less obviously goal-directed in the absence of an actor. The 
mirror system of 4-month-olds has recently been shown to respond to the 
actions of robots with a humanoid body structure (Grossmann et al. 2013). 
Given that actions must be goal-directed to elicit mirror system activity, this 
suggests [like Kamewari et al.’s (2005) work] that infants can attribute agency 
to non-human actors. The precise relationship between mirror system activity 
and the agency or “humanness” of the observed actor is currently unknown. 
The mirror system’s implicit simulation of others’ actions could have 
implications for social cognitive perspectives on action. If infants learn about 
others’ intentions by relating their own actions to actions they observe 
(Meltzoff 2007) the mirror system may at least provide the basic framework for 
this ability. Supporting this notion, prior work has indicated that joint action is a 
social cognitive process in which mirror system activity is also involved. 
Activation in brain regions associated with the human mirror system is 
stronger when performing an action in collaboration with others than when 
performing an action alone (Newman-Norlund et al. 2008). Research with 
young children has replicated this with mirror system activity being stronger in 
4-year-old children during observation of an action performed by another 
person when the child is participating in that action than when she is not 
(Meyer et al. 2011). In the same study, mirror system activation while 
watching a partner’s action was associated with successful performance of the 
task. Behavioural research has shown that 10- and 14-month-olds are more 
likely to perceive that both actors in an observed joint action share a goal if the 
infant has previously participated in a similar joint action. If not, they attribute 
the goal only to the actor who directly interacts with the goal object 
(Henderson et al. 2013; Henderson and Woodward 2011). Saby et al. (2012) 
found that mu desynchronization in 14-month-olds is stronger during 
observation of an action the infant has recently performed, again suggesting 
that the motor experience influences mirror system responses to others’ 
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actions. These results suggest that infants’ imitation and perspective-taking 
are influenced by motor simulation. On the basis of these data, it is clear that 
social cognition and motor resonance processes interact with one another. 
The question of how motor experience influences motor resonance and action 
processing extends beyond research on joint action. A substantial amount of 
motor development occurs in the first two years of life, including the 
acquisition of pincer grips (Sacrey et al. 2012). The ability to perform a pincer 
grip and use it to grasp objects predicts the ability to discriminate between 
pincer and power grasps in functional terms (Loucks and Sommerville 2012) 
and to predict the form of an object for which a hand in a grasping posture is 
reaching (Daum, Prinz and Aschersleben 2011). The results of these studies 
provide support for the hypothesis that perception of an action is influenced by 
production of that action, and that motor resonance and mirror system activity 
play a role in this process. Van Elk et al. (2008b) showed 14- and 16-month-
olds videos of infants walking and crawling across a screen. The authors 
found that experience with these forms of locomotion affected mu and beta 
desynchronization in response to these stimuli, as infants with more crawling 
experience exhibited greater desynchronization, and all infants showed 
greater beta desynchronization in response to the crawling than walking 
videos. Motor experience and activation have been shown to facilitate other 
forms of development, such as spatial reasoning. Soska et al. (2010) found 
that infants’ experience of sitting unaided and exploring objects visually and 
manually predicted ability to mentally rotate 3D objects. Research with adults 
has shown that this form of mental rotation elicits activity in adult premotor and 
supplementary motor areas (Richter et al. 2000), suggesting that motor 
activation underlies the effects found by Soska et al. (2010). 
Although performance and perception of motor abilities are linked 
behaviourally and in brain activity (Daum et al. 2011; van Elk et al. 2008b), 
action performance is not crucial for action perception. Meyer et al. (2013) 
conducted a study with 8-month-olds, none of whom could reliably perform a 
pincer grasp. The infants were shown an adult hand succeeding or failing to 
perform a pincer grasp on a small object. Greater mu desynchronization was 
elicited during observation of the correct than the failed action. The authors 
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propose that while the infants attempt to simulate the novel grasp when the 
outcome is successful, the combination of an unsuccessful outcome and a 
novel grasp is too complex for them to process in any meaningful way. They 
propose a U-shaped function, in which motor resonance is strongest when 
viewing correct actions in which one is not proficient and incorrect actions in 
which one is proficient, and weaker for actions that one can perform but not 
with high proficiency. It is also likely that semantic congruence affects this 
function, as incongruent actions elicit stronger mirror system activity than 
congruent actions (Stapel et al. 2010).  
There is other, behavioural research that has shown that semantic processing 
may account for how infants understand actions despite not being able to 
perform them yet. It has been shown that 12- and 15-month-olds categorize 
novel objects on the basis of semantic elements, such as the function and 
causal effects of the object, even if they cannot perform the planning and 
manipulations needed to use those objects (Elsner and Pauen 2007). This 
suggests that semantic processes can be used to process action if the action 
cannot be mapped onto a motor representation gained through experience. A 
long tradition of research with adults has shown that action is processed 
semantically (e.g. Chainay and Humphreys 2002). More recent research has 
shown that the semantic congruence of an action in adults is reflected in 
desynchronization of activity over the motor cortex (van Elk et al 2010). By 
investigating semantic representations of action in the infant mirror system 
using neuroscience methods, it could be possible to determine whether the 
developmental changes in one process for understanding action (e.g. the 
emergence of an N400 ERP) affects the development of another (e.g. 
changes in the mirror system response to actions, driven by differences in 
action congruence). 
Infant mirror system research has the potential to show how new actions 
become incorporated into the motor repertoire. Motor resonance research in 
adults has been used to understand how new sequences of actions are 
learned (Cross et al. 2009). However, most adults already possess the motor 
ability to perform the components of these new sequences but have not 
attempted these sequences before. For example, research on adults’ learning 
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of novel motor sequences, through observation or performance, uses stimuli 
such as dance movements (Cross et al. 2009; Cross, Hamilton and Grafton 
2006). These stimuli may be novel as entire sequences but composed of 
individual movements that adults have the ability to perform, and comprehend 
as a dancing movement. For infants, actions that cannot be performed 
proficiently are often neither simulated nor perceived functionally (Daum et al. 
2011; van Elk et al. 2008b). Infancy therefore presents a unique time to study 
action, as the ability to simulate many kinds of action (e.g. those requiring 
pincer grasps) is emergent. Consequently, changes in the neural 
representation of action during and after the acquisition of entirely new motor 
abilities can be studied. This kind of research may lead to a more 
parsimonious understanding of action learning throughout the lifespan. It also 
has implications beyond developmental research, for example for the 
rehabilitation of adults who have suffered neurological damage rendering 
them unable to execute or control certain actions, or who need to learn to 
control prosthetic limbs and digits. An additional implication of this kind of 
research is the importance of the “humanness” of the actor. Research with 
adults has shown that it is possible to learn new actions via observation of 
others (Cross et al., 2009). Determining whether infant mirror system-
mediated learning of action is facilitated by watching conspecifics only versus 
any kind of humanoid actor could have implications for the training of athletes, 
dancers, military personnel or medical personnel via computer simulations 
and robotics. 
Within developmental research, studying the function of the mirror system in 
infancy has implications beyond discovering how new actions are learned and 
represented in the motor cortex. In terms of social cognition, this research 
could inform how infants come to attribute agency to different kinds of actor, 
from mirror system responses driven by human action alone at 6 months 
(Shimada and Hiraki 2006) to a later ability to infer goal-directed action even 
in the absence of an actor (Southgate and Begus 2013). It could also 
illustrate, through joint action research, how motor abilities influence the 
development of social cognitive processes such as perspective-taking. In 
relation to semantic processing of action, the response of the mirror system to 
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actions the infant cannot perform but can predict may show whether these 
systems for action processing develop separately or in tandem, and whether 
they are separable or linked systems. 
1.4 Semantics 
EEG research with infants has shown that the mirror system is engaged 
during action processing from an early age. ERP research has shown that 
action perception in infancy is also a semantic process. There is long-standing 
evidence in adults for these two forms of action processing. 
Neuropsychological dissociations between different kinds of impairment show 
that actions can be processed in two different ways, semantically or via a 
direct vision-to-action pathway. For example, some patients imitate 
demonstrated gestures but cannot produce an appropriate gesture in 
response to an object (Chainay and Humphreys 2002). Further support for 
action perception and production as semantic processes comes from research 
showing that an N400 ERP is elicited in response to visually-presented 
sequences of actions with unexpected or inappropriate outcomes, tools or 
gestures (Kutas and Federmeier, 2011; Sitnikova et al. 2008). 
Investigating action development from a semantic perspective may offer some 
clarification as to why infants rapidly learn about goals in action without 
assuming them to be proficient social thinkers. Csibra and Gergely (2007) 
characterise action perception as a teleological process, wherein infants and 
adults alike perceive action not in terms of its means but in terms of its goals. 
For example, 9-month-olds do not expect an agent to follow the same path to 
a goal when there is an obstacle present and when there is not (Csibra et al. 
1999). This process may be separable from motor resonance, as 6- to 8-
month-old infants are more surprised by inefficient but biomechanically 
possible reaches for a goal-object than efficient but impossible reaches 
(Southgate et al. 2008). Findings from this research effort can be understood 
as the infant making an association between a gesture, an object and an 
outcome. Violations of the learned association could elicit their interest much 
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like a semantically unusual sentence might elicit surprise in adults (Ganis et 
al. 1996). 
Baldwin et al. (2001) habituated 10- and 11-month-old infants to multi-step 
action sequences. Infants dishabituated to pauses in the action sequences 
only if the pause did not occur at a natural juncture in the action – for example, 
after a grasp had been completed. This shows that infants perceive actions as 
structured sequences with functional demarcations. Loucks and Meltzoff 
(2013) demonstrated a similar demarcation of action with toddlers. Three-
year-olds shown two familiar, multi-step actions (e.g. putting a doll to bed and 
taking a doll for a drive) with the steps in the correct order but interspersed 
between the two actions, imitated the actions without interspersion. This 
suggests that toddlers’ memory for a demonstrated familiar action sequence is 
dominated by their semantic representation of that action. The results of these 
behavioural studies are reflected in patterns of neural activity. Reid et al. 
(2007) presented 8-month-olds with action sequences that were suspended 
and reversed before completion, such as a video of an actor pouring water 
into a glass from a jug that ends prior to the liquid exiting the jug. Using EEG, 
it was found that bursts of synchronised gamma band activity over left frontal 
regions are more pronounced for incomplete than complete actions. This 
suggests that infants pay more attention to or are more surprised by 
incomplete actions. While surprise in response to goal violations may be 
attributed to social inference about actors’ intentions, surprise in response to 
incomplete actions suggests less equivocally that infants have semantic 
representations of how actions ought to proceed and of the natural 
demarcations of actions.  
In adults, an N400 ERP of greater magnitude indicates that an action has 
been perceived as unusual, unexpected or impossible (Kutas and Federmeier 
2011; Reid and Striano 2008; van Elk et al. 2008a). The same effect is found 
in 9-month-old infants. Reid et al. (2009) showed infants sequences of images 
depicting actors picking food items up and placing them either in the mouth or 
on the head. An N400-like ERP was elicited about 700ms post-stimulus onset 
with a significantly larger amplitude for the incongruent than congruent 
actions. The same effect was not found in 7-month-olds. Given that younger 
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infants can often determine the goal of an action (e.g. Daum et al. 2009a, b; 
Woodward 1998), this finding suggests that the efficient storage and retrieval 
of semantic representations of actions develops over time. Some differences 
are noted between the infant N400 and the adult N400 found in the Reid et al. 
(2009) study. No N400 component was seen in the waveform evoked in the 7-
month-olds. In the 9-month-olds, the N400 component was seen. It was 
different in amplitude between conditions, indicating a response to stimulus 
congruence at this point. Compared to the adult N400, the infant response 
was later in latency and observed in more posterior locations. The difference 
in topology was attributed to a large, attentional fronto-central Nc component 
masking the N400 component over central electrodes. The difference in 
latency is common in developmental ERP studies (Hoehl and Wahl 2012), and 
may relate to the fact that myelination is complete in the adult brain, allowing 
rapid neural responses, but is an ongoing process in the infant brain (Picton 
and Taylor 2007). The fact that infant ERPs change in amplitude over the 
course of a standard testing session (Stets and Reid 2011) could also lead to 
differences in analysed infant and adult responses that might not reflect only 
the studied process – in this case, semantic processing of action. 
In the above study, the congruence of the action was determined by whether 
the outcome of the action matched the function of the object held by the actor. 
Other aspects of an action can also alter the congruence of an action. For 
example, an actor may select an inappropriate tool to achieve their goal, or 
they may grasp or move that tool in an unusual way. During action 
observation, prior information determines how relevant a particular component 
of an action is to its semantic congruence. Southgate et al. (2009a) showed 
18-month-olds a toy animal moving into a toy house. One group of infants 
were shown the action’s goal (i.e. the animal inside the house) before seeing 
the moving action. During the demonstration, the animal either hopped or slid 
into the house. The infants who had already been exposed to the action 
outcome were more likely to imitate the hopping or sliding than the group who 
did not see the outcome first, though all groups imitated the outcome of the 
action. This illustrates that older infants perceive outcomes or goals as the 
most important semantic component of an action, but can also process other 
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aspects of the action semantically. A paradigm like Southgate et al.’s (2009a) 
could be used in an ERP study to determine whether prior knowledge of the 
actor’s goal affects semantic processing of usual or unusual means of 
achieving that goal. 
The existence of a direct vision-to-action pathway in adults (Chainay and 
Humphreys 2002) supports the possibility that motor simulation exists 
independently of the semantic storage of actions. This pathway may be 
present from birth and explain neonatal imitation of facial expressions 
(Meltzoff and Moore 1997). However, mirror system function and the semantic 
storage of action are not distinct processes (Uithol et al. 2011). Beta 
desynchronization is stronger when adults perform functionally incongruent 
than congruent grasps on familiar objects (e.g. grasping a water bottle over 
the lid versus around the body; van Elk et al. 2010). Mirror system activation is 
also responsive to the congruence of an actor’s goals regardless of whether 
the observer attends to the goal (de Lange et al. 2008). These results show 
that semantic information about gestures, tools and goals are incorporated 
into the adult mirror system. It is possible that such representations are also 
present in the infant mirror system. For example, the fact that mu 
desynchronization is stronger for goal-directed than non-goal-directed actions 
from at least 8 months of age (Nyström et al. 2011) indicates that semantic 
representations of actions are incorporated into mirror system function at that 
time. 
It is also possible to integrate the semantic and social cognitive perspectives 
on processing of action by infants. For example, 14-month-olds imitate an 
actor who uses her head instead of her hands to turn on a light switch only 
when her hands are unrestrained (Gergely et al. 2002; Zmyj et al. 2009). 
When her hands are restrained, they imitate the outcome but use their hands 
to accomplish it. This illustrates that while infants structure their imitation of 
adults’ actions around the goal, they pay attention to social cues to clarify 
ambiguity and semantic violations, such as not using the hands to flip a 
switch. Evidence of a further interaction between semantic, social and motor 
resonance processing of action in infancy comes from another study using the 
head-touch paradigm (Paulus et al. 2011a). It was found that infants’ imitation 
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of the actor’s head-touch was also influenced by whether or not the head-
touch would be easy for the infant to represent motorically. The same principle 
of relying on multiple means of action processing might apply to findings from 
other studies. For example, even though the infant mirror system responds to 
actions with no visible agents (Southgate and Begus 2013), Hofer et al. (2005) 
found that younger infants are better at predicting the goal of a grasping claw 
when they know it is operated by a human, and Hopper et al. (2010) found 
that young children are better at imitating actions performed by humans than 
“ghost” actions. Thus, mirror system representations of action may facilitate its 
processing initially by detecting mismatches or incongruity in the action as 
usually performed and the action as observed (e.g. Stapel et al. 2010). At a 
later stage, the semantic processing of action may be facilitated by social 
information (e.g. the claw being operated by a human agent, the actor’s hands 
being restrained), especially when the action is novel or ambiguous. 
The relationship between the action N400 and the linguistic N400 may be 
found by studying the early development of these processes. Normative 
language development in toddlers is associated with an N400 of greater 
amplitude to nonsense versus real words at 19 months (Friedrich and 
Friederici 2006). If the N400 seen in 9-month-olds in response to action 
relates to general semantic development, it could therefore be used as a 
marker for risk of later language difficulties at an earlier stage. Actions 
communicate intentions, and because infants process the goals of actions 
early on in infancy, it is possible that action perception could be a precursor to 
the development of language. Indeed, attention to the direction of an adult’s 
gaze at 10 and 11 months of age has been associated with language ability at 
18 months (Brooks and Meltzoff, 2005), a finding that supports the possibility 
that early attention to and processing of goals is a precursor to language.  
Early walkers are usually early talkers (Oudgeneog-Paz et al. 2012). They 
have greater opportunity to explore the environment, to discover and 
manipulate new objects, and to elicit new words from caregivers as a result 
(Oudgeneog-Paz et al. 2013). It has also been shown that 14-month-olds’ use 
of gesture predicts their vocabulary size at 42 months of age (Rowe and 
Goldin-Meadow 2009; Rowe et al. 2008), suggesting another link between 
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action production and language learning. Further developmental action 
research from a semantic perspective has the potential to clarify the precise 
relationship between action and language development. Given recent results 
showing that infants as young as 9 months exhibit an N400 congruency effect 
to visually presented objects following a label spoken by their mother (Parise 
and Csibra 2012), it is possible that language and action perception develop in 
tandem as semantic processes. In the clinical domain, the production of verbs 
by aphasic patients is aided by observation of human action (Marangolo et al. 
2012), suggesting a link between mirror system function, semantics and 
language processing. A recent review comparing the morphologies of the 
action N400 and the linguistic N400 in adults suggested a common source for 
both (Amoruso et al. 2013). By expanding this work into developmental 
research, it is possible that future work will indicate whether these processes 
develop together or in isolation from each other. 
Semantic processing of action is a specific application of a more general 
process for detecting when something we perceive does not match the 
predictions we have made based on the surrounding context. Within action 
processing specifically, mirror system responses to the action allow the 
outcome of that action to be predicted (Stapel et al. 2010). Social cognitive 
inference about the action may be facilitated by the mirror system response by 
allowing the infant to relate the actor’s intentions to their own experience 
(Meltzoff 2007), and can further be used to provide semantic context about 
whether the actor’s intention matches the action outcome (Reid et al. 2009). 
Action congruence is also represented within mirror system activity (van Elk et 
al. 2008a), which suggests that these processes work in tandem with one 
another, with higher-level predictions about actions influencing the mirror 
system response (Kilner et al. 2007). Table 1.1 lists some examples of action 
development research findings from each perspective, and offers an 
explanation of how these results can be accounted for in an integrated model. 
An aim for developmental research in the coming years is to discover how 





Table 1.1: A timeline of infant action development accounted for by an 
integrated perspective. 
Age Action milestones Integrated perspective 
6 to 8 
months 
Social: Infants predict goals of simple actions 
(Hunnius and Bekkering 2010; Woodward 
1998). 
Mirror system: Activity in motor cortex 
discriminates between human action and 
other movement (Nyström 2008; Shimada 
and Hiraki 2006) 
Semantic: Attentional Nc ERP component 
discriminates between congruent and 
incongruent action outcomes (Reid et al. 
2009) 
Infants attend more 
strongly to action 
outcomes that cannot be 
directly mapped onto their 
stored representations of 
action outcomes. Mirror 
system activity may 
facilitate this mapping. 
8 to 10 
months 
Social: Infants attribute goals to non-human 
actions if given prior knowledge that the 
action is caused by a human actor (Hofer, 
Hauf and Aschersleben 2005) 
Mirror system: Mu desynchronization is 
elicited only in response to actions that are 
discernibly goal-directed (Nyström et al. 2011; 
Southgate et al. 2010) even if no actor is 
present (Southgate and Begus 2013) 
Semantic: An N400 component is seen in 
response to action stimuli. This component 
discriminates between congruent and 
incongruent outcomes (Reid et al. 2009) 
The mirror system 
facilitates simulation of 
action outcomes but social 
cues are still necessary for 
overt detection of goals. 
Goals that do not match 





Age Action milestones Integrated perspective 
10 to 16 
months 
Social: Infants imitate adults’ goals without 
imitating their means (Zmyj, Daum and 
Aschersleben 2009) 
Mirror system: Mu desynchronization is 
greater in response to action outcomes that 
are more difficult to predict (Stapel et al. 
2010). 
Semantic: Infants perceive actions as 
sequences of steps with clear junctures 
(Baldwin et al. 2001) 
Mirror system 
representations of actions 
can be updated on-line, as 
sub-goals of actions are 
evaluated. The goal-driven 
nature of mirror system 
function and stored 
semantic representations 
of action goals facilitate 




Social: False belief reasoning is associated 
with a late ERP (Meinhardt et al. 2011) 
Mirror system: Toddlers who exhibit stronger 
mirror system activity during observation of a 
partner’s action are more likely to successfully 
perform joint actions (Meyer et al. 2011) 
Semantic: Toddlers’ memory for multi-step 
actions is strictly sequenced, even if 
demonstrations are performed out of order 
(Loucks and Meltzoff 2013) 
The emergence of theory 
of mind may influence or 
be influenced by mirror 
system function. Complex, 
multi-step actions are 
represented semantically. 
Motor planning for imitation 
continues to be goal-driven 










A decade ago, infant perception of actions and outcomes were characterised 
behaviourally and attributed to a number of processes such as probabilistic 
inference (Gopnik et al. 2004) or teleological reasoning (Csibra et al. 1999). 
While there is much evidence for these processes, it is with the use of 
neuroscience and particularly EEG methods in the past decade that the more 
fundamental modes of infant action processing that underlie these forms of 
reasoning have been explored. Research using these methods has shown 
that infant prediction of action is performed by the mirror system, that actions 
are processed semantically, and that semantic representations are 
incorporated into the mirror system. It has also shown that social cognition is 
influenced by mirror system function, and that social context and cues may 
inform semantic processing of action. Although research into infant action 
perception and production from each of these three perspectives is generally 
performed without reference to the other two, by synthesising the evidence 
from each of these perspectives it is clear that there is a substantial amount of 
overlap between them. 
With the proliferation of new studies and new results in infant action research, 
many new questions have arisen. These include how mirror system activity 
discriminates between unfamiliar actions and actions the infant sees often but 
cannot perform, or whether the perception of actions performed by humans is 
distinct from the perception of actions performed by non-human agents. This 
review has identified some questions that relate to the potential overlap 
between the perspectives, including the issue of how semantic processing of 
action is incorporated into the mirror system, and of the mechanism by which 
mirror system function may facilitate social cognitive development. 
Investigation of this overlap is an important objective for infant researchers in 
the coming decade. Knowledge of how action processing emerges in infancy 
and how the diverse systems that contribute to it develop, whether in 
synchrony or apart from one another, has relevance beyond the infant context 
and could create a coherent picture of how action is performed and processed 




Are semantic and motor processes underlying action perception 
examples of a mutually dependent system in development? 
Can the relationship between semantic and motor processes be 
disentangled by studying how infants perceive and process 
grasping? 
The preceding literature review details some general means of characterising 
processing of actions by infants. It also highlights how these different means 
of conceptualising action processing may be targeting the same phenomenon 
at different levels of inquiry, and how semantic, motor and social means of 
action processing might influence one another. For example, an aspect of 
action processing considered to be linked to social perception is the 
perception of actions as goal-directed (Grossmann & Johnson, 2007). Early 
development of this kind of goal inference has been shown to be underwritten 
by motor experience (Sommerville, Woodward & Needham, 2005). Extending 
this assumption, the interpersonal aspects of motor activation (as described 
by Uithol and colleagues, 2011) that are evident in infancy might not only 
facilitate the kind of goal inference seen in many iconic studies in this field 
(e.g. Woodward, 1998). They might also be a representation of the same 
phenomenon at a different level of inquiry. Many studies of mirror system 
function in infancy (e.g. Nyström et al. 2011; Southgate et al., 2010) show that 
mirror activation occurs only when goal inference is possible. Part of the 
relationship between mirror system function and early social cognition may be 
a recognition of equivalences between what is seen and one’s own actions 
(the “like-me” framework; Meltzoff, 2007). This allows for inference of 
another’s goals by identifying that another’s body is similar in posture and 
movement to one’s own body, and that when one’s own body is in such a 
position (motor resonance/mirror system) it is because one is performing a 
goal-directed (meaningful or semantically congruent) action, and therefore that 
the other person might have a goal (the same goal) too (social cognition). 
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We can refer to Table 1.1 to more comprehensively clarify differences 
between and overlaps in social cognition, motor processes (and especially 
mirror system function), and semantic processing.  In some ways what the 
summarised studies show is that the operation of the three systems becomes 
more tightly linked in development. First, around six to eight months, goal 
prediction (Woodward, 1998) can be seen as a precursor to social cognition, 
as it allows infants to make inferences that are tied to the perception of 
agency in other people (although attribution of agency is flexible, e.g. 
Kamewari et al., 2005). Second, infants at this stage also show motor 
processing that differentiates between human and non-human motion 
(Nyström, 2008; Shimada & Hiraki, 2006). Finally, their encoding of action also 
refers to the function or “meaning” of the objects being used (Hunnius & 
Bekkering, 2010), though this may be based on familiarity rather than 
semantic processing (Reid et al., 2009). By eight to ten months, we can see 
how these three systems of means of action processing rely upon one 
another. Goals must be detected for mirror activation to occur (Nyström et al., 
2011; Southgate et al., 2010), indicating that infants’ understanding of action 
necessitates that actions are structured in a specific way and that a social 
entity that can have a goal is involved. Action conclusions that are 
incongruous or violate the typical structure elicit an N400 ERP (Reid et al., 
2009), generally attributable to semantic processing (Kutas & Federmeier, 
2011). However, the attribution of goals becomes more sophisticated. For 
example, the presence of unseen actors can be inferred from experience 
(Hofer, Hauf & Aschersleben, 2005). What this combination of findings 
suggests is that action understanding improves in the second half of the first 
post-natal year as a result of integrating different (social, motor, semantic) 
processes.  
Perhaps goals that were initially detected via social processing lead to a 
hierarchical, sequential, semantic processing of action, which in turn means 
that infants try to detect such goals when mapping their own motor 
representations onto others’ actions. Alternatively, repeated motor resonance 
in response to action in conjunction with a sensitivity to or interest in social 
stimuli (i.e. other people, Reid & Striano, 2007) may facilitate goal detection as 
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the same action end-state is perceived and mapped repeatedly, eventually 
leading to a structured action prediction that is so entrenched that deviations 
are perceived as incongruous and violations of that structure. While much of 
the literature cited here points to overlaps between the systems, to date their 
relationships are not explicit, nor is the developmental structure well-
elaborated in terms of which abilities are ontogenetic and self-sufficient in their 
emergence, and which abilities build upon others. 
The goal of this thesis is to explore this integration of processes in infant 
action processing. The work is situated in the framework outlined in the 
literature review, being informed by the social cognitive perspective on action 
processing and addressing questions specifically targeted at disentangling the 
roles of semantics and motor resonance in action processing. This framework 
is not intended to be exhaustive. To revisit the broader framework of Chainay 
& Humphreys (2002), they conceptualise two primary routes to action 
processing, each of which has multiple sub-routes, steps, junctions and 
correspondences. One route is visual (or more broadly perceptual), and one is 
semantic. The work presented here is placed within the latter pathway and 
explores motor activation and motor processes via the mirror system, which is 
seen as a semantic system (Uithol et al., 2011), rather than via motor 
resonance more generally, which can be elicited by perceptual input without 
reference to a semantic processing system (Brass, Bekkering & Prinz, 2001). 
There is extensive evidence for a perceptual route to action processing in 
infancy. For example, Yang, Sidman and Bushnell (2010) and Perone and 
colleagues (2008) discuss infants’ engagement in and processing of action as 
the perception of affordances. In the former work, this refers to “human” 
affordances and learning what actions can be executed by oneself via 
observation and imitation of others. In the latter work the authors emphasise 
the dorsal visual route, as it shows particular patterns of activation in infancy 
to small, graspable objects that are not seen in response to larger, non-
graspable objects (Kaufman, Mareschal & Johnson, 2003), showing  that at 
the level of visual perception, action-specific information is being encoded. 
While this visual and perceptual route is important, for example, in eliciting an 
initial motor response to an action (Brass, Bekkering & Prinz, 2001), the 
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framework employed in this thesis relies on the semantic path in order to 
determine how infants determine whether an action is meaningful and how 
this relates to their ability to plan multi-step actions that require object 
affordances to be exploited via one of many possible means. 
Neural evidence for semantic action processing (Reid et al., 2009) and mirror 
system activation (Nyström et al., 2011) is found from the latter half of the first 
post-natal year. Seven-month-olds do not exhibit the N400 semantic event-
related potential (ERP) component in response to action sequences (Reid et 
al., 2009). Research using mu desynchronization as the measure of mirror 
system function in infants below nine months of age is sparsely published, and 
does not find significant mu desynchronization effects (Nyström, 2008). The 
paucity of research showing neural correlates of semantic and mirror system 
processing of action in younger infants may be due to inappropriateness of the 
paradigms used or a lack of sensitivity in the selected measures. It is by no 
means definitive evidence of the absence of mirroring processes before nine 
months. Motor measures other than mu desynchronization such as ERPs 
(Nyström, 2008) and blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signals 
(Shimada & Hiraki, 2006) find potential evidence for mirror system function at 
younger ages. Further, research has shown that infant ERPs are changeable 
over the course of a testing session (Stets & Reid, 2011), allowing for 
speculation that fewer trials or reduced processing load may facilitate 
semantic action processing prior to nine months of age. Furthermore, the 
P400 ERP is sensitive to the directional congruence of pointing and grasping 
stimuli as early as six months (Bakker et al., 2014; Gredebäck, Melinder & 
Daum, 2010), suggesting that processing of action “meaning” may be 
emergent before the N400 is seen in the infant waveform. It cannot be 
definitively said that semantic and motor processing of action develop 
simultaneously with one another. What can be said is that these modes of 
action processing develop along a similar timeframe. It is possible that 
developmental changes in one have consequences for the other. 
Leaving developmental chronology aside, there are two compelling reasons to 
believe that these means of action processing are linked. The first is that 
motor experience affects whether actions are processed as being novel or 
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functional. For example, Loucks and Sommerville (2012) grouped 10-month-
old infants into those who could use a pincer grip to retrieve a small object 
from a container, and those who could not. Participants were habituated to an 
actor grasping an upright bowl by the rim with a pincer grip, or grasping an 
inverted bowl by the base with a power grip, and moving the bowl across a 
table. In test trials, they were shown the bowl in the opposite orientation to 
habituation, and shown the actor executing both pincer and power grips on the 
bowl without moving it. The same grip used in habituation would be non-
functional whereas the novel grip would be functional. Pincer grip users 
showed a different pattern of looking to infants who could not perform the 
pincer grip task1. Specifically, while less motorically adept infants simply 
dishabituated to a pincer or power grip that differed from the grip shown at 
habituation, pincer grippers looked equally long at the stimuli with the 
(functional) novel grips and the non-functional (previously habituated) grips. 
This shows that attention to the function of actions arises with motor 
experience. Much motor resonance or mirror system work with infants has 
shown that experience of performing a movement or action (van Elk et al., 
2008) or experience of integrating visual and motor stimulation (de Klerk et al., 
2015) affects activation in response to observed action. This is likely because 
generating a motor response to an observed action may be difficult if there is 
no previously held motor representation of that action. Research with adult 
dancers shows that motor activation during observation of action is modulated 
by the observer’s experience with and confidence in performing the action 
(Cross, Hamilton & Grafton, 2006), indicating that motor representations are 
affected by experience throughout the lifespan. Returning to the work of 
Loucks and Sommerville (2012), we see that having a motor representation of 
specific kinds of grip assists not just with representing that grip, as might be 
expected, but also with representing the function or semantics of the grasp. 
This makes implicit sense, as mirror responses are not just representations of 
specific movements but of meaningful, goal-directed actions (Gallese et al., 
2009; Stapel et al., 2010).  
                                                             
1
 Please note that for the remainder of the thesis, “grip” will be used to refer to the specific 
hand posture and “grasp” for the associated action of using said grip to apprehend an object. 
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What is novel about this inference is that it shows that infants might 
incorporate the means of performing actions, such as the grip employed, into 
their semantic representation of that action. Previous work emphasised the 
end-state or goal of the action only (e.g. Nyström et al., 2011; Reid et al., 
2009; Southgate et al., 2010). In the thesis, this possibility is addressed in a 
number of ways. The presence of an N400 in infants in response to grasping 
actions is related to their own experience of grasping (Chapter 3). Similarly, 
differences in motor activation or mirror system function in response to 
semantically congruent and incongruent actions are measured and related not 
to infants’ basic motor abilities, but to their ability to plan actions (i.e. their 
ability to represent action holistically; Chapter 4). In Chapter 2, older infants’ 
ability to make semantic associations between novel tools and functions in the 
absence of information that facilitates motor mapping is studied. Thus one of 
the aims of the present work is to look at how semantic processing of action is 
affected by motor representations of action. 
The other aim of the thesis is to look at how motor processing of action (mirror 
system function) is affected by semantic processes. The second existing 
compelling justification for looking at integration of motor and semantic 
processing of action is relevant here. Mirror system function has always been 
seen as a multi-stage neural process (e.g. Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Kilner, 
Friston & Frith, 2007), with involvement from parietal and superior temporal 
sulcus regions in addition to premotor activation. Taking into account the 
general functions of these regions, there is justification for believing that mirror 
activation in response to observed action has a semantic element. The 
parietal cortex occupies the main portion of what is called “association cortex” 
(Goldman-Rakic, 1988), facilitating the integration of multiple sensory-
perceptual inputs. Along with the superior temporal sulcus, it is linked to the 
establishment of semantics or meaning (Vandenberghe et al., 1996). The 
superior temporal sulcus is also associated with shared attention (Materna, 
Dicke & Thier, 2008), processing of social stimuli (Redcay, 2008), and 
processing of intentionality in action (Pelphrey, Morris & McCarthy, 2004). The 
mirror system is therefore not just a motor system but incorporates social, 
semantic and perceptual processes as well. 
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Thus in the motor activation measured in studies of sensorimotor alpha or mu 
desynchronization there may be modulation of activity that originates from 
these other regions. While the presence of a conspecific performing the action 
is not necessary to elicit mu desynchronization in infants (Southgate and 
Begus, 2013), the rhythm is sensitive only to goal-directed action (Nyström et 
al., 2011). In order to infer the goal of an action, infants must perceive the 
actor as animate (Kaduk, Elsner & Reid, 2013; Kamewari et al., 2005; Luo & 
Baillargeon, 2005) or must perceive the “actor” as a tool controlled by a 
conspecific (Hofer, Hauf & Aschersleben, 2005). Mu desynchronization is 
therefore likely modulated by social aspects of the stimuli. Mu 
desynchronization is also likely to be modulated by semantic aspects of action 
stimuli. The work of Stapel and colleagues (2010) offers an example of this. 
There is little reason that the stimuli of a cup being brought to the ear or mouth 
shown in that study would elicit differential motor activation unless a 
previously held semantic representation of “drinking from a cup” was being 
recruited. More convincingly, the motorically identical stimuli of Southgate and 
colleagues (2010) modulated mu desynchronization differently depending on 
whether the action was meaningful (goal-directed) or not. Thus previous infant 
research suggests but does not explicitly show that semantic and motor 
processing of action are linked. 
Adult research shows a strong link between semantic and motor components 
of tool-directed action. This is seen in the work of Creem and Proffitt (2001) in 
which an unrelated semantic task, but not a visuospatial task, interferes with 
execution of appropriate grasps on differently oriented handled tools. The 
intention of this thesis is to explore this link in infants. The question of how 
motor activation in response to observed actions is modulated by semantic 
components of the action is addressed specifically in Chapter 4. The 
underlying question of how the semantic system of action processing feeds 
into the mirror system is addressed in the other chapters as well. In Chapter 3, 
the semantic processing of grasp or motor components of action, as opposed 
to goal components, is studied. Thus it can be seen whether or not infants 
actually process different means of grasping objects as meaningful. In 
Chapter 2, the ability to represent the functions of a complex tool in the 
32 
 
absence of motor information that might assist in distinguishing those 
functions is measured. This does not preclude mirror system function but 
illustrates how its semantic elements are active in late infancy.  
The theoretical question of how semantic and motor processing of action is 
integrated in infancy is underwritten in this thesis by the concrete question of 
how infants perceive the relationships between hands and objects. The end 
state or inferred goal of an action gives meaning to that action (Proverbio & 
Riva, 2009). In adults, a larger N400 is elicited during preparation of actions 
that will have an incongruous end state (van Elk, van Schie & Bekkering, 
2010), indicating that semantic processing of goals is not involved only in how 
we make sense of others’ actions, but also in how self-executed actions are 
structured. However, the means by which we perform actions alters their 
meaning even if the implicated object (e.g. a claw hammer) has a strongly 
associated action (hammering). Depending on where on the handle the tool is 
grasped and in which orientation, it could be used for forceful hammering, 
precise hammering, or the removal of nails. In some cases, a means of 
holding an object that might preclude its use may have significance. A 
hammer might be held over the functional end so another person can take it 
by the handle. Research with adults has shown that elements of action 
performance are processed semantically, with a larger N400 elicited during 
observation of actions in which a tool is held in an incorrect orientation relative 
to the target (Bach et al., 2009). Motor responses differ between tools that are 
held in a standard manner and those held in a manner that prevents use of 
the tool, that is, held incongruently (van Elk et al., 2010). Thus is it reasonable 
to assume that the means of holding a tool alters the meaning of an action in 
many contexts. The empirical work in the present thesis explores how infants 
perceive hand-object relationships independent of (Chapter 3) or in relation to 
an ensuing action (Chapters 2, 4). This aim is an appropriate basis from which 
to investigate semantic-motor integration, given that changes in the 
relationship of a hand and object can render an action semantically congruous 
or incongruous without necessarily altering the motor aspects of the action 
(Chapters 2 and 4), or the intended goal of an action can remain unchanged 
despite motor differences in the hand-object interaction (Chapter 3). 
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In summary, the objective of the present thesis is twofold. In studying how 
infants perceive relationships between hands and objects in the context of 
motor activation, motor experience and semantic processing, it becomes 
possible to investigate the integration of multiple means of action processing. 
From a broader perspective, this investigation can tell us about the 
ontogenesis or origins in associative learning of the mirror system, a topic of 
recent interest and importance (Cook et al., 2014). Does motor processing of 
action depend on the ability to process action semantically, or vice versa, or 
are they two means of characterising the same underlying process? This kind 
of information can be important for harnessing the best means by which to 
scaffold infant learning about the world around them, whether through direct 
motor interaction or through demonstration. It is via action that infants impose 
their intentions and other aspects of inner life on the world. By investigating 
the development of tool use from its earliest stages, that translation from 
preverbal intention to overt action can be better understood and potentially 
facilitated via application of results to development of learning and 
communicative technologies in early education.  
The thesis commences in the next chapter with a study that examines how 16-
month-old infants form associations between complex, dual-function tools and 
their intended use when simulation of the associated action does not 
differentiate, on a motor level, the two functions. The results of this study 
illustrate that although semantic associations can be formed between the 
parts of a novel tool and its functions, the means in which a tool is held has 












Dissociating semantic and motor aspects of action understanding: 
Processing of dual-ended tools by 16-month-olds infants 
Text as it appears in Ní Choisdealbha, Á., Westermann, G., Dunn, K., & Reid, 
V. (Early View). Dissociating associative and motor aspects of action 
understanding: Processing of dual-ended tools by 16-month-olds infants. 
British Journal of Developmental Psychology. 
Abstract 
When learning about the functions of novel tools, it is possible that infants may 
use associative and motoric processes. This study investigated the ability of 
16-month-olds to associate the orientation in which an actor held a dual-
function tool with the actor’s prior demonstrated interest in one of two target 
objects, and their use of the tool on that target. The actors’ hand posture did 
not differ between conditions. The infants were shown stimuli in which two 
actors acted upon novel objects with a novel tool, each actor employing a 
different function of the tool. Using an eye-tracker, infants’ looking time at 
images depicting the actors holding the tool in an orientation congruent or 
incongruent with the actor’s goal was measured. Infants preferred to look at 
the specific part of the tool that was incongruent with the actor’s goal. Results 
show that the association formed involves the specific part of the tool, the 
actor, and the object the actor acted upon, but not the orientation of the tool. 
The capacity to form such associations is demonstrated in this study in the 
absence of motor information that would allow 16-month-olds to generate a 







Many cues convey the outcome of a human action involving a tool. There may 
be prior knowledge about the actor’s goals, knowledge about the implicated 
tool, or experience with the action. From six months, infants show a capability 
for using much of this information to predict others’ actions. They form 
expectations about the target object of a reaching action from an actor’s prior 
behaviour (Woodward, 1998). They anticipate action outcomes based on the 
object used (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010). There are multiple perspectives on 
the processes recruited by the infant to facilitate this prediction (Ní 
Choisdealbha & Reid, 2014), and consequently on what kinds of action cue 
are essential for action prediction. One of the dominant ideas is that of the 
mirror system (Southgate, Johnson, El Karoui, & Csibra, 2010). Processing of 
action is also characterised independently of motor processes as associations 
between actions and outcomes. For example, 10-month-olds associate an 
observed action on an object with a particular outcome like a sound, and 
exhibit surprise when a new action elicits the same outcome (Perone, Madole 
& Oakes, 2011). These associations exist despite infants’ inability to perform 
the implicated actions (Daum, Prinz & Aschersleben, 2009; Elsner & Pauen, 
2007).  
Semantic processing of action refers to the processing of actions as a series 
of steps or a grouping of action, object and outcome that has a particular 
meaning. For example, the presence of a cup elicits an expectation of 
drinking. If the cup is placed in a sink, a different expectation follows. This kind 
of action processing is well-established in the neuropsychological literature 
(Chainay & Humphreys, 2002). Although behaviourally difficult to disentangle 
from associative processing (and perhaps emergent from it), event-related 
potential research with infants (Reid et al., 2009) and toddlers (Pace, Carver & 
Friend, 2013) suggests that semantic action processing develops early in life. 
This study addresses whether motor and associative/semantic processes 
consistently co-occur in infant action processing (e.g. Daum, Prinz & 
Aschersleben, 2011) or if they are separable. 
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During action observation in infancy, motor representations of actions are 
recruited and activation differs between motorically similar actions with 
different outcomes (Nyström, Ljunghammar, Rosander & von Hofsten, 2011). 
Such activity is present for goal-directed actions even if the outcome is 
occluded from view (Southgate et al., 2010) and is greater in response to 
actions with unusual outcomes (Stapel, Hunnius, van Elk, & Bekkering, 2010). 
The fact that goal-directed structures of ongoing actions influence motor 
activation during observation suggests that there is a semantic element to 
mirror system function (Uithol, van Rooij, Bekkering & Haselager, 2011). For 
example, if the motor activation found in Stapel at al.’s research (2010) was 
not affected by an established representation of the familiar action’s goal, it 
would be elicited near identically by the motorically similar familiar and 
unfamiliar actions performed by the actors. 
One question arising from semantic-motoric processing of action is whether 
semantic processing of action relies on or can be dissociated from co-
occurring motor activation. Links between action production and perception in 
infancy exist for reach-to-grasp actions (e.g. Daum et al., 2011). Dissociating 
semantic from motor activation is challenging given the strength of the link 
between production and perception across multiple age groups (Ambrosini et 
al., 2013). It may be possible in the context of tool use because tool use often 
requires manual skills that are beyond the abilities of infants, but produce 
outcomes that are salient and readily processed.  
The findings described above apply to the perception of actions in which an 
object is directly apprehended by the actor, but do not generalize to tool-
mediated actions. Such actions include those in which an external or 
goal/target object is acted on with a tool (e.g. hitting a nail with a hammer), as 
opposed to actions in which only one object is required to achieve the goal 
(e.g. reaching for and grasping a cup). There is evidence for learning of the 
function of novel tools from the beginning of the second year. Eleven- and 12-
month-olds categorize novel tools on overall similarity without a demonstration 
of their function, and on functional part similarity following demonstration 
(Träuble & Pauen, 2007). Furthermore, functional categorization of these 
novel tools requires that their effects be causal rather than associative – that 
37 
 
is, different objects that pull an elastic band are only categorized together if 
their demonstration showed a physical hooking of the band (Träuble and 
Pauen, 2011), not a “ghost” action in which hook and elastic band moved 
simultaneously. Thirteen-month-olds learn the function of tools if the causal 
part of the tool-mediated action is hidden but plausible (Hernik and Csibra, 
2015).  
These studies offer basis for a definition of infant understanding of tool 
function. It is an association made by the infant between a particular tool and 
one or more aspects of its relationship with a target object – whether the 
outcome produced on the target object by the tool (Hernik and Csibra, 2015) 
or the physical nature of the tool’s interaction with the object (Träuble and 
Pauen, 2011). These associations may be formed at a lower level, or 
semantically. Statistical factors and the contiguity and contingency of actions 
and effects (Elsner & Hommel, 2004) can partially explain asymmetries in how 
infants form action associations (Perone et al., 2011), or attribute actions to 
non-conspecifics (Kamewari, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro & Hiraki, 2005). However, 
neurophysiological evidence shows that actions are processed semantically 
from late infancy (Reid et al., 2009); meaning that components of actions elicit 
expectancies in infants as to how the action will continue. While associations 
between tool and outcome may be formed at a lower level, it is simultaneously 
possible that semantic processing of the action linking them is occurring.  
There is evidence for a disconnection between the ability to perform tool-
mediated actions and associating effects with tools at 6 months (Daum et al., 
2009). This disconnection persists for many months; 12- and 15-month-olds 
shown the functional relationship between tools and associated objects will 
bring such items together despite not using the tool competently (Elsner & 
Pauen, 2007). It is not suggested that mirror system activation is absent in 
tool-mediated actions. Infants may map motor representations of direct 
actions, such as grasping, onto tools (Southgate & Begus, 2013). It is possible 
that infants also learn the effects of novel tools from a semantic perspective, 
matching a tool to the effect produced. Previous novel tool work (e.g., Elsner 
& Pauen, 2007; Träuble & Pauen, 2007; 2011) employed two different kinds of 
tool for two different objects. When presented with one such object and both 
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tools following a demonstration, 15-month-olds performed significantly more 
manipulations with the effective tool for a particular object than with the 
ineffective tool. Understanding an action-effect link might only require a motor 
representation of pushing or pulling on the target object, but does not account 
for the infants’ tool choice, which must have resulted from associations 
between tool shape, target, and outcome. The results of Hernik and Csibra 
(2015) add further credence to the possibility of associative encoding or 
semantic processing of tool use, as that study featured two different tools 
acted upon identically, yet infants associated a specific outcome with each 
tool. 
One- to 2-year-olds are capable of associating tools with specific effects on 
goal objects after a small number of demonstrations. Once learned, these 
associations are rigid. These infants grasp novel tools flexibly but familiar tools 
are held in the established manner even if it hinders the action they are trying 
to perform (Barrett, Davis & Needham, 2007). Thus, it may be difficult to 
attribute more than one effect to a single tool. Twenty- but not 14-month-olds 
exhibit anticipatory looking towards a target object on the basis of how a dual-
function tool is held (Paulus, Hunnius & Bekkering, 2011).  It is possible that a 
motor representation of the grasps on the tool allows the effects of the tool to 
be distinguished from one another. The 14-month-olds may not have shown 
this ability as they might not have been able to reproduce both grasps. In 
Loucks and Sommerville’s (2012) work, 12-month-olds who could not yet 
perform pincer grasps failed to perceive a difference in contexts in which a 
functional grasp is a power versus a precision grasp.  That is, the infants who 
had greater motor experience, whether due to a motor milestone (Loucks & 
Sommerville, 2012) or age (Paulus et al., 2011) could discriminate similar 
actions based on manual information.  
Another source of information used by infants during action processing is prior 
behaviour. Infants anticipate that actors will repeat actions on specific target 
objects (Woodward, 1998), even if that action is a fixation and not a grasp 
(Johnson, Ok & Luo, 2007). Object-directed gaze creates an association 
between actor and object. Fourteen-month-olds shown an actor fixing her 
gaze on one of two objects will look longer to the fixated object during an 
39 
 
action by the actor, but look longer at the other object in the actor’s absence 
(Paulus, 2011). This indicates an association made between actor and object 
via her gaze. This association does not generalize to a new actor (Buresh & 
Woodward, 2007). 
By the middle of the second year, infants integrate information from multiple 
sources to associate tools with specific outcomes. Although motor processes 
play a significant role in infants’ processing of action (Daum et al., 2011; 
Nyström et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2010), it is possible for them to 
associate tools with target objects and their effects on these in the absence of 
motor expertise (Elsner & Pauen, 2007). This associative knowledge about 
the tool gained from observing others’ actions supersedes prior experience in 
performing the action oneself. However, a factor in understanding of tools at 
this age is failure to adjust the use of a tool to new actions (Barrett et al., 
2007), possibly the result of failing to form associations between the tool and 
its new effects. Novel dual-function tools are therefore challenging. Twenty-
month-olds are able to incorporate grasp information and use that information 
in predicting how an actor will use a tool. Fourteen month-olds cannot (Paulus 
et al., 2011). Although motor processes are not necessary for infants to 
understand the effects of tools (e.g. Träuble & Pauen, 2007), this research 
suggests that motor information can be used when possible to distinguish 
between tools’ uses. In the absence of these kinds of grasp or motor cues, it is 
the semantic (Hernik & Csibra, 2015) and associative (Träuble & Pauen, 
2007) processes that allow for differentiation between the functions of a novel 
tool.  
The aim of this study was to establish whether infants distinguish the uses of a 
dual-function tool without distinguishing grasp information, placing the 
emphasis on associative, social and semantic processes, and minimizing 
mirror processes. A dual-function tool held identically for each function was 
created. Given that infants attribute different goals to different actors (Buresh 
& Woodward, 2007), two actors demonstrated each of the tool’s uses. The 
association between a functional part of the tool and its matched object was 
contextualized to the presence of one of the actors. The infants’ looking 
behaviour toward the tools would depend on their knowledge of the actors’ 
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individual goals, seen in prior research (Buresh & Woodward, 2007; Johnson 
et al., 2007). The challenge would come from understanding how the actor’s 
means of holding the tool related to the object associated with the actor or her 
intention. 
It was hypothesized that after familiarizing 16-month-old infants with each 
action they would prefer to look at an image of an actor holding the tool in an 
orientation congruent or incongruent with her goal. Such a result would show 
that in the absence of grasp information distinguishing the uses of a dual-
function tool, an association can be made between the part of a tool oriented 
upward and the object it will be used on, in the context of the actor holding the 
tool. It would build on prior research showing that infants from one year of age 
make these associations with single-function tools. Infants would need to form 
multiple associations, not just between the specific tool part and the target 
object on which it is used, but also between tool orientation and actor. Positive 
results would also indicate that the differentiation of tool function by infants 
can proceed without inducing differential mirror system activation and that 
associations between tools and goal objects can be formed without 




Forty-six infants were recruited from the research centre’s participant pool. 
The eye-tracker failed to calibrate 12 infants. A further 9 infants were excluded 
because of insufficient eye-tracking data (n = 3) or insufficient trials (n = 6). 
The final sample contained 25 infants (17 male, nine female) aged between 
15 months, 16 days and 16 months, 14 days (mean 15 months, 28 days; SD 7 






Participants viewed pictures and videos of two female adult actors using a 
dual-function tool to act on two different ‘goal objects’. Both of the goal objects 
were painted grey wood. One consisted of a large and small post extended 
vertically from a flat base. A yellow loop hung from the larger post (Figure 
2.1a). The other consisted of a large vertical post with two smaller posts 
extended horizontally from it. A red loop hung from the lower post (Figure 
2.1b). 
 
Figure 2.1: Goal objects (a, b) and dual-function tool (c) used in video and 
photographic stimuli. 
The tool (Figure 2.1c) had an orange handle roughly 18 cm in length. On one 
end was a blue C-shaped effector; on the other a green V-shaped effector. 
The blue tool-end always pulled the yellow band. The green tool-end always 
lifted the red band from the lower to the upper horizontal post. Stimuli were 




Figure 2.2: Frames from the stimulus videos. 
The actors were shown in videos expressing preferences for one of the 
objects (‘liking’) and acting on it with the tool (‘demo’). All videos (Figure 2.2) 
depicted the actor standing behind a table, the tool at midline, an object on 
either side. Videos were created for each actor in all visual permutations (blue 
tool-end towards/away from actor, goal objects on left/right). Videos were 
silent except for a 1-s chirping/squeaking sound at the beginning to facilitate 
attention. Actors maintained neutral facial expressions throughout to avoid 
interfering effects of affect (e.g. Flom & Johnson, 2011). The ‘demo’ videos 
were 16-18 s in length. They began with the actor looking at the tool in front of 
her. She picked up and held the tool upright at her chest (appropriate tool-end 
for her action oriented upwards), making eye-contact with the camera. An 
identical whole-hand grip was used in all stimuli. She turned to the object 
matching the function of the upright tool-end, leaned toward it and performed 
the associated action. She withdrew the tool to her chest, made eye-contact 
with the camera again and replaced the tool on the table (Figure 2.2a, b). 
‘Liking’ videos were 13-15 s in length. These began with the actor looking at 
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the tool in front of her. She turned to one of the objects, leaned over it and 
looked intently at it from above for 2 s, then from the side for 2 s. She 
withdrew to an upright standing position, continuing to fixate on the object 
(Figure 2.2c, d). This pattern was based on Johnson et al. (2007).  
Critical stimuli were images of the actors holding the tool, presented for 15 s 
(Figure 2.3). These were also accompanied by a 1-s sound. Two images of 
the same actor appeared side-by-side on a grey background. In one image, 
the blue tool-end pointed upwards; in the other, the green tool-end did. In the 
image in which the actor held the tool-end that matched her goal object 
upright, the orientation was congruent with her intended action. In the other, it 
was incongruent. Critical stimuli were created with the congruent and 
incongruent images appearing equally on each side of the screen. Each 
image subtended a visual angle of approximately 13° horizontally and 15.5° 
degrees vertically on a 22-inch screen (resolution 1350 x 1080 pixels). 
 
Figure 2.3: Example of a critical stimulus image shown to participants, 




Each tool could be used to perform each action, moreso with the C-shaped 
than Y-shaped effector. However, each actor used her effector on only one of 
the goal-objects in the above-described manner. The congruence of her way 
of holding the tool was therefore related to her established goal, and not to the 
affordances of the goal objects. The paradigm was designed thus because 
there is evidence to show that when many action possibilities are available, 
infants assume that an actor will continue to behave in a previously 
demonstrated manner (e.g. Johnson et al.; Woodward, 1998). 
2.2.3 Procedure 
Infants were seated on the lap of their caregiver approximately 60 cm from the 
screen. Eye gaze was recorded using a Tobii X120 eye-tracker. Stimuli were 
presented using Tobii Studio (Tobii AB, Stockholm, Sweden). Calibration was 
performed using a 5-point procedure. 
Following calibration, an attention grabber was played on the screen. Next, a 
series of videos was shown. The first was a ‘liking’ video of one actor followed 
by a ‘demo’ video of the same actor. Next were the ‘liking’ and ‘demo’ videos 
of the other actor. In each ‘liking’/‘demo’ pair, the position of the objects on the 
table and the orientation of the resting tool were the same. 
Following this sequence, up to 12 trials were shown. In each, a ‘liking’ video 
was shown followed by the paired image stimulus. Alternate actors were 
shown in each trial. After the third and sixth trials, the ‘demo’ video that 
matched the preceding trial was shown. The non-critical features of each 
video (e.g. whether the blue end of the tool faced the actor or the infant) were 
counterbalanced for each presentation of these videos. The actor’s preferred 
object and consequently their means of using the tool was consistent 
throughout each experiment, but counterbalanced across participants. 
2.2.4 Analysis 
Identical areas of interest (AOIs) were defined on each of the critical images. 
These were the entire image, the actor’s face, the tool, the upper tool-end, 
and the lower tool-end. As the face and tool AOIs are subsets of the entire 
image AOI, and the upper and lower tool-ends are subsets of the tool AOI, two 
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analyses were conducted to avoid comparing the same looks to one another 
under different categories. Data were extracted from Tobii Studio using an I-
VT filter. For each pair of images shown, a trial was defined as the period 
following the end of the first look at either of the tool AOIs to the end of the 
trial. This definition was utilized because the images were decontextualized 
until the infant saw one of the tools. Prior to seeing one of the tools in either of 
the images, the infants saw the parts of the scene that were the same in both 
images – the actor’s face and the background. By looking at the tool in either 
picture, the infant saw the specific orientation of the tool and could 
subsequently encode the meaning of the scene in relation to the tool being 
held and its orientation. The timing of infants’ first look at the tool did not follow 
a uniform pattern and some trials (21%) were void as the infant did not look at 
the tool. All analyses used proportional total looking time. 
2.3 Results 
Trials were defined as ‘congruent first’ or ‘incongruent first’, depending on 
whether the infant’s first tool look was at the congruent or the incongruent tool. 
Looking times to each of the congruent and incongruent images were similar, 
regardless of trial type (Figure 2.4). 
A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on looking time data with factors of trial 
type, image congruence and area of interest category. There were no main 
effects of trial type (F(1,24) = 3.214, p = 0.086, η2p = 0.118) or of image 
congruence (F(1,24) = 0.005, p = 0.942, η2p = 0). There was a main effect of 
AOI category; infants looked significantly longer at faces than at tools (F(1,24) 
= 6.626, p < 0.025, η2p = 0.216) (Figure 2.5). Infants spent an average of 
26.38% (SE = 2.76%) of total looking time looking at each face AOI, versus 
17.66% of total looking time (SE = 3.39%) looking at each tool AOI (Table 




Figure 2.4: Looking times to the overall congruent and incongruent images, 
Experiment 1.  
Overall, looking times to the incongruent tool-end were longer than those to 
the congruent tool-end (Congruent: M = 45.13%, SE = 6.6%; Incongruent: M = 
54.87%, SE = 1.32%).  A Bonferroni-corrected t-test (uncorrected p values, 
instead α was set to 0.0125 to account for four potential comparisons)  was 
performed on looking times to each of the tool-ends within each image, and on 
looking times to each of the upper ends of the tools (Figure 2.6). In the case of 
the incongruent image, infants looked significantly longer at the incongruent 
tool-end (p < 0.008). No difference was present in looking times to the 
congruent image’s tool-ends (p = 0.135). Infants did not spend a significantly 
longer proportion of time looking at the upper end of the incongruently-




Figure 2.5: Looking times to specific AOIs indicate an overall preference for 
looking at faces over tools, Experiment 1.  
Table 2.1: Average percentage of looking time to each of the tool and face 
areas of interest in each trial type in Experiment 1. 












29.05 3.04 23.36 3.79 
Incongruent 
image, face 
27.76 3.87 25.33 2.85 
Congruent 
image, tool 
17.22 3.26 18.09 2.55 
Incongruent 
image, tool 




An additional analysis was conducted to examine whether infants exhibited 
differences in looking times to the tool-ends within each tool AOI. In each 
image, the proportion of looking time spent looking at the tool-end congruent 
with the actor’s goal versus the tool-end incongruent with the goal was 
compared. A 2 x 2 ANOVA with factors of tool orientation congruence and 
tool-end congruence was performed.  Results revealed a main effect of tool-
end congruence (F(1,24) = 54.834, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.168) and an interaction 
between orientation congruence and tool-end congruence (F(1,24) = 5.109, p 
< 0.05, η2p = 0.225). 
 
Figure 2.6: Looking times to each tool-end in each image, Experiment 1. 
2.4 Discussion 
The results of the first experiment suggest that 16-month-olds do not 
associate the orientation in which an actor is holding a dual-function tool with 
that particular actor (given the manner in which they previously held and used 
the tool in that manner) in the absence of motor information distinguishing the 
grasps used. However, looking patterns show that specific hooks were 
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associated with the actor (and possibly, by inference, their intended use of the 
tool). Infants did not spend a significantly longer proportion of time looking at 
either of the upper-ends of the tool than the other, so the effect is seen solely 
in how they divided their looks between the two parts of the tool. The upper 
tool ends were potentially looked at more because they were close to the 
faces, which drew the infants’ gaze. To explore the lower end of the tools 
would necessitate scanning past the upper end on the way down from the 
face. For the congruently-held tool, looking times to the upper end were 
diluted by looks at the incongruent hook, whereas for the incongruently-
oriented tool, infants spent significantly longer looking at the upper, 
incongruent hook.  
It is possible that the association between each actor and the specific hook 
she used (and resultant interest in the other hook when shown in the context 
of that specific actor) was semantic. Critical stimuli were removed from the 
demonstration context in which an association would have been formed. 
Looking behaviour driven by perceptual association would have entailed an 
overall preference for the image in which the tool orientation differed from the 
orientation during demonstration. Instead, looking preferences were driven by 
tool-parts rather than overall tool orientation, providing a semantic processing 
argument. Each end of the tool was visible when an actor demonstrated its 
function, so the association formed was contingent on the employment of the 
tool end on the target object, not its presence in relation to the actor. In the 
critical stimuli, the target object was absent but the association between the 
tool-part and the actor remained. This suggests that the association was 
based on encoding of the relationship between the tool part and the actor, in 
relation to the prior action on the target object. This kind of encoding may be 
semantic in nature because it refers to the “meaning” of the tool-part (it is used 
on the target object preferred by this actor). 
In addition to this semantic explanation, there is also the possibility that the 
obtained results were the result of perceptual associations generated when 
the actor picked up the tool and held it at her chest while making direct eye-
contact with the viewer during the demonstration videos. It is possible that the 
looking times to the incongruent tool end were based on similarities between 
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the actor’s pose in the demonstration video and in the critical stimuli. The 
infants may have looked longer at the incongruent end of the tool in the image 
in which the actor held the tool upside down because they expected the 
congruent hook to be in its place. A second experiment was conducted to rule 
out this possibility. It was identical to the first experiment, but the 
demonstration videos were shortened to show the use of the tool only. The 
infant therefore did not see the actor holding the tool in the manner of the 
critical stimulus images in any of the demonstration videos. A replication of the 
first experiment’s results would suggest that the infants made an association 
between the hooks and their uses by each specific actor, and not between the 




Nineteen infants were recruited from the research centre’s participant pool. 
Six infants were excluded from the final sample – experimenter error (n = 1), 
insufficient trials (n = 4), and insufficient tracking (n = 1). The final sample 
comprised 13 infants (nine male, four female) aged between 15 months and 
16 months, 16 days (mean 15 months, 26 days; SD 14.5 days). Families 
received travel compensation and a baby book following their visit. 
2.5.2 Stimuli 
Stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 1 except that the actors 
were not shown picking up or replacing the tools in the demonstration videos. 
Each edited video was 4-5 s in length and began with the first second before 
the tool touched the object. The tool was oriented toward the goal object and 
in close proximity to it at the start of each video. The videos ended 
immediately after the intended action was complete. These shortened 
demonstration videos replaced the original demonstration videos at all times – 
in the initial learning phase and after the 3rd and 6th critical stimuli. 
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2.5.3 Procedure and analysis 
The procedure and analysis were identical to those employed in Experiment 1. 
The unused trials, in which the infant did not look at either of the tools, 
amounted to 12.5% of all trials.  
2.6 Results 
Infants spent equally long looking at the congruent and incongruent images (2 
x 2 ANOVA congruence by trial type, no significant main or interaction 
effects). The same 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA as in Experiment 1 was conducted on 
looking time data with factors of trial type, image congruence and area of 
interest category. There were no main effects of trial type (F(1,12) = 0.662, p = 
0.432, η2p = 0.052), image congruence (F(1,12) = 1.142, p = 0.306, η
2
p = 
0.087), or AOI category (F(1,12) = 1.874, p = 0.196, η2p = 0.135). There were 
no interaction effects. Looking times to each of the AOIs are shown in Table 
2.2. 
Analysing looking times to the upper and lower ends of the tool, the primary 
result of Experiment 1 was reproduced (Figure 2.7). There was no main effect 
of hook congruence in this experiment (F(1,12) = 0.017, p = 0.9, η2p = 0.001) – 
infants did not spend more time looking at the incongruent hook overall. There 
was an interaction between orientation congruence and hook congruence 
(F(1,12) = 9.243, p < 0.025, η2p = 0.435). Bonferroni-corrected t-tests with the 
α level dropped to 0.0125 to account for four potential comparisons showed 
that infants’ looking times to the two ends of the hook did not differ in the case 
of the tool held congruently, p = 0.086, but did differ in the case of the tool 
held incongruently, p < 0.008. As in Experiment 1, proportion of looking time to 




Figure 2.7: Looking times to each tool-end in each image, Experiment 2. 
 
Table 2.2: Average percentage of looking time to each of the tool and face 
areas of interest in each trial type in Experiment 2. 
AOI / Trial 
type 
Congruent 









26.3 3.55 30.23 3.65 
Incongruent 
image, face 
27.32 3.45 22.3 4.41 
Congruent 
image, tool 
24.57 5.28 17.5 3.01 
Incongruent 
image, tool 




2.7 General Discussion 
Although infants did not exhibit overall longer looking times to either critical 
image, looking behaviour did demonstrate learning about the relationship 
between each tool-end and the actor who used that tool-end. Overall interest 
in the upright end of the tool indicates interest in how the tool is being held for 
use, the upright tool-end always being used to perform the action. However, 
this enhanced interest in the upright tool-end was only present when the tool 
was held incongruently. This suggests a conflict between interest in the 
upright tool-end and interest in the tool-end unassociated with the actor 
(because it was not used by her). Infants were interested not (as 
hypothesized) in a dual-function tool which is oriented and held incongruently 
for the associated action, but in the feature of that tool that is incongruent with 
the actor’s goal, regardless of how it is oriented. The increased looking time to 
the incongruent tool-end suggests that during action demonstration, the 
infants formed an association between the congruent tool-end and the actor’s 
goal object. Consequently they were more interested in the incongruent tool-
end, which they had not encoded in relation to the actor (via her use of said 
tool-end).  
Results of Experiment 2 affirm the Experiment 1 interaction effect. Infants 
again looked longer at the incongruent than the congruent hook when the tool 
was held incongruently relative to the actor’s goal (or simply her prior 
behaviour), but did not exhibit any difference in looking times to either end of 
the congruently-held tool. Preference for looking at the upright end of the tool 
emerged again despite there being no preference for looking at the faces. It is 
probable that the infants detected that the upright end of the tool was 
important (as the end likely to be used). Again the general preference for 
looking at the upper end was diluted in the case of the congruently-held tool 
by an interest in seeing the hook that did not match the actor’s behaviour.  
Unlike in Experiment 2, in Experiment 1 actors made direct eye contact with 
the camera during the demonstration videos. This may be why the infants 
attended to the faces in the critical stimuli. Infants show enhanced neural 
processing of direct gaze and use it to aid processing new stimuli (Baldwin, 
54 
 
1993; Farroni, Csibra, Simon, & Johnson, 2002; Reid & Striano, 2005). It is 
possible that they may have sought disambiguation about the tools from the 
actors’ faces and gaze in Experiment 1 but not in Experiment 2. It is also 
possible that the result was also driven by similarity between the actors’ pose 
during that part of the demonstration and in the critical images, because if they 
were using gaze as a social learning cue differences between conditions 
might have emerged. Consequently, no conclusions can be drawn about the 
nature of the face preference in Experiment 1 except that it was likely driven 
by the joint gaze during the demonstration videos.  
It is possible that the infants’ interest in the hook unassociated with the actor’s 
behaviour was driven by the fact that they saw the other hook in the “upright” 
grip slightly more often (i.e. in the demonstration videos), or because it was 
held closer to the target object. These aspects of the action are necessary to it 
– common tools (phones, hairbrushes, spoons) are held in a radial grip and 
actions in which an effect is achieved despite distance between tool end and 
target are not understood as causal by infants (Träuble & Pauen, 2011). They 
do not rule out the possibility of higher level encoding. The infant saw one end 
of the tool placed next to one goal object as frequently as they saw the other 
end placed next to the other goal object. The associations made were 
contingent on the relationship between the target, tool and actor but persisted 
in the absence of the target. Looking behaviour did not suggest an overall 
association between the actor and how they held the tool, but suggested that 
it is the target object that grants meaning to the relationship between tool-end 
and actor – this actor prefers the object on which this tool-end is used. 
A key difference between this and previous work (Paulus et al., 2011) was the 
absence of a ‘canonical’ grasp or means of grasping the tool that differed 
between functions. In previous work, 14-month-olds failed to predict the use of 
the object based on such a cue; 20-month-olds succeeded. The 16-month-old 
group studied here showed an ability to separately associate the ends of a 
dual-function tool with different actors and goals, even though mirroring the 
grasps in the critical images would not provide differential information about 
the intended action. Despite the lack of motor information, the infants 
55 
 
differentiated the functions of the tool, albeit not on the basis of how it was 
held. 
It is consequently unclear whether the ability to match tool-ends to the actors 
who utilise them (and potentially to the actors’ goal-driven behaviour) emerges 
before or after the ability to predict tool use from grasp. Action experience can 
be useful for learning associations between objects and goals (Perone, 
Madole, Ross-Sheehy, Carey, & Oakes, 2008) just as it benefits mirroring 
during action observation (van Elk, van Schie, Hunnius, Vesper, & Bekkering, 
2008). Ability to perform tool-mediated actions at 14 and at 16 months of age 
is similar (age from 12 to 18 months does not predict alteration of learned 
grasp; Barrett et al., 2007). Thus, it is plausible that 16-month-olds may, like 
14-month-olds, fail to predict action based on tool grasps.  
Results of the present study taken in conjunction with research on the mirror 
system in infancy suggest that although 16-month-old infants can represent 
motorically pulling or lifting outcomes of action (Southgate & Begus, 2013), 
they may be unable to mirror the means of holding the tool that performs that 
action. This is reflected in Elsner and Pauen (2007) –15-month-olds encoded 
the relationship between a tool and a target object but could not perform the 
target action accurately. In previous research on infants’ spoons use 
(McCarty, Clifton & Collard, 2001), 14-month-olds often needed to adjust their 
grasp to use the spoon effectively. This illustrates a semantic match between 
the spoon and eating, but no semantic-motor representation of how to grasp 
the tool for that action.  
In this study the functional part of the tool is held in a radial palmar grip in 
which the functional part protrudes from the grasp by the thumb and 
forefinger. Although the grasp itself is performed by infants from 6 months 
(Bakker, Daum, Handl & Gredebäck, 2014), any useful mirroring response to 
the critical images would need to incorporate the hand position relative to the 
functional tool-end. Although combined semantic-motoric representations are 
likely present by 16 months in relation to self-spoon-feeding (McCarty, Clifton 
and Collard, 2001), a similar representation could not be generated in 
response to this novel, dual-function tool. This could be because multiple 
representations need to be generated – the means via which the tool is used, 
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the preferences of the actors, and the means of holding the tool for action. 
The results of the present study raise the possibility that mirroring processes 
required to understand tool-mediated actions with a dual function tool, in 
which orientation matters, develop after, or parallel with, processes which 
allow for semantic encoding of tool use. This differs from processing of tool-
less object-directed actions, where motoric processes take primacy (e.g. 
Daum et al., 2011; Loucks & Sommerville, 2012; Perone et al., 2008). 
2.8 Conclusions 
Results suggest that 16-month-old infants can learn about tool-mediated 
actions through an associative and/or semantic processing system in which 
tools are matched to functions and actors’ goals. Given the identical grasp 
employed for both uses of the tool, infants’ mirroring processes did not allow 
them to distinguish between grasps and exhibit a preference for looking at the 
image with the tool congruently or incongruently oriented in relation to the 
actor’s prior behaviour, as hypothesised. This suggests that when learning 
about the parts of dual function tools, 16-month-olds fail to utilize combined 
semantic-motor representations of how to grasp a tool in relation to the 
functional part to be used. As in the early use of other handled tools, infants 
form an association between the tool (or its parts) and its usage. In this case, 
that usage was tied to a specific actor and associations were formed in the 
context of learning about how different actors used the tool, though they each 
used the same grasp to do so. Thus, associating the parts of a dual-function 
tool with specific actors via those actors’ prior behaviour is possible in the 








Prelude to Chapter 3 
Does the means of holding a tool affect infants’ perception of 
action? 
The preceding work shows that although differentiating the functions of a dual-
ended tool is challenging (Paulus, Hunnius & Bekkering, 2011) infants can 
separately associate specific ends of the tool with a particular actor in the 
context of that actor’s demonstrated goal. Crucially, it did not matter in which 
manner the tool was held. That is to say, the 16-month-olds tested showed an 
elevated interest in the hook that did not match the actor’s goal when it was 
held upward, and an anticipated interest in the upright-held hook in general 
was diluted by interest in the incongruent hook when it was held downward. 
By using an identical, whole-hand grasp on the tool in all conditions, the aim 
was to show that these older infants can differentiate grasps on a dual-ended 
tool in the context of the tool’s orientation without the need for differentiating 
grasps. Instead, results showed that at 16 months, infants do not care about 
the orientation in which a tool is held but associate functional ends with actors’ 
goals. Previous work shows that predictions of how a dual-ended tool will be 
used, made on the basis of grasp information, arise in infants sometime 
between 14 and 20 months of age (Paulus, Hunnius and Bekkering, 2011). 
The current work shows that infants at 16 months of age don’t discriminate 
between the orientations in which a dual-ended tool is held for use. In the 
integration of these findings, a number of additional questions arise. 
One of these questions refers to what kinds of grip or grasp information are 
important for infant processing of action. “Grip information” and “grasp 
information” as used here relates to any aspect of hand posture or hand-
object relationships, respectively. This could be a reach with a power or 
precision grip (Ambrosini et al., 2013), the size of the aperture between thumb 
and fingers (Daum et al., 2009), the function of the executed grasp in relation 
to the object (Loucks & Sommerville, 2012) or the grip used (Paulus, Hunnius 
& Bekkering, 2011), orientation of reaching hand to target object (Bakker et 
al., 2014), or the orientation of an object relative to the hand holding it (Ní 
58 
 
Choisdealbha et al., Early View; Chapter 2, this thesis). Already we have seen 
that the last of these is not important in 16-month-olds’ encoding of a dual-
ended tool’s functions. However, all of the other kinds of grip or grasp 
information have been shown to be important at varying stages in infancy. 
Ambrosini and colleagues (2013) found that 8- and 10-month-olds but not 6-
month-olds look toward a smaller rather than a larger object when an actor 
reaches with a precision (thumb-to-finger) grip. Daum and colleagues (2009) 
similarly found that 6- and 9-month-olds anticipate that a hand with a narrow 
aperture is reaching for a similarly narrow object. Loucks and Sommerville 
(2012) found that functional and non-functional power and precision grasps 
executed on objects are processed differently depending on the infant’s 
grasping ability. Finally, Bakker and colleagues (2014) found that the P400 
component of the infant ERP differentiates between reaching hands oriented 
toward and away from an object. 
Another question is, in what contexts are of each of these aspects attended to 
by the infant and processed? If the teleological stance defines action 
perception in infancy (see p. 16), the grasp is important only when it presents 
a hindrance to the efficient completion of the action (Csibra, 2003). This 
certainly applies to the work listed above – a grip that is not the correct shape 
for the implicated object hinders grasping and possible subsequent use of that 
object. Of the work listed above, only Loucks and Sommerville (2012) suggest 
a difference in processing of grasps that do not prevent the completion of an 
action but are not appropriate for the implicated object. In this case, the effect 
is only present for infants with greater motor skill and is modulated by 
habituation to previous presentations of a power or pincer grip. It is also worth 
noting that in the many studies listed above, all actions presented to infants 
below 14 months were reach-to-grasp actions. There is nothing to indicate 
how these infants process grasps in the context of a longer, tool-mediated 
action and how goal prediction occurs when an object is grasped in a manner 
that would prevent action completion, such as bringing a cup to the mouth 
while holding that cup over the top. Motor activation research with adults 
indicates that representations of appropriate grasps for tool function exist in 
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the developed brain (van Elk et al., 2010). When these representations 
develop is an extant question. 
A final question is about the relative contributions of motor and semantic 
processes to perception of grasp. The studies showing how grip and grasp 
information affects infants’ processing of action indicate that differentiation 
between wide and narrow hand apertures (Daum, Prinz & Aschersleben, 
2011), differentiation of the goals of precision and whole-hand grips 
(Ambrosini et al., 2013), neural processing of grasping hands oriented toward 
and away from objects at 6 months (Bakker et al., 2014) and perception of the 
functionality of different grips (Loucks & Sommerville, 2012) are all mediated 
by the infant’s own grasping ability. One inference to be made is that the 
ability to generate an accurate (or at least more complete) motor 
representation of an actor’s grasping posture affects action processing. 
However, the relative influence of visual and motor representations on 
processing of seen hands is complex (Ní Choisdealbha, Brady & Maguinness, 
2011). It may be the case that infants who can perform pincer or thumb-to-
finger grips consequently receive more visual inputs of those grips and their 
relationships to objects of different sizes. This could result in a greater ability 
to predict the targets of different hand aperture sizes or grip types, or to 
determine whether certain hand-object relationships are functional or typical, 
or not. 
The following chapter (Chapter 3) examines these questions. Power and 
pincer grips were presented to adults and 9- and 11.5-month-olds infants but 
what was measured was not the response to the grips themselves. Rather, we 
were interested in the relationship of the power or pincer grip to the shape of 
the object being held was encoded. The grips matched or did not match the 
structure of the objects. For example, in one case a handled cup was grasped 
with the whole-hand over the handle. None of the grips executed on the 
objects, whether congruent or incongruent with them, prevented execution of 
the associated goal, whether this was perceived to be a completed grasp or 
subsequent lifting and drinking from the cup. This means that goal inference 
from a teleological or efficiency perspective would not differ between 
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conditions. Later work in this thesis (Chapter 4) discusses how infants process 
differences in grasp that lead to differences in action execution. 
The measurements taken were neural. ERPs in response to congruent and 
incongruent grasps on familiar objects were measured with a particular focus 
on the N400 component. This component indexes semantic processing of 
both language and action (Amoruso et al., 2013) and emerges from about 
nine months of age (Reid et al., 2009). As adults, we perceive an action in 
which someone holds an object by the handle as meaningful, whereas 
accessing a representation of an action in which the functional end of the tool 
(e.g. a hammer’s head, a spoon’s bowl) is grasped may not present any 
immediate options for goal prediction. Work by Bach and colleagues (2009) 
found in adults that an N400 component is elicited, as expected, when the tool 
employed does not match the target in terms of overall goal (a screwdriver 
used on a lock rather than a screw). They also found that if the tool is held in 
the wrong orientation, a negative component in the typical N400 latency 
period is elicited. Thus we know that aspects of action other than goals 
modulate semantic processing and in the ensuing chapter, evidence is found 
that the grasp-object relationship is one of these aspects. 
Differences in the N400 component in response to congruent and incongruent 
grasps in adults justified measurement of this component during early 
development. An N400 present in infancy in response to these stimuli would 
indicate that semantic processing of hand-object relationships is occurring at 
this developmental stage. A relationship with execution of pincer grips would 
then point toward a contribution of visual or motor experience to semantic 
processing of others’ grasping actions. Positive results (i.e. the presence of an 
N400) would go some way to characterising the relationship between 
semantic and motor processing of action in development. They would show 
that not only do infants attend to whether a grasp matches or does not match 
the object it is executed upon, but that when infants encode actions and 
attribute meaning to them, they attend not only to the overall goal but to the 
means by which that goal is achieved. These hypotheses were not borne out 
by the data. Instead we see that neural processing of hand-object 
relationships and grasp appropriateness undergoes radical changes even in 
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the short period between eight and twelve months of age. Again, we see 
evidence for the separate rather than dependent development of semantic 
and motor processing systems, as semantic processing of action goals 






















Neural encoding of hand-object relationships changes within 
infancy, and between infancy and adulthood. 
Text in preparation for submission to Developmental Science. 
Abstract 
Actions are semantic entities – hierarchically structured sequences with 
components that generate expectancies about how the action will proceed. 
One such component is the means of apprehending tools. Even though 
semantic processing of action outcomes emerges in the first postnatal year, 
infants’ limited motor skills may hinder their processing of differences in grasp. 
In the present work, three groups – adults, 9-month-olds, and 11.5-month-olds 
– were shown images of actors grasping cups via means that were congruent 
or incongruent with the shape of the cup. Participants’ neural responses to the 
stimuli were measured using electroencephalography, and the N400 
component of the event-related potential was computed for each age group. 
The presence of the component in adults and its modulation by stimulus 
congruence indicates that stimuli were processed semantically. Results from 
the infant samples indicate a multi-stage developmental trajectory of this 
process. Attentional sensitivity to differences in grasp appropriateness 
diminishes between nine and twelve months of age, while semantic 
processing of the overall action but not the means of grasping emerges 
around by the end of the first postnatal year. These results suggest that as the 
ability to process actions as semantic entities emerges, the action’s 
congruence is determined by its goal and not affected by the means of 







The emergence of tool use in infancy and early toddlerhood signals a 
convergence of motor and cognitive skills. Many tools require precise 
manipulations such as the use of a pincer grip, control of wrist rotation, and 
application of appropriate force with the arm, all of which are still emergent at 
the end of the first year (Thelen et al., 1993). Appropriate use of a tool 
requires that multiple mental representations are accessed – it must be 
associated with a specific target object or category of target objects; there 
must be a representation of what the tool does to that target object (i.e. its 
function); and there must also be a representation of how to properly 
apprehend and manipulate the tool to achieve that function (van Elk et al., 
2010). Generally these representations, in the context of actions performed 
with the tools, are considered to be semantic (Chainay & Humphreys, 2002; 
Grafton et al., 1997). Infants by the end of the first post-natal year process 
common actions semantically (Reid et al., 2009). They associate tools with 
targets (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010) and hold representations of the effects of 
tools on targets (Hernik & Csibra, 2015; Träuble & Pauen, 2011). The aim of 
the series of experiments described in this work is to expand on previous 
research on semantic processing of actions in infancy and determine whether 
infants between nine and twelve months of age have acquired the third kind of 
tool-related semantic representation listed above – a representation of how to 
hold a tool.  
Motor components of action are fundamental to how actions are represented 
neurally. The mirror system, which represents observed actions in the same 
manner as planned or executed ones, is a phenomenon that has been 
extensively documented in humans using functional neuroimaging (Van 
Overwalle & Baetens, 2009) and electroencephalography 
(Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson & McNair, 2004; Perry & Bentin, 2009) among 
other methodologies (Strafella & Paus, 2000). Adult data also show that motor 
resonance – activation of the motor system in the absence of overt movement 
– occurs in response to stimuli associated with actions, for example while 
viewing images of tools (Proverbio, 2012) or naming actions associated with 
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tools (Grafton et al., 1997). Recent studies with infants have recorded neural 
correlates of motor activity as infants observe goal-directed actions (Marshall, 
Young & Meltzoff, 2011; Nyström et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2009), 
showing that the mirror system is functional in infancy. The processing of 
actions does not, however, rely solely on motor activation in adults nor infants 
(e.g. semantic action processing in adults, Proverbio & Riva, 2009; infants 
encoding tool function despite inability to manipulate tools appropriately, 
Elsner & Pauen, 2009). In understanding how infants learn to act upon the 
world around them and how they can begin to use tools to engage in more 
complex and abstract actions, it is important to understand how the motor 
representation system and the cognitive action processing system develop 
and whether interdependencies exist between these systems. 
The pathway by which motor activation in response to observed action occurs 
may be a direct response to the percept of the action or stimulus associated 
with action, as detailed in an action representation model by Chainay and 
Humphreys (2002). In the same model the authors indicate that action 
representation is also semantic. This is supported by alleviation of apraxic 
patients’ difficulties in identifying or miming tool functions via direct interaction 
with those objects. That is, access to semantic representations of tools can be 
supported by information from the perceptual route to action. Neuroimaging 
data supports this model of a convergent conceptual (or semantic) and 
perceptuo-motor model of action (Watson & Chatterjee, 2011; Yoon et al., 
2012). When discussing action as a semantic entity, what is meant is that 
perception of an action results in expectations about how that action will 
proceed. These expectations are fundamentally linked to the signification of 
the action stimulus. For example, although an association may be formed 
between an action (such as driving) and a stimulus that co-occurs with driving 
(the smell of car freshener), it is not necessarily semantic unless there is a 
contingency between the action and the stimulus, or unless the meaning of 
one hinges upon the other. A reaching action has no significance or meaning 
without a target of the reach; putting a spoon in the mouth is not eating unless 
there is food on the spoon. It is important to understand the emergence of 
semantic processing action in infancy because this kind of conceptual 
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ordering has been shown in other domains to result in more rapid access to 
information than associative processing (e.g. Thompson-Schill, Kurtz & 
Gabrieli, 1998). Developing semantic concepts of familiar actions may allow 
infants to perceive the goals of others and to learn about action functions 
more efficiently. 
In language, words follow one another sequentially and there is a hierarchical 
generation of meaning – each word generates expectancies about the word 
that may follow it. This characterisation of meaning or semantics as sequential 
or hierarchical has been used before in relation to tool use as well as 
language (Stout & Chaminade, 2009). The comparative literature documents 
commonalities between the human Broca’s area and tool-use modules in non-
human primate cortex (Roby-Brami et al., 2012). Semantic processing of 
language can be measured using a specific event-related component of the 
human electroencephalogram (EEG). The N400 component is evident in adult 
event-related potentials (ERPs) over parietal regions for language stimuli and 
over fronto-central regions for pictorial stimuli (Amoruso et al., 2013; Ganis, 
Kutas & Sereno, 1996), from about 300 or 400 milliseconds post-stimulus. The 
N400 peak in the ERP is generally of greater magnitude for semantically 
incongruous stimuli. An early example from the work of Kutas and Hillyard 
(1980) shows a larger N400 peak when the sentence “he took a sip from the” 
concludes with the incongruous “transmitter” compared to the congruent but 
unlikely “waterfall”. 
The N400 is also found in response to action stimuli. Sitnikova and colleagues 
(2008) found a frontal negativity in adult ERPs in the N400 time window that 
was larger for actions in which an inappropriate tool was used to achieve the 
action goal (cutting bread with an iron instead of a knife), than for actions in 
which the tool used was appropriate to the context. These results relate to two 
of the above listed three means by which a semantic representation of a tool-
use action is generated. There is an association between tools and a target, 
as the bread target elicits expectancies about tools associated with it. The 
presence of an iron, which is not one of these tools, is not meaningful in 
relation to the bread and thus is semantically incongruous. There is also the 
association between the tool and its function – the function of the iron is not to 
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cut bread and when placed in a context in which that function is anticipated, it 
in incongruous. Measurement of the N400 is an important tool in determining 
whether semantic processing is occurring and consequently in establishing 
the means by different kinds of concepts are accessed. 
There is evidence that infants engage in the three aspects of tool 
representation listed above (target, function, apprehension). They associate 
tools or objects involved in actions with targets. For example, from 6 months 
of age they anticipate that common tools will be brought to the correct target 
by an actor – such as a cup or spoon being brought to the mouth (Hunnius & 
Bekkering, 2010; Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010). They also associate 
functions with tools, looking longer at outcomes that do not match the tool they 
were performed with (Hernik & Csibra, 2015), and are sensitive to the 
continuity of actions based on their functional or goal-directed structure 
(Baldwin et al., 2001; Reid et al., 2007). The work of Perone, Madole and 
Oakes (2011) with 10-month-olds gives evidence for both of these kinds of 
representation. Following habituation to a particular action performed on a 
particular object, infants dishabituate when the habituated action is performed 
on a novel object, or when a novel action is performed on the habituated 
object, indicating that infants make bi-directional associations between objects 
and action. This is comparable to tool-function associations (Hernik & Csibra, 
2015) Additional experiments from the same work (Perone, Madole & Oakes, 
2011) showed that following habituation to two actions performed on the same 
object, each with a different outcome, infants dishabituated when one familiar 
action elicited the effect or outcome associated with the other action. This 
shows that infants associate outcomes or goals with actions, comparably to 
the results of Hunnius and Bekkering (2010), and Kochukhova and Gredebäck 
(2010).  
In these cases, the representations held by the infants may be more than an 
associative target expectancy generated by perception of a tool or other object 
(or an associative tool expectancy resulting from target presence). There is 
neurophysiological evidence that infants represent familiar actions 
semantically. An N400 is present in the neural responses of infants as they 
observe incongruous actions – actions in which a food item is placed not in 
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the mouth, as would match the expectancy generated by seeing a person 
holding it, but instead is placed by the forehead or ear (Reid et al., 2009). 
Research with toddlers has indicated that the action N400 is present into early 
childhood (Pace, Carver & Friend, 2013) and the morphology of the ERP 
found in this case bridges the differences (i.e. in latency and topography) 
between the 9-month-old and adult N400 responses to action stimuli.  
These developmental N400 studies detail how infants process semantically 
the goal-directed structure of action, based upon representations of the target 
(and perhaps even the function) of familiar actions (Reid et al., 2009) and of 
the function of the action (disrupted in Pace, Carver & Friend, 2013). The 
semantic representation of how tools should be apprehended or manipulated 
has not been investigated neurophysiologically. There is substantial evidence 
to indicate that infants in the first post-natal year discriminate the grasps used 
on different objects. When shown a hand reaching for an occluded object, 6- 
and 9-month-olds look longer when the action conclusion shows the hand 
holding the (now visible) object with a wider or narrower distance between 
thumb and fingers than shown during the reach, relative to actions in which 
the shape of the hand at conclusion matches the shape of the hand during the 
reach (Daum et al., 2009). Six-month-olds who have experience of performing 
thumb-to-finger grips are facilitated in this matching of hand aperture to target 
object (Daum, Prinz & Aschersleben, 2011), and 10-month-olds who can use 
a pincer grip in functional contexts respond to both the novelty and the 
functionality of a grasp in observed actions, whereas their peers who do not 
use pincer grips functionally respond only to grip novelty (Loucks & 
Sommerville, 2012). Among 4-month-olds the P400 ERP component, 
associated with the social significance of stimuli (Gredebäck, Melinder & 
Daum, 2010; Hoehl & Striano, 2012; Melinder et al., 2015; Rigato, Farroni & 
Johnson, 2010), is elicited differently in conditions showing a hand in grasping 
posture directed towards or away from the location where an object was 
previously shown, emerging earlier in those infants who display appropriate 
use of power grasps themselves (Bakker et al., 2014). Thus we see 
perceptual, cognitive and neural evidence for the sensitivity of infants to the 
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different means of apprehending objects, in addition to evidence for the effects 
of motor experience on this sensitivity. 
Tool use therefore represents an interesting pivot point from which to explore 
diverse systems in development. In the case of the present study, the aim is to 
investigate semantic processing of grasps on familiar objects and relate this 
processing to the infants’ motor development. The reasons why semantic 
processing is investigated are, as detailed above, the fact that infants process 
other aspects of action semantically (Reid et al., 2009), and the fact that 
infants respond differently to actions requiring different grips (Daum et al., 
2009; Loucks & Sommerville, 2012). This latter series of findings indicates that 
infants perceive differences in the relationship between hands and objects. To 
characterize the systems underlying processing of hand-object relationships, 
neural encoding was measured in response to grasps that were congruent or 
incongruent with the form of a familiar tool. It was hypothesized that ERPs 
associated with both attentional (Nc) and semantic (N400) processes would 
emerge in infancy and differentiate between these grasps. It was also 
anticipated that infants’ motor development would be related to the magnitude 
of these components. Characterization of the ERPs elicited in infant EEG in 
response to the relationship between tools and their means of apprehension 
would allow for an understanding of how infants learn to manipulate and utilize 
tools in increasingly complex ways into late infancy (Barrett, Davis & 
Needham, 2007; Elsner & Pauen, 2007). Connecting these to behavioral 
motor measures would illustrate the relationship between semantic processing 
and motor systems during development. 
EXPERIMENT 1: ADULTS 
Before investigating the development of infant neural responses to others’ 
choice of grasp, it was crucial to establish how this kind of processing occurs 
in the adult brain. There is neural evidence for differential processing of 
actions depending on the relationship of the grasp employed to the tool it is 
enacted upon. Differences in neural oscillations associated with motor 
activation are found when adults grasp familiar objects in a non-functional 
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manner, such as grasping a water bottle in a spray-bottle hand posture (van 
Elk et al., 2010). Unrelated semantic tasks interfere with adults’ ability to grasp 
a tool in the correct orientation, whereas visuo-spatial tasks do not, suggesting 
that the execution of grasps relies on semantic representations thereof 
(Creem & Proffitt, 2001). Recent research by De Sanctis and colleagues 
(2013) refers to an “m-N400” component elicited during reach-to-grasp 
actions. The spatial and temporal features of the m-N400 suggest a 
commonality with the observed action N400, suggesting again that the 
semantic representational system is recruited when determining how to grasp 
an object. What action N400 studies have not investigated to date is the 
congruence or appropriateness of a grasp in relation to the features of an 
object, in which the grasp does not confound the function (i.e. by preventing 
its normal use, van Elk et al., 2010). 
The grasps used in research by van Elk and colleagues (2010) were 
meaningful in their relationship to the function of the associated tool. In the 
present study, we wished to present grasps on objects that did not prevent 
use of the object regardless of their congruence with the object. In this way, 
differences between conditions would indicate processing purely of whether 
the grasp was appropriate for the object on the basis of object features. 
Furthermore, the actions shown to participants displayed the reach and grasp 
on the object only, and not (typical or atypical) use of the object, again 




Participants were recruited from the University’s student population via an 
internal participant advertising system and emails to graduate students. Other 
participants (n = 5) made contact with the research group because they 
wanted recordings of their own EEG for an arts project, and were invited to 
participate in the research. No remuneration was offered but those 
undergraduate students recruited from the advertising system received credits 
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towards their research skills modules. Ethical approval for this experiment and 
the other experiments reported in this chapter were granted by the Lancaster 
University Research Ethics Committee. 
Twenty-four participants were tested, and twenty-one (6 males) were 
incorporated into the final sample. Two participants were excluded as a result 
of technical issues – one for corrupted data and the other because the session 
had to be terminated before sufficient data was collected. The third was 
excluded because of overall poor data quality. The age range of the included 
participants was 18 to 26 years (M = 20.7 years, SD = 2.65 years). 
3.2.2 Stimuli 
A cup was chosen as the tool to be acted upon. Blue and yellow infant lidded 
cups were used, one of each colour with handles and one without. Handled 
and non-handled cups were chosen as each present an explicit manner in 
which the tool should be held – with the whole hand around the round edge for 
the non-handled cup and with a more precise and narrow grip on the handle 
for the handled cups. Two-handled cups were chosen as they limit the 
possibility of grasping with the whole hand around the non-handled side of a 
standard cup. 
The action of reaching for and grasping the cup was performed on each of the 
cups (yellow/blue, handled/non-handled) by each of three female actors. The 
actions were captured in three static images as in Reid and colleagues’ (2009) 
N400 study, so that the event-related response to the final grasping posture 
could be computed cleanly and without interference from surrounding events, 
such as incidental movements by the actor. As shown in Figure 3.1, the first 
image in each sequence of three depicted the actor sitting at a table with one 
of the cups in front of her. The second showed her reaching for the cup. The 
reach was identical in all stimuli. All actors used their right hand, which 
approached the cup from the side. The reaching posture concealed the thumb 
and showed all four fingers in parallel with one another and touching the 
adjacent finger. This was to prevent any cues such as hand aperture (e.g. 
Daum, Prinz & Aschersleben, 2009) that might generate expectations about 




Figure 3.1: Examples of the first (Setting) and second (Reach) images in 
each sequence, illustrating equivalence of reaches to handled and non-
handled cups. 
 
Figure 3.2: Examples of the critical grasp stimulus across all conditions of 




across stimuli, the expectancies generated would be modified across 
conditions by the structure of the target cup only. 
In the final image in each sequence, the actor grasped the cup with either their 
whole hand or with thumb-finger opposition. In some cases the grasp was 
congruent with the cup features, in others incongruent (Figure 3.2). In the 
case of the incongruent grasp on the non-handled cup, the actor placed the 
thumb and forefinger only on opposite sides of the cup’s round edge. For the 
incongruent grasp on the handled cup, the actor placed their hand over the 
handle, with the pads of their fingers and thumb around the round edge of the 
cup. Images were edited in such a way that the cup’s position on screen was 
consistent within each sequence. 
3.2.3 Procedure 
Participants’ neural responses to the stimuli were collected using an EGI 128-
sensor geodesic Hydrocel sensor net (Electrical Geodesics Inc., Oregon). 
Data was recorded via an EGI NA300 amplifier at 250Hz using EGI Netstation 
software, and re-referenced online to Cz. Stimuli were presented and the 
experiment was controlled using Matlab (TheMathworks, Inc., Massachusetts) 
with Psychtoolbox (Kleiner, Brainard & Pelli, 2007). 
Participants viewed the stimuli on a 20-inch CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 
60 Hz at a visual angle of 23°, in a dark room. Within each sequence of three 
images, the first two images were displayed for 600ms and the final one for 1 
second. Each image in the sequence followed the next with no interstitial other 
than the screen refresh rate. Screen space not occupied by the images was 
grey, and between sequences a white fixation cross appeared in the middle of 
the screen on a background in the same shade of grey. 
Participants were informed that they were part of a study to determine how 
different kinds of grasps are processed in adults, in order to determine how to 
investigate the same phenomenon in infants. They were given standard 
instruction to remain still and try to refrain from blinking while stimuli were 
being displayed. Participants passively viewed approximately 200 of the 
reach-and-grasp sequences and were offered breaks after each successive 
50 trials, in addition to being permitted to request a break at any other time. 
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The displayed sequences were determined by a pseudo-randomisation 
procedure. They were displayed on the basis of random number generation 
within Matlab with the caveat that sequences with the same congruence or the 
same kind of cup (handled or non-handled) could not be shown more than 
twice in a row, and likewise the same actor could not be shown more than 
twice in a row unless the colour of the cup she was interacting with changed 
across sequences. This means of displaying the stimuli was used to prevent 
prediction of stimuli on the basis of presentation patterns, and to maintain 
interest within the infant sample intended to be tested at a later date. 
3.2.4 Analysis 
Adult data was analysed within Netstation using the software’s waveform 
tools. It was bandpass filtered between 0.1 and 30Hz and segmented into 
1200ms epochs extending from 200ms before the appearance of the third 
image in each sequence to 1 second after. The Netstation artefact detection 
process was applied to the data, such that segments with eye movements or 
blinks were rejected. Channels that varied by more than 400μV within a 
segment were marked as bad, and segments with more than 15% bad 
channels were rejected. Channels that were marked as bad in more than 40% 
of segments were marked as bad throughout. The Netstation bad channel 
interpolation algorithm was then applied to the data. Baseline correction was 
applied to each segment based on the 200ms pre-stimulus period (in which 
the second of the images was onscreen) and data were then re-referenced to 
the average reference. Finally, an average ERP was computed in each 
condition for each participant. Given the pseudo-randomisation procedure 
applied for stimulus presentation, stimuli from each of the four conditions were 
not presented to the adults in fully equal numbers but the numbers were 
comparable – following data collection there remained on average for each 
participant 51.3 (SD = 3.4) congruent precision grip trials and 50.3 (3.8) 
incongruent; 48.2 (3.1) congruent whole-hand grip trials and 48 (2.9) 
incongruent. 
Mean amplitude values were calculated for each participant over fronto-central 
channels in the 350 to 550ms post-stimulus period. The region investigated is 
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in accordance with previous pictorial (Ganis, Kutas & Sereno, 1996) and 
action (Amoruso et al., 2013) N400 literature. The time window investigated 
was chosen on the basis of the morphology of the grand average and in 
accordance with prior work (Ganis, Kutas & Sereno, 1996). The selected 
region and the mean ERP over this region are seen in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3: Mean amplitude over fronto-central electrodes (depicted top right 
in blue) in adults in response to the critical grasp stimulus. Results indicate a 
larger N400 response to the incongruent than the congruent grasps, as 
evidenced in the 350-550ms epoch. 
3.3 Results 
A 2-by-2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the data. There was 
a main effect of grasp congruence (i.e. if the type of grasp used matched the 
form of the cup); F(1,20) = 9.369, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.08. The mean amplitude of 
the response to the incongruent grasp was more negative than the mean 
amplitude of the response to the congruent grasp. There was no effect of 
grasp type (precision vs. whole hand); F(1,20) = 0.033, p = 0.857, η2 = 0.001) 
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nor was there an interaction between the two factors; F(1,20) = 1.127, p = 0.3, 
η2 = 0.02. 
3.4 Discussion 
Results show that adults do process the interaction between hand and cup 
semantically, as evidenced by the presence of a fronto-central N400 in the 
data and given that this component has long been associated with semantic 
processing of stimuli including action (Amoruso et al., 2013; Kutas & 
Federmeier, 2011). This response is modulated by the congruence of the 
performed grasp relative to the structure of the grasped cup. This provides 
evidence that when tools or objects are viewed in an action context, the 
elicited representation incorporates the anticipated means of apprehension. 
That is, the shape of a cup signifies a means of holding it. The lack of 
interaction between grasp congruence and grasp type indicates that neither 
kind of grasp is more expected generally. This is important because there is 
some asymmetry in the frequency and flexibility of use of the grasps – the 
more precise grasp on the round-edged cup may be used more frequently 
than the whole-hand grasp over the handle of the handled cup. If such a cup 
were to be grasped with the whole hand, it would likely be held around the 
round edge rather than over the handle. Regardless, results indicate that the 
N400 effect was elicited more strongly by the incongruent grasps than the 
congruent grasps and as such the stimuli are appropriate for use to 
investigate the same effect in a developmental population. 
Investigation of the early development of semantic processing of grasp was 
justified on the basis of these adult results. A nine-month-old age group was 
selected for a number of reasons. First, this is the youngest age at which the 
N400 has been previously found (Reid et al., 2009). Second, in this period 
infants are generally utilizing pincer grips but their means of grasping objects 
has not yet made the transition to pincer grip dominance – these infants use 
significantly more power grips than those entering the second post-natal year 
(Butterworth, Verweij, & Hopkins, 1997). Consequently, individual differences 
in grasping ability could contribute to a rounded picture of how semantic 
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processing of grasping actions emerges in infancy and how such processing 
is affected by motor experience. 
EXPERIMENT 2: 9-MONTH-OLDS 
3.5 Methods 
3.5.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from the research centre’s participant pool. Thirty 
infants in total participated in the experiment with their caregivers. Of these, 
15 infants in total were excluded, for technical failures (n = 2), experimenter 
error (n = 2), highly negatively valenced responses to the sensor net (n = 2), 
insufficient trials attended to during experiment (n = 1) and insufficient valid 
trials without artefacts (n = 8). The age range of the included infants was 8 
months, 13 days to 9 months, 15 days (M = 8 months 28 days, SD = 11 days). 
Eight female and seven male infants were included. All families received £10 
remuneration and a baby book following their visit. 
3.5.2 Stimuli & procedure 
The same equipment, stimuli and experimental procedure were used for the 
infant data with some exceptions. 
Eye-tracking data was collected during the experiment with a Tobii TX300 
eye-tracker (Tobii AB, Stockholm, Sweden). This data is not reported upon 
here. Prior to viewing of the action sequences, infants (sitting on the laps of 
their caregivers) were shown a cartoon of some birds, accompanied by music, 
on the experiment’s CRT monitor. The purpose of this video was twofold – to 
distract the infants with a pleasant stimulus during application of the sensor 
net and to ensure the infant’s eyes were being detected by the eye-tracker 
prior to calibration. Lighting to assist with eye-tracking was provided by an 
LED lamp on the floor. Following application of the net, a standard 5-point 
Tobii infant calibration procedure was performed. It was repeated only once if 
the first attempt at calibration was unsuccessful. Subsequently, the 
experiment began and EEG data was recorded while the reach-and-grasp 
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sequences were displayed. In addition to recording of eye-movements with 
the eye-tracker, infant behaviour was recorded with a camera mounted 
adjacent to the monitor on which the stimuli were displayed. The video 
recordings were tagged with information about the on-screen events occurring 
simultaneously. 
Some additional changes were made to the experimental procedure. Using a 
random number generation procedure within Matlab, the two images shown 
prior to the final image in each sequence could be displayed for 800ms, 
900ms, 1s, 1.1s or 1.2s. The final image was still 1s in length. The lengthening 
of the display of the first two images was to ensure any slow wave effects 
would be terminated by the time the critical image appeared. Differing lengths 
of presentation were used to ensure that remaining slow wave effects would 
not affect the ERPs to the critical images in a consistent manner. 
Sequences were displayed in series of ten with a pause on a fixation cross 
after the tenth sequence. The experimenter, guided by the caregiver’s 
judgment, decided whether to continue at this point or give the infant a short 
break. The fixation cross was moved so that it would be displayed over the 
area where the cup was shown. Consequently, infants would be cued to that 
area and would not have to shift their gaze. Caregivers were instructed that 
they could try to redirect infants’ attention to the screen with occasional 
general utterances such as “what’s she doing?” or “look!” but not to refer to 
specific aspects of the stimuli like cup colour or the nature of the action. 
3.5.2a Motor ability task 
A behavioural task was added following the EEG procedure. After EEG 
recording was complete, the sensor net was removed from the child’s head 
and caregivers and children were given the option to have a break and play 
for a few minutes. Subsequently, they were accompanied by the experimenter 
to another room in which recording of the infant’s behaviour in response to a 
series of grasping tasks was recorded with three overhead video cameras 
placed at different angles relative to the child. The experimenter sat at a small 
table opposite to the caregiver, who had the child on his or her lap. The 
experimenter presented the child sequentially with three items/sets of items 
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taken from the Bayley Scales of Infant Development (BSID) – a small sugar 
pellet, an orange rod, and a pencil and paper. Objects were presented under 
the same instructions found in the BSID-II (Bayley, 1993) under motor scale 
items 41, 49, 56, 57 and 58 (Table 3.1). These particular items were used as 
they were classified in the BSID-II as the subset of tasks applying to 9-month-
olds in which manual interaction was measured. 
The use of the BSID-II items was not intended to recreate a comprehensive 
BSID score. They were used to create a more nuanced picture of the infant’s 
grasping ability than a binary score based on performance or parental report 
of a pincer grip. The infant’s performance on each of the five measures was 
scored 1 or 0 based on performance of the task during the testing session 
only. All infants interacted with all objects; there were no refusals. 
Table 3.1: Bayley (BSID-II) motor development scale tasks used with 9-
month-olds. 
Item No. Item description 
41 Uses whole hand to grasp pellet 
49 Uses partial thumb opposition to grasp pellet 
56 Uses pads of fingertips to grasp pellet 
57 Uses partial thumb opposition to grasp rod 
58 Grasps pencil at farthest end 
3.5.3 Analysis 
Prior to processing and analysis of the EEG data, the videos of the infants’ 
recording sessions were coded for whether or not the infant was looking at the 
screen for the second and third images in each sequence, for gross 
movements by the infant during these images, and for other behaviour (e.g. 
touching the sensor net) that might affect data quality. Segments with 
unambiguous invalidity were identified for immediate rejection. Segments that 
79 
 
were ambiguous (e.g. if the infant might have been swinging their leg out of 
view of the camera, or if it were not clear that the infant was holding 
something in their mouth or actively sucking it) were noted. Excluding those 
infants removed at various stages of the processing procedure, infants sat for 
a mean of 64.3 trials (SD = 12.5) and attended to a mean of 28.5 trials (SD = 
8.3) without excessive movement. 
Data were exported from Netstation and imported into the EEGlab toolbox for 
Matlab (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). It was bandpass filtered, with a 30Hz 
lowpass and a 0.3Hz highpass 5500th order finite impulse response filter was 
applied. Data were segmented into trials spanning the 200ms before the 
appearance of the third stimulus in each sequence and the 1s after, including 
correction for the standard lag between Matlab and the EGI NA300 amplifier. 
Baseline correction was applied using the 200ms pre-stimulus period, during 
which the reaching stimulus was present onscreen. The invalid segments as 
identified during review of the session video were rejected immediately. All 
other segments were manually inspected for artefacts such as blinks or mouth 
movements, with guidance from notes made during the inspection of the 
video, and rejected accordingly. A mean of 24 trials (SD = 10.7) per infant 
remained after this step. 
All segments were manually inspected again to identify bad channels in each 
segment. Using EEGlab, additional automated parameters for bad channel 
detection were applied, such that any channels that breached an upper or 
lower limit of 250μV were marked as bad in that segment. For each segment 
individually, interpolation was performed on channels marked as bad by the 
experimenter or by the EEGlab parameters. Channels marked as bad on 
80%+ of segments were interpolated in all segments, and trials in which 15%+ 
of channels were marked as bad were rejected completely. Following this 
step, on average 23.6 trials (SD = 10.8) remained per infant 
Finally, data for all electrodes in each trial were rereferenced to all electrodes 
with the exception of the peripheral ones. This procedure has been applied in 
other work (Bakker et al., 2014) and is used because of imprecise fit of the 
geodesic sensor nets around the face, jaw, ears and neck of the infant and the 
consequent tendency to collect noisy data from these regions. Segments were 
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categorised on the basis of condition (congruent or incongruent grasp shown) 
and average ERPs were computed. Infants with fewer than 6 trials per 
condition were rejected at this stage. The remaining infants had a mean of 
11.5 trials (SD = 5.6) in the congruent condition and 12.1 trials (5.9) in the 
incongruent condition. 
3.6 Results 
Two components of interest were investigated on the basis of the hypotheses 
(Nc and N400). An additional component of interest was identified from visual 
inspection of the grand averaged data – the P400. Investigation of the P400 
can be further justified on the basis of previous research centred on infant 
processing of grasp and gesture (Bakker et al., 2014; Gredebäck, Melinder & 
Daum, 2010). 
 
Figure 3.4: Mean amplitude over fronto-central electrodes in 9-month-olds in 
response to the critical grasp stimulus. Left fronto-central electrodes are 
shown in (a), corresponding to brown electrodes in the lower left map. 
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Depicted in orange are right fronto-central electrodes, the response from 
which is seen in (b). An effect is seen in the 300-600ms time window. 
An Nc component was visually identified in the left fronto-central region. Given 
that previous Nc research reports manifestation of the component over left 
fronto-central (Quinn, Westerlund & Nelson, 2006), right fronto-central (Hoehl, 
Wiese & Striano, 2008; Quinn et al., 2010) and bilateral fronto-central regions 
(Marinović, Hoehl & Pauen, 2014; Reid et al., 2009), mean amplitude values 
for the 300 to 600ms post-stimulus period were calculated for each condition 
over both left fronto-central and right fronto-central electrodes (electrodes 
used shown in Figure 3.4). A 2-by-2 ANOVA was subsequently performed. 
Results indicate no effect of region (F(1,14) = 0.239, p = 0.63, η2 = 0.004) but 
a main effect of congruence (F(1,14) = 4.848, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.13) in which the 
Nc is larger (more negative) in response to the incongruent stimuli (M = -
3.9μV, SE = 1.4 μV) than the congruent stimuli (M = -1.1μV, SE = 1.03 μV). 
No interaction between the factors was found (F(1,14) = 3.107, p = 0.1, η2 = 
0.05). The grand average ERP is seen in Figure 3.4. 
An analysis of the N400 was performed using mean amplitudes between 600 
and 800ms post-stimulus over the bilateral parietal region. Although N400 
effects to pictorial and action stimuli are generally seen over fronto-central 
regions in adults (see Experiment 1, also Amoruso et al., 2013; Ganis, Kutas 
& Sereno, 1996), previous infant action research has found it in parietal 
regions (Reid et al., 2009). The selection of time window was also guided by 
the work of Reid and colleagues (2009) and visual inspection of the data. No 
such effect was found in the present study (Figure 3.5), t(14) = 0.293, p = 
0.77, d = 0.12.  
Visual inspection of the grand averaged data indicated the presence of a P400 
effect (Figure 3.6). Exploratory analysis of this effect is reasonable given the 
literature in which infants exhibit different P400 responses to pointing and 
grasping hands in different object-relative orientations (Bakker et al., 2014; 
Gredebäck, Melinder & Daum, 2010; Melinder et al., 2015). Difference in 
mean amplitude between conditions was calculated over the same bilateral 
posterior electrodes as used in Bakker and colleagues (2014). Analysis 
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revealed an effect of condition on this component, t(14) = 2.617, p < 0.025, d  = 
0.8, with a larger amplitude effect for incongruent grasps (M = 7.1μV, SE = 
2.54 μV) than congruent grasps (M = 0.78μV, SE = 1.35 μV).  
The mean score (out of 5) given to infants on the measure of grasping ability 
was 3.07 (SD = 1.71). These scores were correlated with the difference in 
magnitude of each of the investigated components, that is, the mean 
amplitude of the component of interest elicited by the incongruent stimulus 
subtracted from that for the congruent stimulus. In the case of the Nc 
component, the mean amplitudes in each region were averaged for each 
condition, given the lack of an effect of region. None of the difference waves 
correlated with the infants’ Bayley scores – P400, r = -0.129, p = 0.32; N400, r 
= 0.281, p = 0.155; Nc, r = -0.039, p = 0.45. All component magnitude 
differences are calculated as mean amplitude for congruent stimulus minus 
mean amplitude for incongruent stimulus. 
 
Figure 3.5: Mean amplitude over parietal electrodes in 9-month-olds in 
response to the critical grasp stimulus. No effects are seen in the 600 to 




Figure 3.6: Mean amplitude over posterior electrodes in 9-month-olds in 
response to the critical grasp stimulus P400 effect is seen in the 300-600ms 
time window. 
3.7 Discussion 
Results indicate that although object-directed grasps are differentially 
processed at this age, as shown by the Nc and P400 effects, semantic 
processing of hand-object interaction has not yet emerged. Of interest in 
relation to the literature on grasp perception at this age, no relationship was 
found between the difference in magnitude of the components for each infant 
and the infant’s grasping behaviour. However, other studies indicating 
relationships between ability to form a particular grasp and the P400 (Bakker 
et al., 2014) or perception of difference in hand aperture-target object 
interactions (Daum, Prinz & Aschersleben, 2011) have indicated such 
relationships in younger infants. Studies with older infants have employed 
functional tasks in which the infant must decide to use a pincer grip to achieve 
a practiced goal (10-month-olds, Loucks & Sommerville, 2012), and 
investigated infants’ perception of grasp functionality as opposed to the 
structural relationship between hands and objects. It may be that at 9 months, 
infants have additional experience observational experience of others’ actions 
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and can use this to structure their understanding of grasp in lieu of practical 
pincer grip experience. 
Although no direct comparisons can be made due to differences in the stimuli 
employed, differences in results obtained here and in Reid and colleagues 
(2009) suggest that the semantic processing of action does not develop as a 
holistic process incorporating all aspects of action congruence, but that 
semantic processing of the congruence of a target in relation to the tool or 
object implicated in an action emerges before processing of grasp 
congruence. Alternatively, results may have been affected by the employment 
of stimuli depicting actors grasping tools instead of eating food, as in the work 
of Reid and colleagues (2009). The motivational salience of food items may 
mean that infants form representations of eating actions more rapidly than 
representations of tool-mediated actions, and thus exhibit semantic ERP 
components in response to the former actions earlier. 
The experiment was repeated with an older age group in order to develop a 
picture of how infants perceive and process grasps towards the second 
postnatal year. It was hypothesised that the older age group would exhibit 
semantic processing of the grasping actions as a result of the changes in 
neural connection (Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 1998) and motor ability (Thelen 
et al., 1993) that arise with increased chronological age. 
EXPERIMENT 3: 11.5-MONTH-OLDS 
3.8 Methods 
3.8.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from the research centre’s participant pool. 
Twenty-six infants in total participated in the experiment with their caregivers. 
Of these, 11 infants in total were excluded, for technical problems (n = 2), 
highly negatively valenced responses to the sensor net (n = 2), insufficient 
trials attended to during experiment (n = 2) and insufficient valid trials without 
artefacts (n = 5). The age range of the included infants was 11 months, 8 days 
to 12 months, 7 days (M = 11 months, 21 days, SD = 8 days). Twelve female 
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and three male infants were included. Female participants were not targeted 
specifically; the demography is a random outcome of the available participant 
pool at the time of the experiment. All families received £10 remuneration and 
a baby book following their visit. 
3.8.2 Stimuli, procedure & analysis 
The same experiment conducted with the 9-month-olds was replicated almost 
exactly with the 11.5-month-olds. The primary exception was that the eye-
tracker was not used. Application of the net was performed while infants 
interacted with a toy for distraction. Despite this difference, the infants 
included in the final sample sat for comparable numbers of trials before 
becoming fussy – 56.3 trials on average (SD = 20.8 trials). Data were 
recorded at a higher frequency (1000Hz) and the default EEGlab filter order 
was applied at the same high and low bandpass levels as applied to the 9-
month-olds data. Following visual rejection, a mean of 30.6 trials remained per 
infant (SD = 11.3); 22.75 (7.5) after visual artefact rejection; 22 (6.8) following 
combined manual and automated bad channel detection and interpolation. 
There were 11.1 (3.5) and 10.9 (4.2) trials on average for the congruent and 
incongruent conditions respectively, again with a minimum cut-off of 6 trials. 
Table 3.2: Bayley (BSID-II) motor development scale tasks used with 11.5-
month-olds. 
Item No. Item description 
49 Uses partial thumb opposition to grasp pellet 
56 Uses pads of fingertips to grasp pellet 
57 Uses partial thumb opposition to grasp rod 
58 Grasps pencil at farthest end 




Additionally, the Bayley tasks on which the infants were scored were adapted 
to tasks appropriate to this older age group. The tasks used were again the 
grasping tasks that fit the age group according to the BSID-II – 49, 56, 57, 58 
and 59 on the motor scale. These tasks are listed in Table 3.2. 
3.9 Results 
Mean amplitudes in regions and time windows corresponding to the Nc and 
the N400 were analysed. Inspection of the grand averaged data did not 
indicate the presence of a P400 in this age group. 
The Nc was computed in the same time window over the same region as in 
the 9-month-olds’ analysis. The Nc component is infant-specific and has been 
shown in previous studies to disappear from the infant ERP by the second 
post-natal year (Grossmann, Striano & Friederici, 2007). Consequently an 
additional factor of time window was added to the data to compare mean 
amplitude in the Nc window to mean amplitude at baseline. This could then 
illustrate whether an Nc component was in fact present in the data. The 2-by-2 
ANOVA with factors of condition, time window and region (left or right fronto-
central) revealed no main or interaction effects for the Nc (see Table 3.3).  
Table 3.3: Results of 2-by-2 repeated measures ANOVA investigating 11.5-
month-olds’ Nc. 
Factor F df p η2p 
Time 1.583 1,14 0.229 0.102 
Region 1.269 1,14 0.279 0.083 
Congruence 2.309 1,14 0.151 0.142 
Time x Region 1.283 1,14 0.276 0.084 
Time x Congruence 2.273 1,14 0.154 0.14 
Region x 
Congruence 
1.348 1,14 0.265 0.088 
Time x Region x 
Congruence 
1.352 1,14 0.264 0.088 
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Visual inspection of the grand averaged response over the parietal (N400) 
region identified in the 9-month-olds’ data indicated no discernible difference 
between conditions. Visual inspection also suggested a slightly earlier time 
window at 11.5 months than was used with the 9-month-olds, 500 to 700ms. 
This change is justified given that ERPs tend to have shorter latencies as 
development proceeds (e.g. de Haan, Johnson & Halit, 2003). To establish 
that the N400 component was in fact present despite any similarities in how it 
was elicited between conditions, the mean amplitude over parietal electrodes 
(Figure 3.7) in each condition during this time window was compared to the 
same during the 200ms baseline period.  
 
Figure 3.7: Mean amplitude over posterior electrodes in 11.5-month-olds in 
response to the critical grasp stimulus. An N400 component is seen in the 
500-700ms time window for both conditions. 
A 2-by-2 ANOVA showed a main effect of time period, F(1,14) = 4.718, p < 
0.05, η2 = 0.2, with activity in the 500 to 700ms time-window significantly more 
negative (M = -5.77μV, SE = 3μV) than at baseline (M = -0.004μV, SE = 
0.004μV). There was no effect of condition (F(1,14) = 2.789, p = 0.117, η2 = 
0.02) nor any interaction between the factors (F(1,14) = 2.768, p = 0.118, η2 = 
0.02). Although a divergence of conditions is seen in Figure 3.7 from early on 
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in the ERP epoch, the same divergence is evident in the waveforms depicted 
in other developmental N400 studies (e.g. Friedrich & Friederici, 2008; Pace, 
Carver & Friend, 2013). Given that no effect of condition was found in the 2-
by-2 ANOVA performed on the data in the appropriate time window, this 
divergence did not affect the data. 
The mean behavioural grasping score of the infants was 3.47 (out of 5), with a 
standard deviation of 1.19 points. There was no correlation between this score 
and the size of the difference between conditions of the Nc, r = 0.366 p = 0.09. 
There was also no correlation between the difference in magnitude of each of 
the conditions in the N400 time period, r = -0.096, p = 0.73, nor between the 
difference in the mean magnitude of the N400 component overall and the 
mean amplitude during baseline, r = -0.257, p = 0.36. 
3.10 Discussion 
Results indicate a wide number of changes in grasp processing in the few 
months separating the samples. Different components are elicited by the 
same stimuli, with some (Nc, P400) no longer being present and others 
(N400) emerging. While a component comparable to the N400 was found in 
the 11.5-month-olds’ data, it did not distinguish between conditions. 
Interpreting this component as a candidate for the N400, these results suggest 
that as infants make the transition to semantic processing of actions from 
potentially associative or familiarity-based processes, they are no longer 
attending to differences in the means of apprehending objects. Specifically, 
when infants process reach-and-grasp actions semantically at 11.5 months, 
they are not incorporating the means of grasping into their semantic 
representations and not attending to these differences at an earlier stage of 
processing, such as attention (as indexed by the Nc), either. 
3.11 General Discussion 
Results from all three experiments illustrate how infants’ processing of hand-
object relationships changes at the end of the first post-natal year, and how 
89 
 
this change makes the means of representing observed action more adult-like 
in terms of the neural processes recruited. There is also a disjunction in how 
differences in hand-object relationships are attended to during development. 
Specifically, at 9 months infants do not exhibit the N400 in response to grasps 
on cups but at 11.5 months a N400 candidate emerges. This could indicate 
that semantic processes are being recruited in processing of reach-and-grasp 
actions at 11.5 months. However, unlike the adult N400, this 11.5-month-old 
N400 does not differentiate whether the grasp matches the form of the cup or 
not. Conversely, the ERP components evident at 9 months (Nc, P400) are 
elicited differently in each condition. This suggests that as infants engage in 
different means of action processing, sensitivity to differences in those actions 
changes. 
Given that the N400 measured in the experiment with 11.5-month-olds did not 
differ between conditions, it cannot be said that these infants were processing 
the semantic relationship between the hand and the cup as the adults did and 
responding differently when the grasp was not meaningful in the context of the 
cup’s shape. The presence of this ERP might instead indicate that infants 
respond to actions semantically, that is, as meaningful stimuli with specific 
structures and mutual expectancies generated by the different components of 
those actions. On the basis of a previous study in which 9-month-olds 
exhibited differences in N400 morphology to actions in which actors placed a 
food item by the semantically correct target (mouth) or an incongruent target 
(forehead, ear or crown; Reid et al., 2009), it is possible that the specific 
manifestation of this component arises because infants were processing the 
semantics of the goal-directed action presented. In the current study, upon 
seeing a hand reaching for a cup, an expectation could have been elicited 
about the conclusion of the action (grasping) and the action may have been 
processed semantically regardless of how the grasp was enacted. It is also 
possible that at eleven-and-a-half months, infants are more flexible in their 
processing of sequential stimuli in general as they begin to integrate 
possibilities into new, semantic means of processing action. With an 
established conceptualisation of action as goal-directed, means of 
performance may be allowed to differ before being cemented as semantically 
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congruous or incongruous by adulthood. This possibility mirrors work by 
Bremner and colleagues (2007) in which two-year-olds are better at 
generating novel sequences after training than three-year-olds, potentially 
because their general lower linguistic skills allow greater cognitive flexibility. 
Constraint on what can be considered a “congruent” grasp may develop later, 
with enhanced development of the semantic action processing system or 
more experience with using handled tools. 
There are some differences between the candidate N400 ERP elicited here 
and that measured in Reid and colleagues’ (2009) work, which could be 
attributed to a difference in task constraints or a difference in age. One of 
these is the morphology of the N400. In the previous work, no N400 was 
evident in the response to the congruent actions; it manifested only when the 
action conclusion was incongruous with the implicated object. In the current 
work, an N400 is seen in both conditions. Under an interpretation that the 
11.5-month-olds’ N400 was elicited as a result of the goal-directed sequence 
of the action, which was universally congruent with the action of grasping even 
if the means of grasping was incongruous with cup structure, we see a 
developmental change in the N400. It is now elicited when the goal of an 
action fits expectations. What this suggests is that developmental change in 
how actions are semantically processed. At 9 months, the semantic 
processing system is only recruited for actions that violate expectations. This 
kind of selectivity may be important for flagging unusual actions and allocating 
further processing resources via a developing action understanding 
mechanism, to allow the infant to compute why such actions are odd. At 11.5-
months, actions in which a target object is grasped are processed 
semantically regardless of the congruence of that grasp. All actions are 
processed in this manner, likely due to increased maturity of the semantic 
processing architecture. 
Another change between 9 and 11.5 months is the disappearance of the Nc 
effect. This component of the infant ERP is not always elicited as infants 
approach the second post-natal year (e.g. Grossmann, Striano & Friederici, 
2007; but see alternatively Carver & Vaccaro, 2007) so it is reasonable that it 
would be present in the younger sample only. However, at 9 months, this 
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component differentiates between the two conditions, with a larger Nc for the 
incongruent than the congruent stimuli, indicating that the infants allocated 
more attention to these stimuli. This could be plausibly attributed to the infants 
seeing the congruent grasps in their daily lives with greater frequency than the 
incongruent ones, rather than processing of whether the grasp is appropriate 
for the cup’s form or not. The presence of an N400 does not contra-indicate 
the Nc (Friedrich & Friederici, 2011; Reid et al., 2009), so the lack of Nc at the 
older age, in conjunction with an N400 that does not differentiate between 
conditions, may be due to diminished sensitivity to sub-components of actions 
and a more generalised attribution of meaning to action.  
The Nc component is diminished in this study’s older infant sample. Previous 
infant N400 research has suggested that the morphology of the N400 differs 
between infancy and adulthood (that is, it does not manifest fronto-centrally in 
infancy) because a large Nc is present in that region (Reid et al., 2009). In the 
current work, the N400 is apparent over the parietal region despite an absent 
Nc component. This indicates another developmental difference in infant and 
adult N400 ERPs. Amoruso and colleagues (2013) suggest that despite 
similar differences in topography, adult N400s to actions and to language 
share a common generator. The difference in topography in this study’s 
samples may be the result of developmental factors related to measurement 
of the EEG at the scalp, such as wide-ranging changes in synaptic density 
that continue into toddlerhood (Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 1997), and 
differences in scalp and skull density (Reynolds & Richards, 2009). It may also 
be due to developmental differences in how semantic processing of action 
occurs at the neuronal population level that are beyond the scope of this work 
to further elucidate. 
The P400 is another component that is not seen in the 11.5-month-olds’ data 
but manifests at 9 months and differs between conditions. Previous research 
has shown that the P400 responds to differences in social stimuli. This 
component is differentially elicited by shifts of eye gaze toward and away from 
the infant (Elsabbagh et al., 2012), and by different emotional facial 
expressions (Hoehl & Striano, 2008). Other research has shown a larger P400 
in response to congruous stimuli, in the sense that the direction of a pointing 
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or reaching hand matched the previous appearance of an object (Bakker et 
al., 2014, 6-month-olds; Gredebäck, Melinder & Daum, 2010, 8-month-olds). 
At thirteen months, the P400 is larger in response to incongruently oriented 
hands. In the present study, a larger P400 was found for grasps that did not 
match the structure of the apprehended cup. No strong conclusions can be 
drawn given that the manifestation of the P400 was incidental, that is, the 
study was not designed to elicit it. Furthermore, the P400 has no established 
adult homologue. Initially, the P400 was believed to be a face-sensitive 
component analogous, as part of the N290-P400 complex, to the adult N170 
(de Haan, Johnson & Halit, 2003). Investigation of the N170 in relation to 
perception of hands is sparse. An early N170 study by Bentin and colleagues 
(1996) found that the component was responsive to faces and not to hands or 
objects. However, Allison, Puce and McCarthy suggest that the generator of 
the N170 lies in the superior temporal sulcus, which has been shown (via 
positron emission tomography) to encode body and hand stimuli. Gredebäck, 
Melinder and Daum (2010) find that an N200 in adults distinguished between 
hands pointing toward or away from objects. A negative component in such 
close temporal proximity to the N170 may indeed be the same component. 
The conflict with the results of Bentin and colleagues (1996) may be due to 
the specific “communicativeness” of the hands in the Gredebäck, Melinder 
and Daum (2010) work. That is, because the hands in the latter study were 
associated with the appearance of targets in specific spatial locations, they 
may have been processed differently from the hands presented without 
context in the former study. Nonetheless, if we assume that 9-month-olds, like 
8-month-olds (Gredebäck, Melinder & Daum, 2010), exhibit larger P400 
components to socially salient stimuli, the incongruent grasps may have 
elicited this response as the infants perceived the unfamiliar grasp as having 
communicative relevance. 
With the precise processes indexed by the P400 and its potential adult 
homologues outside of face perception, categorisation and recognition not 
strongly determined, interpretation of its function in the present study cannot 
be strongly deterministic. Likewise, without analyzing adult data for a P400 
homologue such as the N170 or N200, the conclusions that can be drawn 
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about the development of grasp encoding are limited. For example, if a P400 
homologue were found in the adult data in addition to the N400, it would rule 
out the possibility that the infant P400 is a precursor to the N400. Conversely, 
if it were not found, it might suggest further differences in how infants and 
adult encode action and would strengthen the case that the development of 
grasp encoding is U-shaped, with modes of processing grasp developing, 
being suppressed, and re-emerging before adulthood. 
The absence of correlation effects between the infants’ grasping scores and 
the relative size difference in the elicited components suggests that motor 
experience and concomitant motor representations are not integral to 
associative and semantic representations of grasps. Previous studies drawing 
connections between processing of grasp size and orientation and grasping 
ability (Bakker et al., 2014; Daum, Prinz & Aschersleben, 2012) involved 
younger participants. Those with comparably aged infants employed a 
functional task to assess ability to use precision grips, rather than a task in 
which the infant had to directly apprehend an object in front of them (Loucks & 
Sommerville, 2012). At 9 months, the relationship between a cup and the 
grasp executed upon it may be processed on the basis of observational 
experience. At 11 months, infants do not differentiate between the grasp-
object relationships at the semantic level and this lack of distinction is not 
explained by individual differences in grasping ability.  
One explanation of the results is that the kinds of processes reflected in the 
neural components evident in the infant samples – likely including attention to 
grasping, sensitivity to the social or communicative elements of the same, and 
semantic processing of the action – are separable from motor experience and 
potentially from motor processes more generally. If the study were designed to 
incorporate an index of motor or ideomotor activation such as mu 
desynchronization (e.g. Southgate et al., 2010) a relationship to grasping 
ability may have emerged. Alternatively, it is possible that the lack of 
relationship between the behavioural and neural measures could have been 
driven by the inappropriateness of the specific grasping measures employed. 
The grasping scores from the adapted Bayley measures were homogenous 
within each sample, indicating that most infants from 9 months onward can 
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pick up an object with thumb-finger opposition. A functional task along the 
lines of that used by Loucks and Sommerville (2012) may have captured 
individual action execution differences explicative of neural processing 
differences. Their task required that infants shaped their hand appropriately in 
advance of grasp execution, indicating prior knowledge of the appropriate 
action end-state. Such knowledge may be the foundation of representations of 
appropriate manual interactions with objects of different shapes. 
3.12 Conclusions 
The infant data suggest that the path from early processing of the relationship 
between cups and hands to adult processing of the same is not linear. Nine-
month-olds are sensitive to the difference between grasps that match the form 
of the (familiar) object being acted upon, and those that do not match it. This 
sensitivity is manifested at the attentional (Nc) level and also in the P400 
component which is associated with processing of social or communicative 
stimuli (e.g. Gredebäck, Melinder & Daum, 2010). At 11.5 months, these 
stimuli elicit a candidate N400 component, but the distinction between the two, 
even at an earlier attentional level, is no longer present. In adulthood, the 
N400 distinguishes between grasps that are congruent with the form of the 
object being apprehended and those that are not.  
Other research has shown that infants do not form (potentially semantic) 
associations between actions, objects and outcomes linearly (Perone, Madole 
& Oakes, 2011; Perone & Oakes, 2006) – all aspects of an action are not 
equal in infant representations. The results obtained here indicate that as 
infants’ processing of actions becomes more adult-like in their employment of 
what, based on correspondences with previous research (Kutas & 
Federmeier, 2011; Pace, Carver & Friend, 2013; Reid et al., 2009), appears to 
be a developing semantic representational system, aspects of the action 
unrelated to the overall target of the action or the relationship between the 
object employed and the goal are not processed. Initial semantic 
representations of actions rely on the goal-directedness of the action in order 
to establish the action as meaningful, as in Reid and colleagues’ work (2009), 
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and this is likely what was encoded by the older infant sample in this study, if 
the identified component is an N400. Other aspects of the action, which 
convey something meaningful about the action but do not prevent the goal of 
the action or violate the typical use associated with the implicated object, are 
not incorporated into these representations at this period in infancy.  
Before development of a semantic representational system, infants process 
diverse aspects of a tool-mediated action, including whether the shape of the 
grasp matches the form of the tool. Whether because of greater visual 
experience with specific grasps on familiar objects, or because of some other 
form of matching (e.g. associating wide apertures with large targets), 9-month-
old infants allocate more attention to the grasps that are incongruent with the 
implicated object. They also process them in the same manner as they would 
for many kinds of socially salient action, such as pointing fingers and direct 
gaze. With the initiation of a semantic processing system certain aspects – 
those that give overall significance to the action – are prioritized for 
processing. Other elements of the action, such as the tool-hand interaction, 
are not semantically processed at this period in development. Semantic 
processing of grasp congruence may emerge when the system is more 
mature (e.g. biologically), or when representations of typical actions, such as 
grasping a cup or other common tool, are sufficiently entrenched to allow 










Prelude to Chapter 4 
If motor component of actions do not play a role in semantic action 
processing in the first post-natal year, is there a relationship in the 
other direction? Do semantic aspects of action affect motor 
processing? 
The preceding series of experiments showed that adults incorporate the 
relationship between object and hand into semantic representations of action 
and respond with a larger N400 component when the shape of the grasp used 
does not fit the shape of the target object. They also showed that there is a 
fundamental, quantitative change in how the same stimuli are processed in 
the first post-natal year. At nine months of age, infants allocate additional 
processing resources to stimuli depicting incongruent grasps on objects but 
these differences disappear by around eleven-and-a-half months of age. 
Instead, at this later stage, we see evidence for semantic processing of all 
stimuli, suggesting that although semantic processing of action has emerged it 
does not incorporate this information about the precise means of performing a 
grasping action. Taking into account the lack of correlation between grasping 
skill and neural processing of these stimuli, motor resonance does not seem 
to affect conceptual processing of reach-to-grasp actions at this age.  
Comparative single-cell recording (Umiltà et al., 2001) and functional 
neuroimaging (Chao & Martin, 2000) research indicate that semantic and 
motor processes are linked in action perception. There is also the involvement 
of the primate homologue of Broca’s area in mirror system function (Gallese et 
al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996) to consider, in conjunction with parietal and 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) input to premotor areas (Kilner, Friston & Frith, 
2007; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). In humans, Broca’s area has been 
associated with semantic processing (Dapretto & Bookheimer, 1999; Rodd, 
Davis & Johnsrude, 2005), the inferior parietal lobule with integration of visual 
and motor inputs (Mattingley et al., 1998), and the STS with processing and 
integrating the meaning of perceptual input, particularly with regards to its 
communicative elements (Redcay, 2008; Redcay, Kleiner & Saxe, 2012). 
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Thus the regions involved in the mirror system according to the predictive 
model of Kilner, Friston and Frith (2007) are collectively involved in creating 
associations between visual and motor input and evaluating the significance of 
those associations. Thus, they offer evidence for the joint involvement of 
semantic and motor processes in the mirror neuron system. 
Another study found that meaningful actions engaged a fronto-temporal action 
processing system more strongly than meaningless actions (Decety et al., 
1997). This finding and the above studies all indicate that action mirroring 
could be a two-step process, as proposed by Gallese and Goldman (1998), in 
which processing of the meaning of observed actions feeds into motor 
activation. In extended terms, action mirroring is a series of feedback and 
feedforward loops in which superior temporal sulcus, parietal regions and 
premotor regions are all involved, incorporating in their activity Bayesian 
inference based on prior information about actions and current progress of the 
action (Kilner, Friston & Frith, 2007). 
Gallese and Lakoff (2005) also suggest that conceptual elements of action are 
accessed via the sensorimotor system alone, independent of other cortical 
regions. However, results within Chapter 3 partially contradict this. At 9 
months, the differential allocation of attention to congruent and incongruent 
grasps on objects suggests some kind of associative action processing that 
exists with no relationship to grasping skill. This is because grasping skill likely 
indexes the ability to access a motor representation of observed grasps 
(Daum, Prinz & Aschersleben, 2011; Loucks & Sommerville, 2012). When 
semantic processing of reach-to-grasp actions emerges (as a goal-directed as 
opposed to means-focused process), again this relationship between 
execution and perceptual or conceptual processing is absent. It may be that 
conceptual elements of action can be accessed via the sensorimotor system 
alone once conceptual representations are entrenched, but conceptual and 
sensorimotor representations of action may initially develop in isolation from 
one another. More recent, associative accounts of mirror system function 
(Cook et al., 2014) support this conceptualisation of motor representation of 
action in development, as repeated associations between observed actions 
and performed actions result in responses to observed action that are elicited 
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via ideomotor resonance after sufficient repetitions of the association. Recent 
work by de Klerk and colleagues (2015) also suggests that the mirror system 
in development operates via visuomotor matchings. It may be that in the 
previous study, the 9-month-old infants were simply too young and 
inexperienced with precise object manipulation for associative processes to 
have been linked to grasp execution. In the 11.5-month-olds group, the 
developmental trajectory had changed, with grasp not incorporated into 
semantic or associative processing of action and consequently there could be 
no direct visuomotor-mapping relationship between these processes and 
production of precision grasping. 
Another way to investigate the relationship between motor and semantic 
processes in development is to take actions that are identical in their motor 
elements, but differ in their meaning. In the previous chapter, semantic 
processing of grasp was measured. In the next chapter, changes in mirror 
system function in response to identical grasps that differed in congruence 
were measured. In this study, the shape of the actor’s hand as it grasped a 
spoon was the same in all conditions. If the grasp were a radial grasp 
(functional end of tool near thumb/index finger) a normal action would ensue. 
If it were an ulnar grasp (functional end near little finger) the ensuing action 
would not be one typically associated with (or congruent with) the tool, 
although the end goal would be accomplished in all cases. 
Desynchronization of EEG activity in the 6-9Hz bands, over central or fronto-
central electrodes, is thought to represent activation of the motor system. This 
kind of activity is found in infants from about 9 months as they observe others’ 
goal-directed actions (Nyström et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2010), and is 
thought to be homologous to the firing of premotor neurons in macaques as 
they observe goal-directed action (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). 
If this activity is elicited purely by sensorimotor matching, no difference in 
response to the execution of the grasps would be expected. If this activity 
arises from mirror system function in the sense of a two-stage (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998), Bayesian (Kilner, Friston & Frith, 2007) or conceptual 
sensorimotor (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005) system, it would be expected that 
motor activation would be affected by semantic differences in the grasp-object 
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relationship, provided that the age group studied had formed reliable 
associations between the orientation of a grasp on a tool and success in using 
that tool. 
Taken in context with the previous studies in this thesis, there is cause for 
some precaution in designing such a study. Chapter 2 indicates that 16-
month-olds do not encode object orientation when associating specific tool-
ends with actors’ goals. However, the tool used in Chapter 2 was a dual 
function tool and consequently presented elevated complexities in encoding 
(Barrett, Davis & Needham, 2007; Paulus, Hunnius & Bekkering, 2012) 
relative to a simple tool with a familiar function, such as a spoon used for 
eating. Results from Chapter 3 illustrate that during development, differences 
between grasps congruent and incongruent with a familiar object’s shape are 
detected. Work on infant use of spoons (McCarty, Clifton & Collard, 1999; 
McCarty, Clifton & Collard, 2001) illustrates that appropriate grasps on spoons 
for efficient eating can be executed as young as 9 months and become more 
consistently executed early in the second post-natal year.  
By measuring 9- to 11-month-olds’ neural activity associated with mirror 
system function in response to motorically similar but semantically distinct 
spoon-use actions, and by relating those responses to the infants’ own motor-
planning skills during spoon use, it may be possible to determine how the 
semantic or conceptual elements of actions, beyond goal-directedness, are 











Infant mirror responses to motorically similar and semantically 
distinct actions. 
Abstract 
Mirror system function is a two-stage process, incorporating attribution of 
meaning to observed actions in addition to motor resonance in response to 
those actions. The aim of the present study was to elucidate how pre-existing 
conceptual representations of action modulate mirror system function in the 
developing brain. In order to do so, EEG data were recorded from 32 infants 
(14 retained) between nine-and-a-half and eleven months of age as they 
watched videos of actors grasping and eating from spoons using identical 
grasps that differed in orientation relative to the spoon and consequently in 
congruence with eating. Event-related desynchronization in the 5 to 9 Hz band 
of EEG activity over central electrodes was measured and compared for 
congruent and incongruent grasping and eating actions. Participants’ motor 
planning was measured during a self-feeding task performed by the infants. 
Results affirm that motor activation during action observation is a predictive 
process. No overall effect of action congruence on motor activation was found 
but correlation of motor activation with self-feeding behaviour indicates that 
better ability to plan actions is related to the size of the difference in response 
to incongruent and congruent actions. These results have implications for 
visuomotor association and predictive coding accounts of mirror system 
function. 
4.1 Introduction 
Research into mirror system function suggests that premotor neural activation 
is a fundamental component of how we perceive others’ actions (Fadiga et al., 
1995; Gallese, Rizzolatti & Keysers, 2004). Single cell recordings in non-
human primates indicate a correspondence between firing patterns for the 
101 
 
same actions performed and observed (Gallese et al., 1996). Mirror system 
principles have been applied to research on diverse topics from imitation 
(Brass & Heyes, 2005) to empathy (Carr et al., 2003) to psychiatric illnesses 
(Arbib & Mundhenk, 2005). Investigation of mirror system function is 
particularly interesting in the context of developmental action perception. In 
characterising the operation of the mirror system in infancy it becomes 
possible to determine whether other means of processing action – social, 
associative, teleological, and semantic – are dependent on the development 
of initial ideomotor correspondences or emerge as independent systems. In 
the work described here, the relationship between motor and semantic action 
processing systems at the end of the first post-natal year was investigated. 
One means by which mirror system function can be characterised is via the 
mu (sensorimotor alpha) and beta rhythms of electroencephalographic (EEG) 
activity. Parallels are drawn between activity in these frequency bands and 
activation of brain regions associated with mirror system function in studies 
using magnetoencephalography (MEG; Caetano, Jousmäki & Hari, 2007) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; Perry & Bentin, 2009). Using 
mu desynchronization as a correlate for mirror system function has also been 
justified by studies showing its modulation by the same factors that modulate 
mirror neuron activity in primate studies (Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson & 
McNair, 2004). Mirror activity is generally recorded over fronto-central and 
central electrodes and occurs in adults at 8 to 12 Hz (mu) and 12 to 24 Hz 
(beta; e.g. van Elk et al., 2010). In infants, beta is less well-characterised (but 
see van Elk et al., 2008) whereas mu desynchronization has been widely 
studied (Marshall, Young & Meltzoff, 2011; Nyström et al., 2011; Southgate & 
Begus, 2013; Southgate et al., 2010). Alpha activity in general (including mu) 
manifests in infants at a lower frequency than in adults, around 6 to 9 Hz 
(Stroganova et al., 1999). Mirror system function and more general motor 
resonance processes are indexed by a decrease in power in the alpha band of 
EEG recorded over central scalp regions. This power decrease or suppression 
is the result of desynchronization of population activity. Consequently, motor 
activation, mu desynchronization or suppression and decrease in mu power 
are terms used with high but not full interchangeability in the literature. In the 
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present work, motor activation and mirror activation will be used to describe 
the general phenomenon under investigation and mu desynchronization to 
describe the specific phenomenon measured. 
The question of how semantic processing systems interact with the mirror 
system is fundamental. Since the initial primate research, mirror neurons have 
been specifically stated to respond to goal-directed actions (Gallese et al., 
1996; Rizzolatti et al, 1996). Goals provide semantic context or meaning for 
actions. The presence of a goal or target makes an action predictable. While 
mirror activation can be thought of as an ideomotor, automatic or involuntary 
response (e.g. Brass, Prinz & Bekkering, 2001), if pre-existing representations 
of the implicated actions did not exist, there would be no justification for why 
motorically similar but conceptually or semantically dissimilar actions could 
result in differential mu desynchronization, as happens in many infant studies 
(Nyström et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2010; Stapel et al., 2010). Returning to 
the earliest works on mirror system function, Gallese and Goldman (1998) 
indicated that although superior temporal sulcus (STS) and premotor (inferior 
frontal gyrus/IFG, macaque F5) neurons are involved in semantic and motor 
processing of observed action respectively, both systems “could represent 
distinct stages of the same analysis” (p. 499, Box 2). That is, mirror system 
activation follows initial visual or auditory (e.g. Caetano, Jousmäki & Hari, 
2007) detection of meaning in a perceived action. A later conception of mirror 
system function moved from a model in which representations are fed forward 
from STS to prefrontal regions via parietal regions, to a Bayesian model in 
which prior expectations or typically co-activated pathways allow each mirror 
system module to provide predictive representations to its preceding module 
(Kilner, Friston & Frith, 2007). This model provides further justification for why 
semantic and motor processing of actions are strongly linked, as ideomotor 
responses to actions can be elicited in anticipation of a specific goal based on 
previously-held representations of actions similar to the observed action, 
rather than being dependent on having a complete representation of the 
current action. This goes some way to explaining why mirror neurons respond 
to actions before their completion (Gallese et al., 1996) and when the 
completion is occluded from view (Umiltà et al., 2001). 
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This relationship between motor aspects and semantic elements of actions is 
borne out in the infant mu desynchronization research. The mirror system is 
differentially activated by actions with an occluded but plausible goal and 
those with no discernible goal, even when the actions are motorically identical 
(Southgate et al., 2010). It is also differentially activated by actions casually 
initiated by the actor and those occurring coincidentally (Nyström et al., 2011), 
and by actions that match the context in which they are performed and those 
that do not (Stapel et al., 2010). Thus, the conceptual or semantic aspects of 
these familiar actions modulate the infants’ ideomotor responses. There is 
extensive evidence that infants hold representations of many different 
elements of actions, including action structure (Baldwin et al., 2001; Reid et 
al., 2007), actors’ goals (Woodward, 1998) and artefact function (Perone, 
Madole & Oakes, 2011). Drawing direct parallels with the above-cited mu 
desynchronization findings, they represent occluded targets of reaching 
(Daum et al., 2009, relating to Southgate et al., 2010), associate common 
artefacts with specific targets (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010, relating to Stapel 
et al., 2010), and respond differently to causal and associated action effects 
(Träuble & Pauen, 2011, relating to Nyström et al., 2011). Consequently, it is 
reasonable to infer that even in infants, there is an element of prediction in 
mirror system function, with semantic representations from STS and parietal 
regions feeding forward to IFG and other premotor regions, and receiving 
feedback as action processing continues.  
The work of Stapel and colleagues (2010) integrates well into the predictive 
coding model of Kilner, Friston & Frith (2007). Whereas no mu 
desynchronization was found in response to the non-goal-directed actions 
shown by Southgate and colleagues (2010) and Nyström and colleagues 
(2011), Stapel and colleagues (2010) found that greater mu desynchronization 
is elicited by observed actions that violate the goal usually associated with an 
implicated object. They showed 12-month-olds videos of actors bringing cups 
to the mouth or to the ear. Their explanation of the results was that whereas 
the lifting of the cup elicited motor activation in both cases, the bringing of the 
cup to the ear elicited greater motor activation as the representation needed to 
be updated for the novel action. The resultant stronger motor activation can be 
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accounted for as premotor activation in response to the action feeds back to 
semantic processing regions, leading to updated representations and 
predictions. In the case of the standard use of the cup, feed-forward activation 
without extensive feedback modulation or iterative Bayesian predictions is 
sufficient to represent the action. 
Developmental populations do create some challenges for a predictive, STS-
parietal-premotor model of mirror system function. There is no evidence of the 
N400 event-related potential (ERP) at 7 months of age (Reid et al., 2009), 
indicating that infants at this age do not process actions semantically, or at 
least have a qualitatively different means of doing so than older infants, 
children and adults. However, there is evidence from near-infrared 
spectroscopy (NIRS; Shimada & Hiraki, 2006) and independent component 
analysis (ICA) ERPs (but not mu desynchronization; Nyström, 2008) that the 
infant motor system responds differentially to observed actions and observed 
motion at six to seven months of age. There remains a theoretical question of 
whether what was measured in these studies was mirror system function or 
general motor resonance. The distinction between these two processes can 
be drawn via Uithol and colleagues’ (2011) characterization of interpersonal 
and intrapersonal motor resonance – in the former case, the resonance is 
between the motor states of executor and observer, in the latter, it is between 
the observer’s perceptual representation of an action and their motor 
representation thereof. While mirror system function involves both inter- and 
intrapersonal resonance, motor resonance may be purely intrapersonal and 
can be elicited by stimuli other than goal-directed actions. For example, 
Proverbio (2012) found that the mu rhythm is desynchronized (in adults) more 
strongly to images of tools than images of non-tool artefacts. Neural activation 
in response to tool pictures as measured by fMRI (Chao & Martin, 2000) and 
positron emission tomography (PET; Grafton et al., 1997) occurs in regions 
associated with execution and observation of actions. Consequently, neural 
measures of mirror system function without source localization or conceptual 
or semantic manipulation may be confounded with measures of motor 
resonance. As the work of Shimada and Hiraki (2006) and Nyström (2008) 
compared congruent actions with non-action moving and static stimuli, it is 
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possible that the motor activation measured in infants before the emergence 
of semantic action processing relates to general resonant processes rather 
than the mirror system specifically. Later work with older infants (e.g. Nyström 
et al., 2011; Stapel et al., 2010) compared conceptually different actions to 
find differences in mu desynchronization that may be more strongly related to 
the developing mirror system. It is also important to note that associative 
rather than semantic representations of action may modulate mirror system 
function during development (Gerson, Bekkering & Hunnius, 2014). 
Despite or perhaps because of the challenge of the different chronological 
emergence of motor activation in response to observed actions and of 
semantic action processing, characterizing the relationship of these action 
processing systems to one another in early development is important. In 
asking such a question it also becomes possible to see how motor experience 
affects mirror system function. The first two years of life show a marked 
transformation from the neonate who cannot lift her head, to the crawling and 
upright-sitting infant, to the toddler who can walk unassisted and manipulate 
small objects with ease. All of these changes are accompanied by 
concomitant perceptual or cognitive developments (Anderson et al., 2013; 
Corbetta, Thelen & Johnson, 2000; Soska, Adolph & Johnson, 2010). Looking 
at neural mirroring in development allows the investigation of the question of 
whether observing others’ actions leads to resonance in the representation of 
the goal or of the minutiae of the action itself. For example, while adults might 
learn novel motor sequences via observation and show similarities in motor 
activity during observation and execution of such sequences (Cross et al., 
2009), participants in studies of these phenomena generally have the physical 
motor capacity to perform each step in the sequence even if they have not 
done so previously. Infants, however, may have motor restrictions on their 
performance of certain actions. Van Elk and colleagues (2008) compared mu 
and beta desynchronization is 14- and 16-month-old crawlers and walkers. 
They found greater beta suppression for videos of infants crawling relative to 
walking, and found that the difference in the size of mu and beta effects for 
crawling relative to walking was correlated with the infants own crawling 
experience. That is, infants with more months of crawling experience showed 
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greater relative mu and beta suppression to crawling videos than their peers 
with less crawling experience. Thus we see that the achievement of a motor 
milestone such as walking does not fundamentally and immediately alter 
neural responses during observation of the same action, but that greater 
experience of an action, such as crawling, does lead to stronger motor 
representations. 
The contribution of experience as sustained process and not a one-off event 
can be seen in the work of de Klerk and colleagues (2015). Seven- to 9-
month-old infants were given walking experience on a treadmill with 
contingent or non-contingent observation of their own or another infant’s legs 
stepping. All infants, including those receiving no training, showed greater mu 
desynchronization to observation of others’ stepping at post- than at pre-test. 
While there were no overall group differences, among the infants in the 
contingent condition, there was a correlation between the amount of training 
received and mu desynchronization at post-test relative to pre-test. Thus, a 
greater degree of experience, whether motor (van Elk et al., 2008) or 
visuomotor (de Klerk et al., 2015), leads to stronger mirror representations of 
actions. This fits with predictive coding accounts of mirror system function 
(Kilner et al., 2007) and associative accounts of mirror system development 
(Cook et al., 2014). However, given that infants with no walking experience 
also exhibited differences in mu desynchronization between pre- and post-
test, there emerges a question of how mere visual experience can elicit mirror 
system activation in a purely associative manner. It is possible that this is due 
to goal simulation. Alpha desynchronization occurs in 9-month-olds in 
response to the movement of a toy (an action they can perform), regardless of 
whether it is moved by a hand or a claw, or self-propelled (Southgate & 
Begus, 2013). The results of this study suggest that early mirror system 
function may be driven by teleological or other conceptual representations of 
action (e.g. Csibra, 2003). This might result in responses driven by elicitation 
of action representations of achieving the assumed goal of the observed 
action, rather than following its specific gestural or motor elements. This 
developmental work (Southgate & Begus, 2013) and the motor experience 
work (de Klerk et al., 2015; van Elk et al., 2008) suggest that the mirror 
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system incorporates resonance in terms of both the goal of an observed 
action and the means of performing that action. 
The research detailed above indicates that (1) ideomotor responses are found 
in infants in response to actions from 6 months of age (Shimada & Hiraki, 
2006), (2) by the end of the first post-natal year, these responses are 
modulated by conceptual aspects of actions and thus relate to mirror system 
function (Nyström et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2010), (3) motor activation is 
predictive and enhanced during simulation of novel actions (Stapel et al., 
2010), and (4) visuomotor experience of the specific motor components 
observed action are not necessary for the action to elicit mu 
desynchronization (de Klerk et al., 2015). From the state of current knowledge 
about the mirror system in infancy, some key questions remain. One of these 
is the extent to which conceptual or semantic action information modulates 
mirror system activation, in the absence of differentiating motor information. 
Another is the extent to which mirror system activation is predictive for actions 
that differ in this manner. Finally, if mirror system activation is predictive of the 
conclusions of actions that are conceptually congruent or incongruent, it may 
not be that overall visuomotor experience with a particular movement is 
necessary for the elicitation of mirror responses. Rather, it may be that the 
infant’s ability to execute a movement in line with an overarching goal, that is, 
the ability to plan an action on a combined motor-semantic level, affects their 
mirror system’s response to others’ actions.  
To address these questions, infants were shown videos of actors eating from 
spoons and given opportunity to execute self-feeding actions with a spoon 
afterwards. A 9- to 10.5-month-old age group was tested, as at this age the 
ability to self-feed with spoons and to grasp handled tools appropriately is 
emergent but variable (McCarty, Clifton & Collard, 1999; McCarty, Clifton & 
Collard, 2001). In order to investigate both the predictive nature of mirror 
system function in infancy, and its responsiveness to semantic modulation 
without concurrent motor differences in the execution of the action (e.g. the 
change in object trajectory in Stapel and colleagues, 2010), actors executed 
an identical grasp on a spoon perpendicular to their reach. Depending on the 
left-right orientation of the spoon to their grasp, the self-feeding action could 
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be executed congruently with standard spoon use, or incongruently, at an 
angle not usually associated with spoon use. After observation of these 
videos, the infants were given a self-feeding task similar to that presented by 
McCarty, Clifton and Collard (1999). Their motor planning ability was rated 
based on whether they grasped the spoon by the handle, whether they 
needed to transfer the spoon between hands, and whether they succeeded in 
eating from the spoon without first making an error such as putting the handle 
in the mouth.  
It was hypothesised that the size of the difference in mu desynchronization at 
the time of the actor’s grasp on the spoon would be correlated with the infant’s 
action planning ability. That is, those infants who could pick up a spoon 
correctly for eating would perceive the difference in the relationship between 
the hand and the spoon. This would manifest as greater motor activation in 
response to the incongruent grasp because the ensuing eating action would 
require an update of existing motor programs, as in Stapel and colleagues’ 
(2010) work. Such a result would indicate that mirror system function is 
predictive in infancy, that semantic or conceptual aspects of action modulate 
it, and that it is affected by action planning ability. It was further hypothesised 
that there would be no group differences at the time of eating but that there 
would be an overall difference in mu desynchronization between conditions at 
this time – specifically that the incongruent action would elicit greater 
desynchronization, again because of the need to update existing action 
representations. Results in line with these hypotheses would illustrate that 
mirror system activation in response to self-feeding with tools incorporates 
semantic representations and has predictive elements prior to the end of the 
first postnatal year. These results would also elucidate the effects of action 
planning experience, in contrast to motor or visuomotor experience, on action 









Participants were 32 infants recruited from the database of interested families 
held by the Baby Research Centre at Radboud University, Nijmegen, where 
this study was conducted. Ethical approval for the research was granted in 
accordance with regulations for research with infants and children at Radboud 
University Nijmegen. At the time of the study, infant participants ranged 
between 9 months, 18 days and 10 months, 22 days in age. Eight infants were 
excluded for overall poor data quality. One infant was excluded due to 
experimenter error (no video recording of experiment). One infant was 
excluded for attending to insufficient trials without simultaneous movement (< 
9 trials). With a liberal inclusion criterion of three trials per condition (e.g. 
Gerson, Bekkering and Hunnius, 2014), six further infants were excluded for 
not having sufficient artefact free trials. In the case of these six infants, 
sufficient good quality trials were available in the experimental conditions but 
not in the baseline condition. 
4.2.2 Stimuli 
Stimuli were a series of videos depicting actors picking up and eating from 
spoons. Actors were seated at a table with a spoon resting on a plate in front 
of them. Three actors were used, and for each actor a total of eight scenarios 
were filmed. The handle of the spoon was placed on the left or right side of the 
bowl; the actor used their left or right hand; and for visual variety to encourage 
a longer period of attentiveness from the infant, the spoon contained either 
vanilla yoghurt or chocolate mousse at the beginning of the video. 
The actions were timed with a metronome to maintain consistency across 
actors and scenarios. Videos were each approximately 6 seconds long. At the 
beginning of each video, the actor was shown for one second (one 
metronome beat) sitting at the table with their hands concealed from view 
below it. During the second metronome beat, they reached for the spoon and 
on the third grasped it at the middle with a whole hand grasp. On the fourth 
beat they picked it up and brought it to the mouth, opening the mouth and 
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inserting the spoon on the fifth beat and holding the spoon in the (closed) 
mouth on the sixth. Videos originally contained the removal and replacement 
of the spoon on the plate and the placing of the hands back below the table-
top but these steps were removed during editing.  Final videos were not 
exactly six seconds long because of naturalistic variations in the actors’ timing 
of their movements. The average video length was 6.004 seconds, with a 
standard deviation of 22ms. Given that the trials were defined by specific time-
points within the videos linked not to the metronome but to the actor’s own 
actions, and given that each time point was equal in length and contained the 
same part of the action across trials, these minor variations could not have 
affected results. 
The critical manipulation came from the relationship between the hand used 
by the actor and the orientation of the spoon. In half of all scenarios, the 
spoon was grasped in a radial grip. That is, the thumb and forefinger were 
nearest the bowl of the spoon, as in a normal means of using a spoon. The 
spoon was then brought to the mouth and inserted from the same side of the 
body as the hand used, resulting in a straightforward eating action. In other 
cases, the spoon was grasped in an ulnar grip, with the little finger nearest the 
functional end. In this case the spoon was brought across the midline of the 
body and the bowl inserted at the opposite side of the mouth from the arm 
used, resulting in an unusual endpoint that would be difficult to achieve from a 
motor standpoint (and actors did express the challenge of eating thus). 
Crucially, the shape and motion of the hand was identical during the reach for, 
grasp on and lifting of the spoon. Nothing about the action, until the movement 
of the arm to either side of the midline, was predictive of how it would proceed 
except for the relationship of the radial and ulnar sides of the actor’s hand to 
the functional end of the spoon. 
Videos were edited to remove sound and to restrict the view such that the 
actors were seen from the nose down. This was to prevent the actors’ faces 
from being a distraction to the infants during the critical manual action, and to 
prevent any changes in stimulus processing that might result from facial 
ostensive cues from the actor or a lack thereof.. Example frames from the 
videos can be seen in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.2 depicts the motor similarities in 
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the grasps in each video at the grasping time points, as well as the differences 
in the eating time points. 
 
Figure 4.1: A series of frames from the stimulus videos. A and B are frames 
from the same video. An actor grasps the spoon in a manner in which the 
radial hand orientation is congruent with standard use of the spoon (A). He 
then brings it to the mouth in a standard manner (B). Frames C and D come 
from a video depicting an incongruous, ulnar grasp orientation for spoon use 
(C), resulting in an unusual eating action (D). 
For the baseline trials, static abstract images were used. These were similar 
to those employed in previous infant action observation studies (Marshall, 
Young & Meltzoff, 2011; Saby, Marshall & Meltzoff, 2012). The mu 
desynchronization exhibited by infants in response to such images has been 
identified as one of a number of appropriate baseline measures for such 
studies (Cuevas et al., 2014). Images were displayed for an equal amount of 




Figure 4.2: Images showing close-ups from frames of the stimulus videos. In 
row A, the congruent stimuli are shown, with row B showing the incongruent 
stimuli. Note that the posture of the hand is similar in both cases except for its 
relationship to the functional end of the spoon. The final, eating posture differs 
in both hand posture and hand-spoon relationship. 
4.2.3 Procedure 
4.2.3a EEG recording 
The study contained two parts. In the first part, infants watched the video 
stimuli during EEG recording. In the second part, infants were presented with 
a range of spoons in a paradigm adapted from McCarty, Clifton and Collard 
(2001). Before the study began, infants were given some time to play and 
interact with the experimenters while the study was explained to the 
caregivers and consent to participate was given. Parents were given standard 
instruction for developmental EEG research – not to allow the child to move 
around excessively and to try to re-orient the child to the screen if necessary 
but not to engage in communication with the infant about the nature of the 
videos. 
EEG data was obtained using a 32-electrode ActiCap EEG system (Brain 
Products, Munich) arranged according to the 10-20 system. The signal was 
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rereferenced to the vertex during recording, amplified using a BrainAmp 
amplifier (Brain Products, Munich) and digitised at 500 Hz. Following 
application of the EEG cap and electrodes to the infant’s head, electrodes 
were checked for impedance ranges and in the case of electrodes with poor 
impedance (above 60 kΩ) attempts to improve it were made (i.e. by improving 
adherence of the electrode to the scalp or adding additional electrolyte gel to 
the associated well). The infants and their caregiver were then brought from 
the experiment control room into the adjacent stimulus presentation room. The 
infant was seated on the lap of their caregiver in front of a computer monitor at 
a distance of approximately 50cm. The electrodes were connected to the 
amplifier at this time. 
The infant’s EEG was recorded using BrainVision Recorder (Brain Products, 
Munich). The ongoing EEG was monitored using this program from the control 
room. An overhead camera in the stimulus presentation room recorded the 
infant’s behaviour, allowing for later rejection of trials in which the infant was 
moving or looking away from the stimuli. The video feed was also monitored 
from the control room, such that experimenters could be engaged by the 
caregiver for assistance or respond to issues during recording such as the 
infant pulling at the electrode cables. The experimenters were generally not 
present in the stimulus presentation room during the video portion of the 
experiment but entered for a small number of participants to reorient the 
infant’s attention or address technical issues as on one occasion when the 
infant removed an electrode from the cap. 
Infants were shown up to 84 stimuli, with equal numbers of the congruent and 
incongruent stimuli represented within those stimuli. Presentation order was 
determined using pseudorandomization software (Mix, van Casteren & Davis, 
2006) with no constraints on randomisation procedure. Stimuli were presented 
using Presentation® software (Version 0.69, www.neurobs.com). Infant-
directed instrumental music was played via speakers during stimulus 
presentation to aid infant attentiveness. On average, 56 (SD = 18.5) stimuli 
were presented before the infant became fussy and would no longer reliably 
attend to the screen. Following coding of valid trials, there were on average 31 
(SD = 14.6) trials available for the grasping action and 28 (SD = 14.4) 
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available for the eating action. Following rejection of trials containing artefacts, 
a mean of 13.4 (SD = 5.4) trials remained per condition for the grasping action 
and 11.4 (SD = 5.3) for the eating action. Given that the same baselines were 
used for each action, a mean of 6.3 baseline trials (SD = 2) remained in both 
cases. 
4.2.3b Behavioural task 
Following the conclusion of presentation of the video stimuli, infants were 
engaged in a motor planning task. A small table, a chair for the experimenter 
and an additional video camera were brought into the stimulus presentation 
room. The chair on which the caregiver and infant sat was turned 
perpendicular to the display set-up, and the table and experimenter’s chair 
placed opposite them. The additional camera was set up with a slightly 
elevated side view of the experimenter, table and infant. 
The task was based on the work of McCarty, Clifton and Collard (2001; 1999). 
Infants were presented with a series of up to twelve spoons with the handles 
oriented toward their left or right hand. The spoons were presented on the 
experimenter’s hands such that the tip of the handle and of the bowl rested on 
either outstretched palm, with the bulk of the handle free to be grasped from 
above or below (Figure 4.3(A)). Although in the original work (McCarty, Clifton 
& Collard, 1999) a wooden holder was used to present most of the handled 
objects to infants, in this study the experimenter’s hands were used as 
McCarty, Clifton and Collard (2001) noted that 9- and 14-month-olds were 
reluctant to grasp from the holder. They also stated that the potential 
restriction on underhand grips from experimenter-mediated presentation was 
not empirically important, as fewer than 4% of the grips produced by their 





Figure 4.3: Frames from experiment videos depicting experimenter’s 
presentation of the spoon stimuli in accordance with McCarty, Clifton and 
Collard (2001). Frame A shows the infant preparing to execute a radial grip. 
Frame B shows the infant using an ulnar grip. 
Food was placed on the end of the spoon to encourage the infants to eat. At 
the time of booking the visit, caregivers were instructed to bring food that the 
infant liked which could be eaten from a spoon. Whereas applesauce was the 
most commonly used foodstuff in the work of McCarty, Clifton and Collard 
(2001), bananas and other mashed fruit, yoghurt and baby food were used in 
the present study. In the event that a caregiver forgot to bring food, fruit 
flavoured baby foods were available. Presented spoons were made of blue, 
yellow, red and green plastic, approximately 10cm in length. Food was 
scooped onto each spoon from the side that would face the infant (i.e. the 
right side of the bowl if the handle was to be presented toward the infant’s left 
hand). Infants were presented with a maximum of twelve trials, with the 
orientation and colour of the spoon on each trial pseudorandomised using a 
software algorithm (Mix, van Casteren & Davis, 2006). The procedure was 
constrained so that within every four trials, each spoon colour was used once 
and each orientation was employed twice. This gave the experimenter 
opportunity to prepare four spoons in advance of beginning the task. It also 
ensured infants who did not engage in many trials would be presented with 
the handle near their preferred hand as often as the bowl was, helping to allay 
issues of infants underperforming because of stimulus presentation 
constraints. Although handedness is generally not observed so early in life, 
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hand preferences in apprehension of handled tools have been observed 
(Connolly & Dalgleish, 1989; McCarty, Clifton & Collard, 1999). 
Trials were ended if the infant did not interact with the spoon in any way within 
20 seconds of presentation. Touching the spoon but not picking it up was 
considered an interaction. For all infants, the experimenter engaged the 
infants in mutual gaze and joint attention to the spoon and used simple words 
and phrases to engage the infant in the task, such as the Dutch for “for you” 
and “yummy”. The experiment was concluded if the infant did not interact with 
the spoon in any way for two consecutive trials. For those infants included in 
the EEG analysis, video recordings of the spoon use task were coded for 
which hand was used; which part of the spoon was grasped and in the case of 
grasps on the handle, in which orientation; how many touches occurred before 
the spoon was picked up; whether the spoon was transferred between hands 
after being picked up; and whether the infant put the spoon in their mouth (and 
if they put the handle in their mouth instead of the bowl). The included infants 
engaged with the spoon on an average of 10 trials from a possible 12, with a 
standard deviation of 2.8 trials. 
4.2.4 EEG processing and analysis 
Overhead video recordings were inspected using ELAN frame-by-frame video 
analysis software (Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Sloetjes & 
Wittenburg, 2008) to identify valid trials. The video recordings included an 
inset display of what was presented on the stimulus presentation monitor at 
the time of recording. Responses to the grasping time point and the eating 
time point were considered separately. This was because each could be 
considered as a conceptually different goal-directed action. It was also 
because infants did not reliably attend to the full video but did attend to parts 
of videos, and because in the baseline trials, infants would not watch the 
screen for the four to five seconds required for an appropriately long baseline 
measure for comparison. Consequently, valid trials for the grasping analysis 
were those in which the infant watched the video for one second before and 
one second after the actor’s first touch of the spoon. Valid trials for the eating 
analysis were those in which infants watched the video for one second before 
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and one second after the actor’s bottom lip touched the spoon. Valid trials for 
the abstract image baseline stimuli were those in which the infant’s first look at 
the image lasted for two consecutive seconds. Additionally, trials were only 
valid if the infant did not engage in movement while watching the video. 
During presentation of each video, the EEG data file was tagged with a 
marker indicating when the actor’s hand first made contact with the spoon in 
each video and when an abstract image had been onscreen for one second. 
The time difference in each video between the first touch of the actor’s hand 
on the spoon and the first contact of the actor’s bottom lip with the spoon was 
known from inspection in ELAN software. Consequently, the number of EEG 
samples between the grasping event tag and the presentation of this eating 
event was known for each presented video. Each infant had two event files, 
one that contained the sample information for the grasping action and one that 
contained the sample information for the eating action. In the case of 
grasping, each file contained the sample numbers for each valid trial that 
corresponded to 850ms or 425 samples before and after the actor made first 
contact on the spoon with their hand. For the eating time points, these 
numbers were 850ms or 425 samples before and after the initial touch of the 
bottom lip on the spoon. The reason why each trial was defined as 850ms 
either side of the defining event was because this length ensured no overlap 
in the EEG recorded during each grasping trial and each eating trial.  
Baseline trials were defined as follows. If the infant’s first look at the baseline 
stimulus lasted continuously for at least two seconds, the trial was considered 
valid. The “midpoint” of the trial, comparable to the first touch of the hand on 
the spoon for the grasping trials and the touch of the bottom lip to the spoon 
for the eating trials, was defined as the time at which the infant had been 
looking at the stimulus for one second. These timings were all determined 
through use of frame-by-frame analysis in ELAN software. Periods extending 
850ms before and 850ms after this one-second point were used as the 
baseline for the corresponding periods before and after the actor enacted the 
grasp on the spoon or put the spoon in their mouth.. 
EEG data were processed in Matlab (version 2014a, TheMathworks, Inc.) 
using the FieldTrip toolbox (Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and 
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Behaviour, www.ru.nl/neuroimaging/fieldtrip). Each infant’s EEG recording 
was bandpass filtered with highpass and lowpass thresholds of 1 and 50Hz 
respectively. A detrending procedure was applied. Each infant’s EEG 
recording was then segmented in line with the event files. This data was 
inspected visually for artefacts and bad trials and bad channels were 
removed. Data for each infant were then rereferenced to the whole head 
minus the bad channels. A fast Fourier transformation was performed on the 
data with a 500ms sliding Hanning taper and spectral smoothing of 3 Hz. This 
provided mean power values for each frequency between 1 and 50Hz 
represented in the EEG data at each electrode for each trial. These methods 
are in accordance with standard procedures for event-related 
desynchronization studies (Gerson, Bekkering & Hunnius, 2014; Meyer et al., 
in press) This process was performed once for the grasping events and once 
for the eating events. 
The average of these values for each infant at each of the electrodes C3, Cz 
and C4 for each of the frequency bands 6, 7, 8 and 9 Hz, before and after the 
defining grasp or eating event, in each of the three conditions (congruent, 
incongruent, baseline) was obtained, again once for the grasping events and 
once for the eating events. For each set of events, the ratio of each of these 
values for the congruent and incongruent conditions relative to the matched 
baseline value was found. A base 10 log transformation was then performed 
on the data, in line with standard practice for event-related desynchronization 
research (Cuevas et al., 2014). This means that negative values indicate less 
power and hence more desynchronization of mu activity relative to baseline. 
Positive values indicate more synchronisation relative to baseline. At this 
stage, one infant was excluded from all analyses for mu desynchronization 
values more than 3 standard deviations above the mean at the post-eating 








4.3.1 Grasping time point 
A 2-by-2 analysis of variance was conducted on the data relating to the actor’s 
grasp on the spoon, with factors of condition and of time (before or after 
execution of the grasp by the actor). There was no effect of condition, F(1,13) 
= 0.102, p = 0.754, η2p = 0.008, nor was there an interaction between 
condition and time, F(1,13) = 0.301 p = 0.592, η2p = 0.023. There was an 
effect of time, F(1,13) = 4.878, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.273, with greater 
desynchronization prior to execution of the grasp than after (M = -0.06 dB, SE 
= 0.03 dB before, M = 0.04 dB, SE = 0.05 dB after; Figure 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4: Log10 of mu power during grasping period of stimulus videos 
relative to power during observation of baseline stimuli. 
Error bars represent standard error. 




4.3.2 Eating time point 
The same analysis was conducted on the data corresponding to the placing of 
the spoon in the mouth by the actor, with the factor of time in this case 
referring to values before and after the execution of this action. There were no 
significant main effects of condition, F(1,13) = 0.045, p = 0.835, η2p = 0.003, or 
of time, F(1,13) = 3.703, p = 0.076, η2p = 0.222. There was no significant 
interaction between these factors, F(1,13) = 4.489, p = 0.054, η2p = 0.257. 
Although in the case of the interaction there was a trend towards significance, 
from inspection of Figure 4.5 it is clear that such an interaction would stem 
from a difference in one of the conditions between time points, and not a 
difference between both conditions at one of the time points. 
Figure 4.5: Log10 of mu power during eating period of stimulus videos 
relative to power during observation of baseline stimuli. 




Figure 4.6: Log10 of mu power during eating and grasping periods of stimulus 
videos relative to power during observation of baseline stimuli. Mean activity 
over electrodes C3 and C4 is represented. The analysed frequency bands, 6 
Hz to 9 Hz, are represented within the red boxes. These boxes are split to 
show the “pre” and “post” action periods. Action congruence is not 
represented given lack of effects. 
4.3.3 Alternative analysis: Grasping and eating as parts of a single, 
continuous action 
In an alternative analysis in which all four time points (pre-grasping, post-
grasping, pre-eating, post-eating) were compared, similar results are borne 
out. A main effect of time is found with Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
applied, F(1.36, 17.68) = 4.141, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.242. Given the anticipation of 
predictive activation, greater desynchronization before the execution of each 
action was expected and no correction was applied to pairwise comparisons 
between before and after grasping and before and after eating. In this case a 
significant difference was found between pre- and post-grasping, p < 0.05, but 
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not between pre- and post-eating, p = 0.076 (M = -0.095 dB, SE = 0.04 dB 
before, M = 0.01 dB, SE = 0.05 dB after), although the latter effect is marginal. 
Comparison between post-grasping (M = 0.04 dB, SE = 0.05 dB) and pre-
eating (M = -0.095 dB, SE = 0.04 dB) is significant without correction, p = 
0.028, but must be considered with caution given the lack of a priori 
hypothesis about differences between these time points. Corrected as one of 
three comparisons, the threshold of p < 0.017 is not met. Frequency maps for 
each action over selected central electrodes can be seen in Figure 4.6. 
4.3.4 Correlations 
A planning score was assigned to each infant on the basis of coding of his or 
her behaviour. The coded behaviours included the following: 
 Mean number of spoon touches before picking up the spoon on trials in 
which the spoon was picked up. 
o Mean 1.56 touches, standard deviation 0.77 touches. 
 Mean number of transfers between hands per trial in which the spoon 
was picked up. 
o Mean 0.61 transfers, standard deviation 0.56 transfers. 
 Proportion of presented trials in which the spoon was picked up in the 
correct orientation and the same orientation was maintained throughout 
the trial. 
o Mean 35.8% of trials, standard deviation 21.3%. 
 Proportion of all possible trials in which the spoon was not picked up. 
o Mean 18.37% of trials, standard deviation 28.38%. 
 Proportion of presented trials with no eating from the spoon. 
o Mean 61.12% of trials, standard deviation 32.29%. 
 Proportion of presented trials in which there was no eating from the 
spoon OR the handle was placed in the mouth first. 





Table 4.1 indicates that many of the factors are related to one another but are 
not universally correlated. The proportion of presented trials with no eating, 
and the proportion with erroneous attempts to eat or no eating, correlate with 
one another (as might be expected). This pair of factors each correlate with 
the number of trials on which the spoon was not picked up, which again 
makes sense as without pick-up there can be no eating. This pair of factors 
also correlate with the mean number of touches executed on the spoon before 
pick-up per pick-up trial. Finally, a marginal trend is seen in the relationship 
between trials with no pick-up and the mean number of transfers on pick-up 
trials, with more transfers associated with fewer no pick-up trials. 
These metrics were correlated with each infant’s motor activation score at 
each of the time points for each of the actions. To get the motor activation 
score, the log of the ratio of the mu power relative to baseline for the 
incongruent condition was subtracted from the congruent condition. A more 
positive score therefore means more motor activation in the incongruent 
condition (relative to baseline) than in the congruent condition (also relative to 
baseline).  
Given the hypothesis that greater motor activation during incongruent relative 
to congruent actions would be found for infants with more established motor 
representations or better motor planning skills, one-tailed bivariate correlations 
were performed. In the case of transfers between hands, a two-tailed 
correlation was performed given that transfers of objects can be considered 
“sophisticated manual actions” (p. 129, Soska, Adolph & Johnson, 2010) or an 
indicator of poor action planning (McCarty, Clifton & Collard, 2001; 1999). 
Data satisfied parametric assumptions and consequently Pearson’s 
correlations were performed on all metrics and all periods of the observed 
action. Results are shown in Table 4.2. 
Results indicate various relationships between motor activation in response to 
eating from spoons and the infant’s own motor planning abil ity. Specifically, it 
is shown that infants who pick up a spoon with fewer touches (greater ease, a 
more rapidly formed plan) are those who show a larger difference between the 
response to congruous and incongruous grasps on the spoon as the actor 
brings the spoon to the mouth (Figure 4.7).   
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1 -0.248 0.0003 0.298 0.633** 0.616** 
Mean no. 
transfers 











0.298 -0.497* 0.35 1 0.558** 0.506** 
Trials with 
no eating 





0.616** -0.183 0.4 0.506** 0.869** 1 
** indicates significance at p < 0.05 level for one-tailed Pearson correlations. 
* indicates p < 0.1 for one-tailed Pearson correlations, non-significant but 
noted for marginal trends. 
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Table 4.2: Correlations between each factor and size of difference in mu 
between responses to congruent and incongruent actions. 
Factor/period Grasp, pre Grasp, post Eat, pre Eat, post 
Mean no. 
touches 
r = 0.157 r = -0.066 r = -0.815** r = -0.347  
Mean no. 
transfers 






r = -0.139 r = -0.284 r = -0.222 r = 0.513** 
Trials with no 
spoon pick-up 
r = -0.055 r = -0.238 r = -0.231 r = -0.526** 
Trials with no 
eating 
r = 0.241 r = 0.274 r = -0.338 r = -0.501** 
Trials with no 
eating or eating 
error 
r = 0.449* r = 0.355 r = -0.319 r = -0.319 
** indicates significance at p < 0.05 level for one-tailed Pearson correlations. 
## indicates significance at p < 0.05 level for two-tailed Pearson correlations 
(i.e. p < 0.025). 
* indicates p < 0.1 for one-tailed Pearson correlations, non-significant but 






Figure 4.7: Inverse correlation between the number of touches on the spoon 
before picking it up per trial, and the difference in mu desynchronization 
between congruent and incongruent conditions before the spoon is placed in 
the mouth. 
 
Figure 4.8: Correlation between the number of transfers between hands per 
trial and the difference in mu desynchronization between congruent and 
incongruent conditions after observed grasp execution. 
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Those infants who execute a greater number of transfers of the spoon 
between hands (e.g. to get it into the preferred hand or into the correct 
orientation for eating) show a larger difference in the response to the observed 
grasps on the spoon after the grasp has been executed (Figure 4.8). Infants 
who engaged with more trials and picked the spoon up on those trials show a 
larger difference in the response to the observed actions after the spoon has 
been placed in the actor’s mouth (Figure 4.9), as do infants who succeed in 
eating from the spoon (Figure 4.10). Finally, infants who picked up the spoon 
in the correct orientation (a radial grip) and held it in that orientation 
throughout the trial also showed a larger response to the incongruent than 
congruent action after the spoon has been placed in the mouth (Figure 4.11). 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Inverse correlation between the proportion of total trials in which 
the spoon was not engaged with, and the difference in mu desynchronization 
between congruent and incongruent conditions after the spoon is placed in the 




Figure 4.10: Inverse correlation between the proportion of total trials with no 
eating, and the difference in mu desynchronization between congruent and 
incongruent conditions after the spoon is seen placed in the mouth.  
 
Figure 4.11: Correlation between the proportion of presented trials in which 
the spoon was picked up and maintained in the correct orientation, and the 
difference in mu desynchronization between congruent and incongruent 




The results of this study indicate that mirror system activation around ten 
months of age does not differentiate between motorically similar but 
semantically distinct actions, as shown by the results of the analysis of infant 
responses to the grasping actions. There were also no differences in 
activation in response to the congruent and incongruent eating actions despite 
the strong motor differences in execution of the action, that is, the need to 
bring the arm across the body into an unusual posture to execute the 
incongruous eating action. Results did show that mu power increases after 
execution of a grasp, reaffirming the predictive nature of mu 
desynchronization and the step-wise means by which infants perceive action. 
Some patterns emerged in the relationship between the size of the difference 
in motor activation between conditions and the infants’ abilities to plan tool-
mediated self-feeding actions. After observing the execution of the grasp on 
the spoon, infants who were better at planning self-feeding actions and 
engaged in more self-feeding showed a greater degree of motor activation for 
the incongruent than the congruent action than those who were not as good 
as planning actions and did not engage as frequently.  However, given the 
small number of infants in the sample, this result must be discussed with 
caution. There were no effects prior to the execution of the grasp, indicating 
that infants at this age cannot process the congruence of an ensuing self-
feeding action on the basis of grasp orientation alone, even if their motor 
systems are responding to the reach. 
Interpretation of the mu desynchronization results as emergent exclusively 
from motor activation must be approached with caution. Although previous 
research has relied upon analysis of central and fronto-central electrodes only 
(Stapel et al., 2010) to draw similar inferences, without a comparison point 
from other scalp regions it is difficult to draw conclusions specific to 
sensorimotor brain regions. Recent conceptions of mirror system function 
refer to general associative cortex as a potential source (Cook et al., 2014), 
suggesting that non-motor regions are a valid source of such activation. Other 
EEG research suggests that there is desynchronisation in frontal and parietal 
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as well as central regions during observation of an action, whereas central 
desynchronisation only is seen in response to performance (Marshall, Young 
& Meltzoff, 2011). Thus what can be said about the results is that the 
activation seen is central desynchronization in response to a grasping action 
prior to its execution, which synchronises past baseline levels following that 
execution. This activation cannot be said to be either exclusively or non-
exclusively central on the basis of the analysis performed. Nonetheless, a 
pattern is seen in the degree of activation relative to the “congruence” of the 
action, dependent on the motor planning and self-feeding performance of the 
child. This suggests a relationship between motor processes and processing 
of the stimuli in question. Whether this relationship is dependent on mirror 
system function (e.g. Southgate et al., 2010), on visuo-motor mapping (e.g. de 
Klerk et al., 2015) or on a more general interaction between developmental 
progress in different domains (e.g. Soska, Adolph & Johnson, 2010) cannot be 
inferred from the present analysis. 
4.4.1 Overall processing of grasping and eating 
One clear result from the data is that infants showed greater mu 
desynchronization in response to the grasping action prior to the execution of 
the grasp than after. This result affirms an aspect of the mirror system that has 
previously been suggested to exist in infancy. That is, mirror system activation 
is predictive or preparatory, not in the sense that it involves a preparation to 
perform the same action as observed (Gallese et al., 1996), but in the sense 
that it is stronger before the execution of the intended grasp. Previous infancy 
work by Southgate and colleagues (2010) has illustrated this. Nine-month-old 
infants exhibited mu desynchronization in response to reaching actions even 
when the action conclusion was occluded, indicating that infants could 
predictively infer the goal-directed nature of the action.  
Strongly related to the present results, Southgate and colleagues (2009) found 
that during observation of reach-to-grasp actions, 9-month-olds exhibit an 
initial desynchronization of mu power upon appearance of the reaching hand. 
Following a brief rebound, there was sustained motor activation as the hand 
held and removed a grasped object. By splitting the measured time period in 
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the present study into before and after the execution of the grasp, it was 
shown that for 10-month-olds, encoding of a reach-to-grasp action within the 
mirror system is predictive and mu power increases after the grasp has been 
executed even in the context of a continuing action. The marginal difference in 
mu desynchronization between the post-grasp and pre-eating periods may be 
akin to the rebound found by Southgate et al. (2009), suggesting, in line with 
previous research, that actions are perceived as delineated sequences of 
multiple stages (Baldwin et al., 2001; Pace et al., 2013; Reid et al., 2007). 
Thus the actor’s behaviour, from spoon pick-up to eating, is not perceived as a 
holistic or fluid action but a series of goal-directed steps. 
It is possible to consider these results in a visuomotor or associative account 
of mirror system function in development (e.g. Cook et al., 2014; de Klerk et 
al., 2015). Infants at 10 months may have extensive experience with grasping 
objects, and may have representations of the targets associated with those 
objects (e.g. Kochukhova and Gredebäck, 2010). However, they potentially 
have little experience engaging in subsequent, precise, target-directed use of 
the objects and the associated motor programs may not yet be present. 
Connolly and Dalgleish (1989) wrote that demand to self-feed with spoons 
generally emerges only in the second year of life, and McCarty, Clifton and 
Collard (1999) found that 9- and 14-month-olds tended to grasp a spoon 
without planning the subsequent steps of the action. The motor planning 
scores of the infants in this study were highly variable, indicating similar 
difficulties in tool planning and use for the present sample. Thus, 10-month-
olds may show motor desynchronization only in response to the part of the 
action with which they have formed strong visuomotor or ideomotor 
associations, which is more likely to be grasping than self-feeding. 
4.4.2 Action planning 
The relationships between infant action planning and motor activation 
between conditions were multifaceted. To restate, a larger difference in mu 
desynchronization (relative to baseline) for incongruent than congruent 
actions, indicating attribution of greater processing resources to the unusual or 
less predictable action, correlated with most of the motor planning factors 
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measured but at different stages of the observed action. The size of this 
difference at the time immediately after the actor had grasped the spoon 
correlated with the mean number of times infants transferred the spoon 
between hands in each trial. As the spoon was being brought to the mouth, 
activation difference correlated inversely with the mean number of touches the 
infant executed on the spoon before grasping it. Finally, after execution of the 
eating action, it correlated inversely with both the proportion of trials in which 
the infant did not pick up the spoon and the proportion of trials in which the 
infant did not eat from the spoon.  
Integrating the presence of a rebound after grasping and the perception of 
actions as a series of sub-steps with the finding that infants who engaged in 
more transfers of the spoon between hands showed a larger difference in 
between-conditions motor activation after grasp execution adds nuance to the 
visuomotor account described above. As stated previously, infants process 
actions as sequences with sub-steps and natural junctures (Baldwin et al., 
2001; Reid et al., 2007). This does not mean that infants perceive these 
junctures as action conclusions. Much research shows that infants in the latter 
half of the first post-natal year generally look to actors’ mouths after a spoon 
or cup has been grasped (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010; Kochukhova & 
Gredebäck, 2010; Stapel et al., 2010), indicating that they anticipate further 
action. One might expect that the ability to perform an action fluidly, without 
needing to adjust the grasp on a tool, would be associated with mirror 
representations that might incorporate the reach-to-grasp on the spoon as part 
of a single, eating-directed action rather than its own action. Consequently, it 
might be expected that motor activation would be sustained after the grasp, 
particularly in the incongruent condition (in accordance with Stapel et al., 
2010), by those infants who perform actions fluidly. 
The actual results suggest that the opposite is correct. There was no 
significant inverse correlation between number of transfers and proportion of 
trials in which the spoon was grasped correctly to begin with. That is, infants 
who transferred the spoon more often did not necessarily do so because they 
picked it up incorrectly in the first place. Thus more transfers may illustrate, as 
Soska, Adolph and Johnson (2010) suggest, greater motor ability. The 
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behaviour of the infants may have incorporated exploration of and curiosity 
about the object as well as goal-directed action. For these transferring infants, 
the size of the rebound was smaller for the incongruent grasp than the 
congruent. Thus transferring was associated with a difference in step-wise 
processing of standard and unusual actions. Either unusual grasp execution 
was not perceived as a juncture in the same way as congruent grasp 
execution, or this is evidence of the kind of enhanced processing of novel but 
reproducible action relative to standard action seen in Stapel et al. (2010). The 
results might be explained within a visuomotor account of developing mirror 
system function. Infants who are more adept at manipulating handled objects 
or who have more experience of re-evaluating and adjusting tool-mediated 
actions may have stronger visuomotor associative encoding of the natural 
junctures in action. This encoding might drive differential processing of actions 
that conform to or violate standards at the time of the juncture (e.g. Baldwin et 
al., 2001). 
This result can also be accounted for in accordance with the predictive coding 
account of mirror system function (Kilner, Friston & Frith, 2007). For the group 
overall, the mu rebound after grasp execution may have been driven by a 
strongly entrenched representation of grasp, meaning that a Bayesian 
prediction was generated before grasp execution. The correlation between 
difference in motor activation between conditions and transfer of the spoon 
suggests that infants who were more motorically adept may have detected a 
mismatch between their representation of spoon use and the observed 
execution in the incongruent condition and generated more iterations of the 
action prediction within the Bayesian mirror system network. Given that there 
was no overall effect of condition this suggestion is speculative. 
The other correlations between motor activation and motor planning can be 
accounted for more directly. Infants who touched the spoon more often before 
picking it up (suggesting indecisiveness or slowness in generating an action 
plan) showed a smaller difference in motor activation between conditions in 
the pre-eating stage than infants who were better at planning. This suggests 
that as the congruent or incongruent conclusion of the action becomes evident 
via cues other than grasp, better planners tend to show greater motor 
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activation in response to the incongruent than the congruent action, in line 
with the work of Stapel et al. (2010). At the conclusion of the action, when the 
difference in action congruence is evident, infants who picked up the spoon 
and who ate from it more often showed more motor activation in response to 
the incongruent action relative to the congruent action, as did infants who 
picked up and maintained the spoon in the correct orientation to begin with. 
The emergence of these correlations at the pre- and post-eating stages only 
suggest that motor cues other than grasp, such as cross-body movement and 
the proximity of the spoon to the (mouth) target were employed by the better 
action planners to distinguish between the congruent and incongruent actions. 
These results point to an association between representation of observed 
actions and action planning that is likely to be general to all tool-mediated 
actions rather than a specific visuomotor association with self-feeding. This is 
because fewer than 15% of the infant participants (4 of 32) had self-fed with 
spoons before participating in the study. Thus the more adept action planners 
may have been integrating visual experience of seeing others use spoons with 
their own motor experience of holding objects in different postures and 
identifying unusual actions, with reference to both motor and conceptual 
processing systems. 
Others’ results indicate that mirror system development is tied to visuomotor 
experience (de Klerk et al., 2015). Although no overall effects of condition 
were found in the present work, this series of correlations suggests that as 
experience with tool-mediated action emerges, differences in how actions are 
performed on the basis of how tools are used begin to be encoded. It may be 
that the level of experience required is more substantial than that exhibited by 
the sample of infants in this study. An older age group with greater self-
feeding experience may yield clarifying results, as work by Yoo and 
colleagues (in press) found developmental differences between nine and 






4.4.3 Theoretical accounts 
The lack of overall differences in response to the semantically congruous and 
incongruous actions can be explained along a number of dimensions. One 
potential explanation is that the mirror system is not responsive to tool-
mediated action, as early work on the mirror system with non-human primates 
(Rizzolatti et al., 1996) found no mirror response to such actions. However, in 
this case the tool was novel to the monkeys. Spoons are familiar tools and by 
6 months infants anticipate spoons being brought to the mouth (Kochukhova 
and Gredebäck, 2010). Furthermore, mu desynchronization in response to 
tool use has been found in infants of comparable age to those studied here 
(Southgate & Begus, 2013; Stapel et al., 2010; Yoo et al., in press). In the 
Stapel et al. study, it was also made evident that the function of a tool is 
incorporated into the motor representation of the action and that incongruous 
tool use elicits greater motor activation as the new action requires an update 
of previously held representations. In Chapter 3 of the present thesis, it was 
shown that although infants at 9 months perceive differences in the 
relationship between hands and objects on the basis of the object’s shape, by 
12 months of age they exhibit no neural evidence of differential attentional 
encoding of such grasps. It may be that the infants in the present study fell 
within the period of development in which hand-object relationships are not 
attended to. It may also be that the minutiae of the hand-object relationship in 
this study were difficult to encode, because there was no difference in hand 
shape between the stimuli as there was in the previous work in this thesis.  
What is more puzzling is that there was no difference in mu desynchronization 
during the eating portion of the action, in which arm movement employed was 
quite different for the congruent and incongruent grasps and the motor profile 
associated with the incongruent tool-use action was unusual (as in Stapel et 
al., 2010). This may be an indication that infant encoding of action is largely 
goal-directed or teleological and that the infants in this study were attending to 
the accomplishment of the goal of eating, as conveyed by the spoon, and not 
the manner of achieving that goal. Southgate, Johnson and Csibra (2008) 
found that 6- to 8-month-old infants look longer at inefficient actions than 
biomechanically impossible actions, so it may be that the presence of a goal 
136 
 
allowed infants to represent the action in a motoric manner despite difficulties 
in simulating the precise means of performing the action. Behavioural studies 
show that 12-month-olds can learn the functions of novel tools by observation 
but fail to employ those tools effectively (Elsner and Pauen, 2007), again 
suggesting that the lack of differential response to normal and unusual 
employment of a spoon may have occurred because infants’ mirror responses 
are generated on the basis of the inferred goal rather than the performed 
action. This possibility again supports the predictive coding model of mirror 
system function (Kilner, Friston & Frith, 2007) with the most reliable aspect of 
the action – the goal – modulating the infants’ response to the action whereas 
less reliable aspects – the means of holding the tool – have no effect.  
This assumption can be supported by the correlations between motor planning 
factors and difference in motor activation between the incongruent and 
congruent actions. Infants who pick up the spoons more often, who do so with 
fewer initial touches and in the correct orientation, who are comfortable 
transferring the spoon between hands, and who succeed in eating from the 
spoon more often, show a larger difference in activation to incongruent relative 
to incongruent actions, predominantly after the grasp has been executed and 
the conclusion of the action has become evident from postural rather than 
purely manual factors. These better planners may have a stronger 
representation of the visuomotor or ideomotor aspects of a successful action 
end-point for eating from a spoon. No infant could reliably perform the action 
perfectly, that is, no infant could pick up a spoon in the correct orientation for 
eating from it and maintain it in that orientation throughout the trial (the 
individual highest percentage of trials with a grasp in the correct orientation 
maintained to trial conclusion was 58.33%). This may provide an explanation 
for why a relationship between planning skill and motor activation differences 
between conditions did not arise reliably throughout the entire observed 
action. The infants may not have had strong prior information about the 
correct way to hold a spoon, particularly for the initial grasp on the spoon, 
because they were not frequent or proficient users of spoons. Gerson, 
Bekkering and Hunnius (2014) showed that infants at 10 months exhibit 
greater motor desynchronization to sounds associated with actions they have 
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performed than those associated with actions they have merely observed. 
Thus, motor experience and related prior information about actions are 
important for the generation of mirror system representations of such actions. 
It may have been that in the case of the present study, the kind of motor 
representation and experience required for differentiation of grasps was 
beyond the reliable experience level of the age group studied. 
4.5 Conclusions 
Results of the present study indicate that the operation of the mirror system at 
10 months of age is goal-directed and does not incorporate information about 
the means by which the action is performed. In contrast to the predictions 
enumerated in the introduction, it appears that once a predictable goal is 
encoded by the infant on the basis of the action, the means of performing that 
goal are rendered  secondary to the accomplishment of the goal itself, as in 
the work of Southgate, Johnson and Csibra (2008). We cannot draw precise 
conclusions about whether motorically similar actions elicit differential mirror 
system activation on the basis of their semantic components. This is because 
the spoon-feeding action shown to participants did not modulate mirror system 
activation even at the point at which there were motor differences between 
conditions (that is, when the spoon was brought to the mouth). However, the 
presence of correlations between motor planning skill and a larger difference 
in motor response between incongruent and congruent actions as the action 
conclusion became predictable (or was executed) tentatively suggests that 
with greater motor experience or stronger internal representations of action, 
differences in mirror system responses to congruous and incongruous grasps 
may emerge. In order to establish the development of the relationship 
between the motor and semantic components of the mirror system, a simpler 
action would need to be presented or a slightly older age group would need to 
be studied. McCarty, Clifton and Collard’s (2001; 1999) work has shown 
changes in planning of self-feeding actions between nine, fourteen and 
nineteen months of age, changes that are promising for future study of the 
mirror system along these lines. 
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Results of the present study do show that during reach-to-grasp actions, 
infants exhibit motor activation predictive of the performed action. This 
activation rebounds towards baseline values after the grasp has been 
executed, even when the overall action is incomplete. This suggests that, in 
line with infant behaviour in which spoons are grasped and subsequently 
adjusted for eating, infants perceive actions as a series of steps that are 
processed separately. This assumption is supported by the renewed 
desynchronization of mu activity as the spoon is brought toward the mouth, 
indicating that eating is the goal of the action. In sum, more evidence has 
been added to the argument for predictive mirror system function in infancy 
(Southgate et al., 2010; 2009) and results indicate that with further study the 
relationship between motor and semantic processes in developmental mirror 
system function can be characterised with the same or a similar paradigm 










Chapter 5: General Discussion 
5.1 Introduction to the Discussion: Revisiting the theoretical 
background 
5.1.1 Why study the development of semantic processing to understand 
mirror system function? 
Simulation of others’ actions in a manner neurally homologous with one’s own 
preparation or performance of similar actions is an often-recorded aspect of 
human brain function. The finding of “mirror neuron” or “mirror system” 
function in primates (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996), and in 
humans specifically (Fadiga et al., 1995; Iacoboni et al., 1999), can be thought 
of as a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1996/1962) in psychological science. Precise 
characterisation of the human mirror system is in progress, with questions of 
its origin as phylogenetically ancient (Bonini & Ferrari, 2011; Gallese et al., 
2009) posed against an associative learning account wherein domain-general 
architecture and processes support emergence of the mirror system (Cook et 
al., 2014; Heyes, 2010), and a moderating ideomotor account in which 
perception-action associations and related neural communications develop in 
an endogenously constrained manner (Brass, Bekkering & Prinz, 2001). 
Despite these unresolved etiological questions, the discovery of the mirror 
system has brought conceptualisations of the primate brain as an entity 
defined by social processes to the fore. For example, mirror system responses 
are seen as rapid, relational and automatic (e.g. Carr et al., 2003) whereas 
research prior to the mirror system paradigm shift characterised adult 
simulation of others’ actions as intentional and elicited via bottom-up 
perception-action mappings (e.g. Decety et al., 1997). The former means of 
responding to others’ actions has been applied to a plethora of topics in 
psychological research, with emotion perception, autism spectrum disorders, 
sign language and processing of music among those listed by Cook and 
colleagues (2014). Although the relationship to these topics is still under 
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investigation, it is inarguable that the early mirror neuron work has caused a 
change in how perception of others’ actions is approached in research. 
The question of meaning, of semantics, is integral to the mirror system (Umiltà 
et al., 2001) and to action processing more generally (Amoruso et al., 2013; 
Decety et al., 1997). Meaningful actions are actions in which a particular goal 
is achieved, causally, and that goal is congruent with the specific tools 
employed and the context of the action. It is because of the expectancies 
generated by the context of an action and by the tool used (Sitnikova et al., 
2008), by the orientation and appropriateness of that tool (Bach et al., 2009), 
and by the overall possibility of inferring a goal (Proverbio & Riva, 2009) that 
actions can be perceived as meaningful and that perception-action matching 
can occur. Thus, in order to understand how the mirror system develops, it is 
essential to study semantic processing of action as well as the emergence of 
motor resonance and action mirroring. 
5.1.2 Differences in the developmental trajectories of semantics and 
motor processing – research to date 
As often stated in this thesis, semantic integration of goals of familiar actions 
develops in the first post-natal year, as evidenced by the N400 ERP (Chapter 
3, this thesis; Reid et al., 2009). In the same period, infants show increased 
attention to or enhanced encoding of actions that do not end at natural 
junction points (that is, after the completion of specific goals or sub-goals) via 
dishabituation (Baldwin et al., 2001) or increased frontal neural activity (Reid 
et al., 2007). “Rebounds” or increases in mu power following such junctures 
(Chapter 4, this thesis; Southgate et al., 2009) also highlight how they are 
used by infants to structure action. By 24 months of age, these kinds of action 
boundaries can be used as a general means of determining whether an action 
makes sense, and thus of processing novel actions semantically (Pace, 
Carver & Friend, 2013). The semantic processing literature focused on 
language development shows that novel meanings can be integrated in a 
rudimentary manner in the second post-natal year (Friedrich & Friederici, 
2008) but also shows that low productive language skills at 30 months of age 
are associated with the absence of a (language) N400 effect at 19 months 
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(Friedrich & Friederici, 2006). It is not evident in this case whether 
development of underlying neural architecture allows behavioural acquisition, 
whether behavioural change drives neural development, or indeed whether 
the neural and behavioural development are different ontological means of 
conceptualising the same entity. Nonetheless, this work shows that for an 
entity such as language or action to be processed semantically, an initial 
developmental shift, indexed by the presence of the N400 ERP, must occur. 
Evidence for motor responses to observed actions is found before the 
emergence of the N400 ERP (NIRS evidence at 6 months, Shimada & Hiraki, 
2006; no N400 ERP at 7 months, Reid et al., 2009). Given that initial semantic 
evaluation of an action is integral for mirror system function (Gallese et al., 
1996; Southgate et al., 2009; Umiltà et al., 2001), it is puzzling that mirror 
processing of action may occur prior to semantic integration of action goals. 
Indeed, work on the infant mirror system, albeit with age groups at which 
semantic processing of action is emergent, indicates strongly that only 
meaningful actions (as defined in section 5.1.1) elicit motor activation 
(Nyström et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2009). Perception of action as 
meaningful or non-meaningful is evident in infancy. Infants process actions as 
causal, goal-directed entities that conform to a specific structure (Baldwin et 
al., 2001; Reid et al., 2007; Träuble & Pauen, 2011). Developmental research 
on motor activation shows that infants exhibit such activation in response to 
actions with a visible or inferred target (Southgate et al., 2009) and to actions 
with an effect causally generated by the actor (Nyström et al., 2011), and not 
to actions without targets, nor non-causal actions. This shows, conceptually, 
that it is mirror system function that is being measured and not general motor 
resonance (Uithol et al., 2011). This theoretical puzzle – how to have neural 
evidence for mirror system function without accompanying evidence for 
semantic integration – motivated the work in the preceding thesis. The general 
objectives of the preceding work were to understand how semantic and motor 
processing of action develop in infancy, to understand how action production 
skills play a role in action perception and processing along these trajectories, 
and to understand how infants learn to interact with tools. The more specific 
aim of the work was to understand how these means of action processing 
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develop in conjunction with one another and whether one can operate without 
the other. Hand-object interactions were used as the platform from which to 
investigate these systems.  
The main conclusion to be drawn from the present work is that the 
development of mirror system function and the expansion of semantic action 
processing in infancy are interconnected in ways that are not easy to 
disentangle. The development of each system is not yoked to the other but 
they still show relationships, albeit weaker ones than are found in behavioural 
research. In the following sections, the specific findings of the work will be 
discussed and integrated with one another and with the wider field of 
research. 
5.2 Summary of findings 
5.2.1 Existing evidence for integration of social, semantic and motor 
action processing in infancy 
A broad review of the relevant developmental perception, cognition and 
cognitive neuroscience literature conducted in Chapter 1 showed that 
conceptual links exist between social, semantic and motor resonance 
frameworks of infant action processing. Particular note was made of how 
measures of motor resonance are affected by action semantics, and how 
indicators of semantic processing incorporate motor aspects of actions. 
Examples of the former include studies of motor activation in which infant mu 
desynchronization differs between congruent and incongruent actions, such 
as when an action has no goal (Southgate et al., 2010) or has a goal that does 
not match the implicated tool’s function (Stapel et al., 2010). Examples of the 
latter include studies in which infant perception of incongruities in hand-object 
relationships, whether in relation to grip size (Daum et al., 2011) or grasp type 
(Loucks & Sommerville, 2012), is associated with motor experience. 
The identification of these empirical relationships between semantic and motor 
processes in developmental action perception was brought into the context of 
mirror system theories, in which motor and semantic processes are engaged 
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and feed into one another (Cook et al., 2014; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; 
Kilner, Friston & Frith, 2007; Uithol et al., 2011). These links justified 
investigation of the core questions of the thesis, which target how the 
semantic processes and motor processes employed in action perception 
develop, if employment of one process depends on activation of the other, and 
if they are manifestations of the same process at different levels of ontology. 
5.2.2 Semantic processing of tool use in the absence of differences in 
motor aspects of hand-object relationship 
In Chapter 2, we aimed to examine how semantic processing of novel tool use 
occurs when there is minimal input from ideomotor or motor simulation 
processes. Two groups of 16-month-old infants were presented with stimuli 
showing the use of a novel dual function tool on two different novel objects, 
producing distinct but similarly salient actions on each one. Previous studies 
with a dual function tool showed that 20-month-olds could rapidly learn to 
predict on which of two novel objects the tool would be used, on the basis of 
how the tool was grasped (Paulus, Hunnius & Bekkering, 2012). The intention 
of this work was to examine the extent to which the infants’ predictions were 
aided by perception-action matching on the basis of those grasps.  
To realise this intention, the dual function tool was created in such a way that 
it could be held in a whole-hand grasp for each function, with orientation 
determining its intended use. Two actors were depicted using the tool, each 
using a different end of the tool on one of the two novel objects. We 
anticipated that, given infants’ strong encoding of goals (Hunnius & Bekkering, 
2010; Woodward, 1998) and their tendency to associate specific actors with 
goals but not transfer those goals to another actor (Buresh & Woodward, 
2007), using different actors would facilitate encoding of function. Infants were 
shown the tool’s functions and actors’ goals via demonstration videos, and 
then shown side-by-side critical images in which the actor held the tool in an 
orientation that matched (goal-congruent) and an orientation that did not 
match (goal-incongruent) the use appropriate to their goal. Infants’ looking 
times to the critical images were measured. 
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Results of both experiments showed that infants did not form an association 
between the orientation of the tool and its function. They did not encode the 
ulnar or radial relationship between the actor’s hand and the tool part that 
actor used. Rather, they formed an association between the tool part itself and 
the actor via the actor’s demonstrated goal, and during presentation of critical 
stimuli they looked longer at the tool part they had not encoded in relation to 
that actor. These results suggest that when the functions of a dual function 
tool cannot be distinguished on the basis of perceptual-motor mapping, 16-
month-olds do not attend to the relationships between hand and tool features 
that might facilitate prediction of tool use. 
5.2.3 Semantic processing of motor differences without manipulation of 
the action’s goal 
Chapter 3 describes a series of experiments in which semantic processing of 
grasp information was measured. Goals of actions are processed semantically 
from about nine months of age (Reid et al., 2009) but the meaningfulness of 
an action lies in more than its target (e.g. Bach et al., 2009; Sitnikova et al., 
2008). The means in which a tool is held can determine the meaning of an 
action (Paulus, Hunnius & Bekkering, 2012). In order to investigate how grasp 
is processed semantically, and to do so independently of goal manipulation, 
stimuli were created in which actors grasped cups in a manner congruent or 
incongruent with the overall shape of the cup. 
An initial study with adults established that this aspect of action is processed 
semantically in the adult brain, as a fronto-central negativity in the N400 time 
period was found to distinguish between congruent and incongruent grasps on 
the cups. Results from 9-month-olds indicated that are differences in how 
infants process congruent and incongruent grasps. A larger Nc component for 
the incongruent grasps suggested increased orienting of attention to these 
stimuli. This effect cannot be attributed to an overall ability to process how 
hands and objects fit together but is likely driven by visual experience of 
seeing others hold cups in specific ways. A larger P400 component for the 
same stimuli suggested that the difference in attention to each stimulus 
category was driven by social factors. This is reasonable given that goal 
inference may be more difficult in the context of the less familiar grasps. No 
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N400 component was present. An N400 component was evident in the neural 
responses of 11.5-month-olds, indicating that grasps are processed 
semantically at this age. However, this component was not modulated by 
grasp. Consequently, the N400 effect was likely a response to the overall 
goal-directedness of the stimulus and not to the minutiae of the grasp. In 
contrast to the work of Reid and colleagues (2009) the component was seen 
in both conditions, indicating that the neural architecture underlying semantic 
processing of goal-directed action has matured by this age.  
5.2.4 Motor processing of semantic differences in action in the absence 
of differences in motor aspects of hand-object relationship 
In the final experiment described in this thesis, in Chapter 4, infants between 
nine-and-a-half and eleven months of age were shown videos of actions in 
which the motor components were identical (up to a particular time point) but 
the meaning of the actions differed. Specifically, the execution of a radial or 
ulnar grasp on a spoon was predictive of whether the spoon would be used in 
a standard manner or whether it would be eaten from in an unusual, 
motorically unfamiliar posture. It was hypothesised that all infants would show 
greater motor activation in response to the unfamiliar action at the conclusion 
of the action, indicating the need to update previously held motor 
representations of self-feeding in accordance with Stapel and colleagues’ 
work (2010). It was also hypothesised that only those infants who were more 
capable of planning their own self-feeding actions, as measured in a self-
feeding task, would show similar differences at the time of the grasp on the 
spoon. This would indicate that only those infants with strongly entrenched 
representations of grasps on handled objects would be able to predict an 
unusual ensuing action from the ulnar grasp.  
Results indicate that infants did not encode the differences between the 
congruent and incongruent means of holding the spoon at any point from the 
initial grasp through to the completion of the action. This result may have 
arisen because the infants simply did not have much prior experience with 
self-feeding with spoons and consequently could not reliably represent the 
differences in the displayed action. One emergent result was that mu rhythm 
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desynchronized before execution of the grasp, rebounded after completion of 
the grasp, and desynchronized again (a marginal effect) as the spoon was 
brought toward the mouth. This indicates three things. The first is that the 
significant difference between the pre-execution and post-execution stages of 
the grasping part of the action, but not between the eating parts of the action, 
suggests that grasping is represented more strongly by infants at this age, 
possibly as a result of more extensive motor or visuomotor experience with 
grasping than with tool use. The second is that the results reaffirm the 
predictive nature of mirror system function even in infancy (e.g. Southgate et 
al., 2010). The third is that they reaffirm that infants process goal-directed 
actions in terms of their sub-steps (Baldwin et al., 2001; Reid et al., 2007) and 
offer evidence for the neural basis of action parsing.. An additional finding 
from this work is that action planning and motor skill correlate with differences 
in activation during observation of congruent and incongruent actions, with 
greater planning and execution skills associated with a stronger response to 
the unusual action.. These results suggest that although no overall effects 
were found in the present study, differences might emerge in an older age 
group with more experience of action planning and stronger motor 
representations of tool-mediated action. 
5.3 Theoretical implications 
5.3.1 Demonstrated links and disjunctions between semantic and motor 
processing 
The research conducted within this thesis indicates that the development of 
motor processing of action and semantic processing of action are not 
irrevocably linked. Tool parts can be associated with actors and goals in the 
absence of distinguishing motor information. Differences in motor aspects of 
action, such as in the relationships between hands and objects, are processed 
early in development. In the studies described here, such processing was not 
shown to be linked to grasp execution ability. Slightly later in development, as 
semantic processing of goal-directedness of action emerges, these 
differences in grasp are no longer encoded and again, no relationship to 
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grasping ability was found. Finally, motor activation in response to observed 
action, strongly established by other work to be present by nine months of age 
(Nyström et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2009, 2010), is not affected by 
semantic elements of grasp at this age. However, differences in responses to 
incongruent versus congruent stimuli are linked to action planning and motor 
ability, suggesting that semantic and motor processing of grasp do become 
linked as motor representations of actions are established via experience. 
The disjunction in emergence of mirror processes and semantic processes 
referenced earlier was not explained by the work in this thesis. In fact, results 
suggest that specific semantic elements of action do not affect mirror system 
function before the end of the first post-natal year (Chapter 4), and that motor 
elements of action are not processed semantically at this stage (Chapter 3). 
Given the established “two-stage” model of mirror system function (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998) and the fact that infants show differential motor responses to 
meaningful and non-meaningful actions (Nyström et al., 2011; Southgate et 
al., 2010), it is not correct to suggest that the mirror system operates in 
infancy without some form of semantic processing. Rather, results suggest 
that infants do not attend to the motor minutiae of goal-directed actions with 
familiar, single-function tools in the first post-natal year, or with novel, dual-
function tools in the second post-natal year. Rather, it is possible that infants 
adopt a teleological stance (Csibra, 2003), that is, they attend to the goal of 
the action to give that action meaning. In the case of the first study (Chapter 
2), this was the tool part used by the actor. In the case of the second study 
(Chapter 3), this was the execution of a grasp on a cup. In the third study 
(Chapter 4), this was the execution of a grasp on a spoon.  
The lack of difference in response before and after placing the spoon in the 
mouth in this study may be due to weaker representations of precise, tool-
mediated, self-feeding actions relative to whole-hand reach-to-grasp actions. 
Developing motor representations may also explain the results of Chapter 3. 
Without strong motor representations of the differences in power and precision 
grips, the ability of 9-month-olds to detect whether an observed hand posture 
is appropriate for the grasped object (as opposed to whether hand aperture 
size is appropriate) might be based on associative or attentional processes 
148 
 
independent of motor activation. Given the results of Chapter 2, it is possible 
for infants to represent relationships between an actor’s goal and the tool they 
employ without simulating the minutiae of the manual interaction between 
hand and object. 
A final consideration is that infants rely on cues from others to structure their 
learning about the world (Reid & Striano, 2007). There are many studies 
demonstrating manifestations of this means of encoding information in infant 
brain activity, including studies showing that communication about object 
appearances via hands is processed differently depending on whether the 
hand is oriented in the direction of a previously displayed object or not (Bakker 
et al., 2015; Gredebäck, Melinder & Daum, 2010; Melinder et al., 2015). Given 
that all studies in this thesis contained human actors and were consequently 
social in nature, and that evidence of modulation of a “social” ERP 
component, the P400, was found in Chapter 3, results need to be considered 
within a social framework as well. In the following sections, the theoretical 
considerations of the work presented will be applied to models of action 
processing from infancy research and from mirror system research. 
5.3.2 The teleological stance 
Attending to and processing the manual minutiae of an action may be difficult, 
especially considering the need to simulate precise positions of digits in 
relation to the tool used, and precise gestural components, both of which are 
aspects of action that develop over an extended trajectory (Butterworth, 
Verweij & Hopkins, 1997; Corbetta et al., 2000). However, the 9-month-olds in 
Chapter 3 did show a differentiation between congruent and incongruent 
grasps, albeit not on a semantic level. Other research shows that detection of 
grasp differences develops between six and nine months of age, depending 
on the infant’s motor skills (Daum et al., 20011), and that motorically adept 
infants process grasps in terms of function around ten months of age (Loucks 
& Sommerville, 2012). In the present work, it was when evidence of the 
semantic N400 component was found (Chapter 3, 11.5-month-olds) that 
differential processing of grasp via other components disappeared. This result 
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suggests an overall shift in how infants process grasps occurring once actions 
are processed in terms of their semantic structure. 
It indicates that although infants are sensitive to general differences in and 
novelty of grasping actions between eight-and-a-half and nine-and-a-half 
months of age, once they begin to process actions semantically, they no 
longer attend to elements of the action other than the teleological, that is, the 
goal. This teleological stance-driven semantic processing may explain the lack 
of effect of grasp on motor activation in the Chapter 4 experiment, as infants in 
this age range may be beginning to process action semantically and to attend 
to the overall goal to the omission of other elements. It also applies to the 
results of Chapter 2. Infants’ encoding of the relationship between tool and 
object omitted the manual minutiae in the form of information about the 
orientation of the goal-congruent tool part. Instead, the association was 
formed between the actor and the tool part they used. This indicates a focus 
on the end-state of the action seen by the infants (particularly in Chapter 2, 
Experiment 2, in which the final demonstration video shot showed the tool in 
contact with the target), and not on the precise means of achieving that end 
state. 
The interpretation of these results in relation to the teleological stance (Csibra 
et al., 1999) is deliberately sparse. Much of the focus of this thesis, particularly 
in Chapter 3, has been on encoding of action in the absence of factors that 
would alter the efficiency of that action. Consequently, the theorising 
underlying the thesis has incorporated factors other than efficiency and 
rationality. Six- to 8-month-olds infants might have found the efficient but 
biomechanically impossible actions shown by Southgate, Johnson and Csibra 
(2008) less unexpected than inefficient, possible actions, but infants at this 
age are aware of the constraints of human physiology. A P400-like neural 
response is seen in 8-month-olds in response to biomechanically impossible 
body schemas (Reid et al., 2008). Infants inhabit bodies and their perception 
of actions has been shown repeatedly to rely on bodily factors such as motor 
activation (e.g. Saby, Marshall & Meltzoff, 2012; Stapel et al., 2010) and 
representations of what one’s body can do (Daum et al., 2011; Loucks & 
Sommerville, 2012). It is for this reason that when considering the results of 
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the preceding studies in the context of infants having a teleological stance, the 
interpretations relates to encoding the action with primary focus on the end 
state, and not on efficiency (Csibra et al. 1999) or rationality (Gergely, 
Bekkering & Király, 2002). Indeed, given the definition of meaningful actions 
as actions with goals, it might be suggested that semantic processing of goals 
shifts encoding of action such that infants exhibit a teleological stance, instead 
of allocating attention to action stimuli on the basis of novelty. This shift is 
demonstrated in Experiments 2 and 3 in Chapter 3, as described in the first 
two paragraphs in this section. 
Returning to questions of efficiency and rationality, we might suggest that the 
16-month-olds in Chapter 2, the 11.5-month-olds in Chapter 3, and the 10-
month-olds in Chapter 4 did not encode the differences in the hand-object 
interactions because the precise means of holding the tool in each case did 
not inhibit efficient performance of the action if the infants were ignoring the 
constraints of human biomechanics as in the work of Southgate, Johnson & 
Csibra (2008). However, the correlations found in Chapter 4 offer a refutation 
to this interpretation. These results suggest that infants who are better 
planners and more motorically adept show differences in how they encode the 
normal, easily performed congruent eating action, and the motorically more 
unusual or difficult incongruent eating action. It is not that attention to or 
encoding of differences in motor minutiae disappears permanently once 
semantic or goal-oriented encoding of action emerges. The adult results from 
Chapter 3 illustrate this, as in adult functioning the congruence of grasp is 
processed semantically. It appears that perception of differences in grasps 
diminishes once semantic processing of action begins, perhaps because of 
top-down allocation of attention to attributes of stimuli that define or predict the 
action’s goal. Then, as infants learn to plan and perform grasping actions with 
more aptitude, they incorporate the specific manual information into their 
representations of observed actions. The results of Chapter 2 can be 
accounted for in this manner as well. Actions involving dual-function tools 
require that, upon detection of the tool, the actor and the interaction between 
the two, one action representation much be activated and another inhibited. In 
the absence of precise manual information distinguishing between both 
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actions, the action is represented in terms of its end-state. Nonetheless, the 
results of all three chapters indicate that although infants might represent 
actions in terms of their goals, as their own motor skills develop, attention to 
the efficiency of actions is supplanted by incorporation of motor 
representations. 
5.3.3 The two-stage and predictive coding models 
It is in Chapter 4 that we see how motor ability affects representation of 
actions on a conceptual or semantic level. Differences in activation were seen 
before versus after a spoon was grasped, but not before versus after the 
spoon was placed in the mouth. On the assumption that infants have more 
experience grasping objects directly than manipulating handled tools to 
perform actions such as eating, this result suggests that actions with stronger 
motor representations are better represented in the infant’s mirror system. The 
motor planning results suggest that those infants who are better planners and 
more motorically adept show a greater divergence in their responses to typical 
or unusual means of grasping and eating from those spoons than less 
motorically capable peers. The relationships found were predominantly 
between motor planning and responses to the different types of action before 
and during eating, but the significant and marginal correlations found for the 
grasping actions, both of which are linked to transferring and manipulating the 
spoon rather than well-planned performance of action, suggest that motor 
ability helps to distinguish semantic differences in motorically-identical grasps 
that will results in motoric (and semantic) differences in later action 
performance. 
Good action planning in infants could be attributable to having strong motor 
representations of tool use, and substantial motor abilities may result in the 
efficient formation of such representations. Given the patterns seen in Chapter 
4, one might suggest that the re-emergence of processing of action minutiae 
by adulthood (Chapter 3), and their incorporation into semantic 
representations, could be driven by both visuomotor associations and action 
experience. Much of the emphasis of the two-stage conception of mirror 
system function (Gallese & Goldman, 1998) is on semantic representations of 
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actions feeding into motor areas, such that once an entity is defined as a goal-
directed action, the mirror system is activated. This model is supported by the 
extensive number of primate and infant studies cited in this thesis in which 
correlates of the mirror system are not elicited by actions with no discernible 
goal (Nyström et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2010; Umiltà et al., 2001). 
Conversely, the work in this thesis supports the more recent predictive coding 
model of mirror system function (Kilner, Friston & Frith, 2007), in which there 
is mutual activation in parietal, superior temporal and frontal motor areas, and 
motor representations can be fed back to modulate activation in the preceding 
areas. An example of this in prior infant research comes from the work and 
Stapel and colleagues (2010) in which mu desynchronization is stronger in 
response to actions with novel goals, indicating that as a mismatch was found 
between the motor trajectory of the actor’s motion and the motor trajectory 
usually elicited by a cup activation in the system was enhanced. Initial 
expectation of a particular motor trajectory would naturally be generated in the 
semantic systems further posterior but the motor mismatch may have been 
signalled in frontal motor areas. 
As detailed in section 5.3.2, the work in this thesis shows that although infants 
are initially sensitive to differences in how objects are grasped, as semantic 
representations of action develop the emphasis shifts to the goal of the action. 
As infants learn to plan actions, they must represent motor specifics such as 
the orientation in which a handled tool must be grasped. Motor 
representations such as these could feed into the semantic representations of 
action, resulting at some later stage in development in the adult patterns found 
in Chapter 3, in which motor minutiae alter the semantic representation of tool 
use. Results in the present thesis showed no semantic processing of grasp at 
nine months, mirror system activation in response to overall grasp at ten 
months, and semantic processing of overall grasp at eleven-and-a-half 
months. Taken in conjunction with motor activation studies performed with 
nine-month-olds (e.g. Nyström et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2010), we can 
suggest that semantic processing of action does not need to be present for 
mirror system activation to occur, as per the Gallese and Goldman (1998) 
model. The developmental trajectories of motor and semantic representations 
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of action may be separate, despite the links between both systems. This 
possibility is supported by the predictive coding model of mirror system 
function (Kilner, Friston & Frith, 2007). Within the predictive coding mirror 
system, semantic representation of action does not flow unilaterally into motor 
activation. Each means of action processing is mutually modulated. 
Developing motor representations of tool-use actions might assist detection of 
semantic or conceptual differences in those actions, as shown by the 
correlation results in Chapter 4. This may occur before such actions are 
represented semantically or as such representations are in development, 
given that Chapter 3 shows that semantic representation of overall grasping 
action (and not of differences in grasp) develops between nine and twelve 
months of age. 
5.3.4 The directed attention model  
Nearly two decades of research on infant perception and processing of 
actions shows that encoding of action as a special class of stimulus emerges 
early in life, with perception of differences between actions determined by the 
actor’s goal (Woodward, 1998) or means of achieving that goal (Daum et al., 
2009). Action perception has a social element – stimuli with the movement 
characteristics of actions are not processed as such if the actor is not 
perceived as agentic (Hofer, Hauf & Aschersleben, 2005; Kamewari et al., 
2005; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005). Actions are one example of the diverse kinds 
of social stimulus for which there is evidence of differential neural processing 
early in life (Grossmann & Johnson, 2007). Actions can have diverse forms. 
Actions shown to and processed by infants within the scope of this thesis 
include reaching to grasp many different objects, eating from spoons, and 
manipulating novel tools to move parts of novel objects in different ways. Even 
within the relatively limited scope of this work, which focused on grasping, 
different patterns of arm and hand movements are seen. The facts that infants 
in this work could parse multi-step actions into their subcomponents (Chapter 
4), attribute different (novel) goals to different actors (Chapter 2) and 
determine differences between grasps or incorporate those grasps into 
semantic sequences (Chapter 3) suggests that infants have aptitude in taking 
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such sequences of object-directed movement from amidst the changing visual 
stimulation they experience from moment to moment, and making sense of 
them as singular (or multi-component) entities. 
One proposal for how infants select such stimuli for attention and processing 
is the directed attention model. This model suggests that following detection of 
“socially relevant” or biological entities through low-level features such as 
patterns of movement, and identification of those entities as caregivers or 
conspecifics, attention is directed to specific features of the environment via 
social cues from those entities. There is evidence that social cues assist 
infants’ perception and encoding of novel stimuli. Work with infants between 
four and nine months of age shows greater attention to and encoding of 
objects in paradigms in which there is mutual and joint gaze (Hoehl et al., 
2014; Parise et al., 2008; Striano, Reid & Hoehl, 2006), and in which adults 
direct their gaze toward (rather than away from) objects (Michel et al., 2015). 
All of these results show that social cues help infants to direct their attention 
appropriately within a stream of extensive sensory-perceptual input, and form 
representations of key stimuli. A speculative attempt to account for infants’ 
apparent precocity in processing actions might be that attention is frequently 
drawn to actions because they are stimuli or sequences of stimuli of which 
both biological motion and object-directed attention are an integral part. 
The results found in the research in this thesis can be accounted for within the 
directed attention framework. One direct example of sensitivity to adults’ gaze 
is the behaviour that differed between experiments from Chapter 2. Infants 
who participated in the experiment in which the actors made direct eye contact 
with the camera during demonstration of the tool’s functions looked 
significantly longer at the faces than the tools during the critical image stimuli. 
Infants who saw only the core part of the demonstration (Experiment 2) did 
not. In this case, the bid for joint attention inherent in direct gaze did not alter 
how 16-month-olds encoded the functions of the tool. Instead, it seems to 
have primed the infants to attend to facial communicative cues from the 
actors. This result, although incidental, illustrates that although older infants 
attend to social cues from digital stimuli, direction of attention to social factors 
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within such stimuli could be dependent on the richness of the cue. For 
example, direct eye gaze within the context of biological motion could be 
necessary for eye gaze to be attended to within still images later. The overall 
results of this study can be accounted for in this manner as well. Infants may 
have segmented the tool into two parts and associated one part with each 
actor because of processing constraints. Within the directed attention model, 
social cues from others are used to direct attention to aspects of the 
environment that should be prioritised for encoding but working memory limits 
are imposed such that maintaining different social cues from two actors 
towards the same object may be challenging (Reid & Striano, 2007). 
Consequently, encoding of multiple object functions in the context of different 
actor preferences may be challenging, and breaking the object into parts 
instead of attended to it as a whole, oriented in different ways, might involve 
relatively reduced working memory load and require fewer processing 
resources for the infants. 
Also relevant to the work in this thesis is the question of how manual gesture 
is processed as a social cue, potentially in the communicative or orienting 
manner of eye gaze. The P400 component of the ERP, generally associated 
with processing of eye gaze (Rigato, Farroni & Johnson, 2010), is elicited by 
hands pointing toward or away from objects (Gredebäck, Melinder & Daum, 
2010; Melinder et al., 2015). This indicates commonalities in how non-verbal 
communication is processed regardless of the body part implicated. Recent 
research has shown that hands in grasping postures are processed in this 
manner like pointing hands (Bakker et al., 2015). The results from the nine-
month-old sample in Chapter 3 show an enhanced P400 component for 
incongruous grasps, occurring in addition to an enhanced Nc component. This 
conjunction of results suggests that infants allocated additional attention to the 
unusual means of grasping the cup but also suggests that they encoded the 
hand as a communicative element of the stimulus. It may be that infants’ 
perception and processing of action is facilitated by the gestural or movement 
components therein. These components, hand movement and shape in 
particular, may help to direct attention to the salient, meaningful components 
of the action (i.e. the implicated objects and the targets of the action). This 
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offers an explanation for why encoding of goals occurs for grasping hands but 
not claws (Woodward, 1998) except in contexts in which an actor is known to 
control the claw (Hofer, Hauf & Aschersleben, 2005). Familiarisation with a 
conspecific in control of the claw alters its social relevance and consequently 
how the infant uses it as a means of directing their attention. 
A final consideration of the links between the directed attention model and the 
work in this thesis comes from Chapter 4. A result from this study relates to 
action parsing. Following execution of a grasp on a spoon, the degree of 
motor desynchronization decreases (mu power increases). This result fits into 
a literature that shows that in the second half of the first post-natal year, 
infants’ representations of actions are parsed at relevant junction points 
(Baldwin et al., 2001; Pace et al., 2013; Reid et al., 2007). In toddlerhood, 
actions are conceptually organised into sub-components parsed at these 
junction points (Loucks & Meltzoff, 2013). Within the directed attention model, 
such parsing would arise from infants attending to adults engaged in action. 
First, the biological motion inherent in the action would be detected. 
Identification of the person proceeds and is important in contexts such as 
Chapter 2, where preferences differ between actors (infants distinguish actors’ 
preferences; Henderson & Woodward, 2012). Through mutual gaze and 
shared attention, the infant would be engaged to attend to the action and infer 
its goals. The targets or objects and gestures associated with specific action 
sub-steps would be consistently seen together although the sub-steps may 
not always be combined in the same way. This would result in encoding of 
actions centred on sub-steps and junction points rather than representation of 
extended actions as singular, continuous stimuli. 
There are two findings about action parsing from Chapter 4. The first is that it 
is evident from the mu desynchronization pattern. The second is that this 
pattern of desynchronization and rebound is statistically significant for the 
grasping action, and not for the eating condition, although it is marginal for the 
renewed desynchronization between the conclusion of the grasp and the 
preparation to eat. The reason why parsing might result in a rebound in mu 
power following grasp execution recalls the predictive coding model of Kilner, 
Friston and Frith (2007). If the mirror system is thought of as a Bayesian 
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system, when prior information is complete, uncertainty is minimal, and 
system activation will be reduced. Once an action juncture has occurred – for 
example, a spoon has been grasped – there is no further uncertainty about 
how that part of the action will continue. Although the presence of a spoon on 
the table may constrain the possible actions of a reaching hand or reduce 
uncertainty, other possibilities (e.g. error; Meyer et al., in press) remain until 
the execution of grasp is complete. Bringing the predictive coding model 
together with the directed attention model, we can characterise the reach as 
an action with communicative relevance. In the work of Bakker and colleagues 
(2015) and in Chapter 3, a P400 is elicited in response to hands in grasping 
posture. This ERP is elicited in response to communicative stimuli 
(Gredebäck, Melinder & Daum, 2010; Hoehl & Striano, 2012; Melinder et al., 
2015; Rigato, Farroni & Johnson, 2010). In Chapter 3, it was larger when a 
grasp incongruent with object structure was performed relative to a congruent 
grasp. What this suggests is that when a standard, congruent grasp is 
performed, the communicative flexibility or uncertainty of the reach is reduced. 
In the case of the incongruent grasp, the uncertainty remained, driving the 
infants to direct their attention to the action via this social mechanism. Given 
that no overall effects of congruence were found in Chapter 4, we can assume 
that execution of the grasp in general reduced uncertainty, whether we think of 
that uncertainty as Bayesian or as social and communicative. 
The absence of the parsing effect for the eating action has a number of 
explanations. It may be that the difference in uncertainty between a hand 
holding a spoon and bringing that spoon to the mouth is smaller than for the 
reaching hand. This would be related primarily to the infant’s own visuomotor 
experience, and not to the fact that reaching to grasp an object could elicit 
many possible conclusions at the end of the sequence (eating, feeding 
another, moving the spoon), whereas once the hand holding the spoon moves 
to the mouth predictions are semantically constrained (as shown in Reid et al., 
2009). Even adults cannot detect the motor differences in others’ reaches to 
grasp a spoon for eating versus moving it to another location (Naish et al., 
2013). Alternatively, it may be that infants have less experience with self-
feeding than with grasping objects. The correlation results of Chapter 4 show 
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that the ability to perform and plan tool-mediated actions alters mu 
desynchronization patterns, and so extensive experience with reaching but not 
self-feeding leads to a difference in the conceptual-motor encoding of these 
actions. Finally, coherent with the directed attention model, shared attention 
may not be elicited as frequently from the infant during an adult’s self-feeding 
actions than during reach-to-grasp actions. Consequently, encoding of 
junction points in eating may be less strong than encoding of grasp junction 
points. 
5.3.5 Integration of frameworks  
This work suggests that multiple models of action perception and processing 
in infancy can be integrated. The directed attention model draws on social and 
conceptual elements of infant function. The predictive coding model is a 
framework for mirror system function. The teleological stance is a strongly 
conceptual model. Nonetheless, results from the preceding work indicate that 
all three can operate in conjunction with one another, just as the literature 
review in Chapter 1 shows that social, semantic and motor processes are all 
employed during action perception and processing in infancy. 
Results show that infants are initially sensitive to different perceptual elements 
of grasping actions, such as the means of grasping used (Chapter 3, 
Experiment 2). Subsequently, actions are encoded in conceptual or semantic 
terms, with an emphasis not on the means of action performance but on the 
end-state of the action (Chapter 3, Experiment 3; Chapter 4). In later infancy, 
infants associate the parts of a dual-function tool with its different uses but not 
its overall orientation, again indicating that for sufficiently complex tools or 
actions encoding of the means of action performance does not happen.  
Taken in accordance with the models discussed above, we can assume that 
via the mechanisms of the directed attention model, infants attend to actions. 
Prior to the development of a semantic processing system, perceptual aspects 
are encoded. Once the semantic system develops, the teleological stance 
becomes strong and these perceptual aspects or action minutiae are no 
longer processed. Instead, the emphasis is purely on how the achievement of 
the end-state associated with a specific action. Differences in how the object 
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is grasped or brought to the target are not important. Predictive coding in the 
mirror system distinguishes between those points in the action at which an 
end-state is achieved and those at which it is not. Returning to the directed 
attention model, uncertainty in action end-states can be linked to the 
communicative relevance of the action involved or to how likely such end-
states are to have been seen in communicative or shared attention contexts. 
When predictive motor coding of an action end-state is difficult, such as in the 
context of a dual-function tool held in the same hand posture (albeit in 
different orientations) for all goals, direction of attention to each function by 
separate actors can result in partial action encoding – tool parts are 
associated with end-states but the precise means of performing the action is 
not. In order for actions to be encoded in full, social, motor and semantic 
information must be processed. Directed attention, a teleological stance, and 
predictive coding all contribute to the formation of a full representation of 
action. 
5.4 Limitations and directions for future research 
5.4.1 Specific limitations of the work  
The question asked in this thesis was how semantic and motor 
representations of action develop and how these systems of action processing 
operate in conjunction with one another in infancy. The conclusion to be 
drawn is that although each system may develop along its own trajectory, 
there is evidence that they operate together to process actions in terms of 
their end-states. Interpretation of results within the frame of the secondary 
question of the thesis – how infants process conceptually or motorically 
different means of performing tool-mediated actions – leads to further 
questions rather than specific conclusions. Indeed, each experimental chapter 
in this thesis leads to the same question. If representations of the precise 
means of interacting with a tool are not present in semantic or mirror 
representations of the presented action now, then when do they become 
present during development?  
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A specific limitation of the work is that each of the three main questions – how 
infants associate dual-function tools with goals on the basis of how they are 
held, how semantic processing of grasp-object relationships develops, and 
how the congruence of means of holding tools is integrated in mirror system 
function – could be answered more completely with additional information on 
the developmental trajectory. The Chapter 2 paradigm could show if tool 
orientation is important for processing single-function tool use earlier in 
development, or if dual-function tool orientation is ever utilised in 
distinguishing between its functions. Given that the adult neural correlates of 
grasp processing differ from the 11.5-month-olds’ correlates in incorporation of 
grasp congruence, investigation of further age groups could illustrate when the 
specifics of the grasp-object relationship are incorporated into semantic 
representations of grasping actions. Finally, study of additional older age 
groups within the Chapter 4 paradigm would likely illustrate the developmental 
trajectory of predictive motor processing of grasp, particularly because of the 
emergent relationship illustrated by the correlation analyses in that chapter. 
An adult sample could also indicate whether prediction of the motor minutiae 
of an action on the basis of grasp occurs in the developed mirror system. 
Another limitation in the work in this thesis is the nature of the specific tasks 
employed to characterise infants’ motor development. In Chapter 2, no such 
task was presented but the conclusion that 16-month-olds failed to associate a 
specific means of holding the tool with the actor’s goal because they could not 
differentially simulate the different means of holding the tool might be better 
supported if a sample, given opportunity to imitate the actors, differed in their 
results from the groups in Experiments 1 and 2. In Chapter 3, a motor 
experience measure was employed but no correlations were found between 
grasping ability and the difference wave for each neural component analysed. 
This may be because the components measured respond to conceptual 
elements of action only. Given that other research has shown relationships 
between grasping ability and looking times (Daum et al., 2011; 2009) and the 
P400 component (Bakker et al., 2014), it may be that the components 
measured in this study do not incorporate ideomotor processes or at least no 
longer do so at the ages studied. In order to capture the effects of the infants’ 
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held motor representations, that is, their ability to simulate the differences in 
the thumb-to-finger and whole hand grips shown and potentially encode the 
relationship of those grips to the structure of the implicated object, other 
components (such as the motor ERP found by Nyström, 2008) might be 
targeted for analysis in a similar paradigm. 
Alternatively, the specific task used may have been inappropriate. From the 
correlations in Chapter 4, we see that with better action planning, a combined 
motor-conceptual procedure, semantic differences in observed actions elicit 
increasingly divergent responses. Assessment of the infants’ abilities to use 
thumb-finger opposition in Chapter 3 may have been more relevant to the 
measured components if the task captured the infants’ plan or choice to use 
thumb-finger opposition (as in Loucks & Sommerville, 2012), because even at 
nine months use of a pincer grip approaches universality. It must also be 
noted that sample sizes in Chapters 3 and 4 were small. Larger samples in 
Chapter 3, Experiments 2 and 3 may have illustrated a more subtle 
relationship between pincer grip use and semantic and perceptual processing 
of grasping. Although moderate correlations were found in Chapter 4, a larger 
sample size may have clarified the results of the marginal correlation between 
the difference in activation between conditions in the pre-grasping period 
(critical for understanding ability to predict actions from grasps) and the 
infant’s ability to eat from the spoon without error.  
A final limitation to consider bridges some specific limitations of the work and 
a general limitation of the field. This limitation refers to the extant question of 
when infants make the transition from associative to semantic processing in 
action. Before discussing the specific issues in this thesis, we must define the 
difference between the two. They can be conceptualised in opposition to one 
another although arguably, semantic relationships are a specific kind of 
association. Associations are specific in terms of the related stimuli, but 
general in terms of how stimuli can be related. Semantic relationships are 
general in terms of related stimuli, but specific in terms of how stimuli can be 
related. An association is a relationship between two or more specific stimuli 
or stimulus classes – a blue sky and the memory of sitting on a beach, typing 
on a keyboard and the taste of coffee, a hammer and the act of hammering. 
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The last of these associations is causal – hammering usually requires a 
hammer – the others are not, having simply arisen from being paired 
contiguously but not contingently. That is, a blue sky and a beach can be 
experienced apart from one another, whereas the act of hammering is 
contiguous with having a hammer and has a very high (though not exclusive) 
contingency with that tool. Semantic relationships are created specifically 
between causally or structurally linked stimuli, but once a causal or structural 
form is known, it can be modified. For example, if I know that the structure of a 
hammering action is to use a hammer to hit a nail or other object with force, I 
might not associate a shoe with hammering and while I might find someone 
hammering with a shoe to be engaging in an unexpected action, it is not 
incongruous because the overall causal structure of the action is not violated.  
Kutas and Hillyard (1980) write about “strongly” and “moderately” incongruous 
stimuli. Following the sentence fragment “he took a sip from the”, certain 
representations associated with sipping are activated – cup, glass, and 
perhaps less strongly, tap. If the sentence concludes with the noun 
“transmitter”, this is strongly incongruous. The representation of the act of 
sipping does not conform to one’s knowledge of what a transmitter is and what 
can be done with it. However, the noun “waterfall” may be congruous or 
moderately incongruous. If we do not have other contextual information, 
“waterfall” is congruous but unexpected; if our prior knowledge includes the 
fact that the agent is at home, sipping from a waterfall is incongruous with that 
context. 
There are two extant developmental questions arising here. First, when do 
infants make the transition from purely associative to associative and 
semantic processing? Second, does an association become semantic through 
repeated exposure (contiguity) or do infants generate structural knowledge 
about, for example, actions, and determine if a semantic relationship is valid 
via contiguity, contingency and context? That is, are infants’ semantic 
associations initially developed from specific associations, or from general 
rules? Under the assumption, rife in the literature, that infants differentiate 
between actions and non-actions on the basis of a number of cues – agency 
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(Hofer, Hauf & Aschersleben, 2005; Kaduk, Elsner & Reid, 2013; Kamewari et 
al., 2005), discernible goals (Southgate et al., 2010; Woodward, 1998), 
contingency of the outcome on performance of a causal action (Nyström et al., 
2011; Träuble and Pauen, 2011), and upholding the standard function of 
objects (Reid et al., 2009; Stapel et al., 2010) – the results of the reported 
studies can be interpreted as the result of semantic processing on the part of 
the infants. Infants process similar combinations of movements, objects and 
end-states differently if there are violations of the general nature of actions in 
place, even if they are shown these combinations frequently enough to form 
associations. Examples of paradigms showing this include the wrong 
movement performed with an object (Reid et al., 2009; Stapel et al., 2010), no 
discernible goal (Southgate et al., 2010), and a novel action performed with a 
tool that violates rules of physical causality (Träuble and Pauen, 2011). This 
last example shows that if the general structure of action is violated, infants do 
not process the sub-components of that action (e.g. the tool used) in the same 
way as when the action is causal and does not violate general knowledge or 
principles of actions. On the basis of Hebbian learning, associations should be 
formed between frequently co-occurring stimuli, but in this case the semantic 
violation seemed to prevent the infants from doing so.  
Under these assumptions, in chapter 2, infants associate tool-ends with actors 
not because of a co-appearance of the actor and that tool-end in a salient 
context (demonstration of the tool-end’s use), but because infants understand 
that an action has an actor with a goal, and that goal must be performed with 
a specific tool-part. In chapter 3, this assumption leads to interpretation of the 
Nc effect as indicative that infants hold an association but not a semantic 
association between tool shapes and grasp postures at nine months, and at 
11.5 months such associations might be more flexible or infants simply do not 
attend to hand-object relationships. Finally, in chapter 4, the assumption is 
that, revealed by mu power differences at different action sub-steps, infants’ 
conceptions of actions as semantic, structured entities affect mirror system 
function, but they do not have a semantic, mirror-system-affecting conception 
of how tools must be interacted with to attain specific goals (i.e. eating).  
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The interpretation of semantic processing in chapter 2 is particularly 
susceptible to an associative-only interpretation if we assume that at 16 
months, infants do not necessarily encode all action as semantic. Looking 
patterns could be explained via the counter-interpretation noted above, that is, 
that infants may have just formed an association between a tool-end and an 
actor because of the tool-end’s salience (held upright during demonstration, 
used to effect outcome). In chapter 4, we might suggest that sub-steps are 
separated associatively, as infants might have many possible actions 
associated with reaching but few associated with completing a grasp on a 
spoon, and thus the need to continue to simulate the action in order to predict 
it is diminished at that sub-step. In chapter 3, we see evidence for associative 
processing via the Nc, but no evidence for N400-differentiated semantic 
processing of grasp-object conformity. Decades of research tell us that the 
N400 indexes semantic processing (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011), but in 
developmental contexts we know very little about its emergence. By focusing 
research efforts on the developmental N400, other congruence-modulated 
developmental components (e.g. P400; Bakker et al., 2015) and indeed 
associative components (e.g. Nc; Quinn, Westerlund & Nelson, 2006), the 
question of when and how infants make the transition from associative to 
semantic processing could be better investigated. This would allow inferences 
and assumptions about how infants process action, whether semantically or 
associatively, to be founded in evidence from the literature. For example, in 
adult literature, the N400 is found overwhelmingly in studies in which the kind 
of structural, modifiable meaning defined as “semantics” above is modulated, 
and to argue that it indexes another process is difficult (Kutas & Federmeier, 
2011). Conversely, in infancy, without a similarly strong array of evidence it is 
difficult to argue that N400 homologues definitively indexes semantic 
processing in infancy. 
5.4.2 General limitations in the field 
When the work in this thesis commenced, many studies of mirror system 
function in infancy emphasised how the mirror system worked in relation to 
“goal-directed” action, with ambiguous gestures or non-causally-generated 
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end-states used as a foil (Nyström et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2010). Some 
literature on the N400 potential as a marker of semantic processing of action 
in infancy existed (Pace et al., 2013; Reid et al., 2009) as did much research 
on infant encoding of conceptual elements of action (e.g. Daum et al., 2009; 
Träuble & Pauen, 2011). The mirror system or motor activation work did not 
explicitly refer to its connections to conceptual elements of action processing 
despite the differences in conditions being driven by what could be considered 
a conceptual or semantic aspect – goal-directedness. This thesis was written 
and the experiments herein conducted with the intent of making these links 
more explicit. 
There are a number of discontinuities in our knowledge of the mirror system 
as a developing neural network. The overarching question is that of whether 
its function develops along predetermined trajectories or whether the 
formation of visuomotor associations supports ideomotor responses during 
observation of predictable actions (see e.g. Cook et al., 2014). Although mu 
desynchronization can be measured from across the infant’s scalp, it is not 
clear to what extent this correlate of motor activation is driven or modulated by 
the superior temporal and parietal modules of the mirror system network. This 
relates to the previously identified question, derived from the two-stage 
(Gallese & Goldman, 1998) and predictive coding models (Kilner, Friston & 
Frith, 2007), of how the mirror system can function without semantic 
processing of action. Within the latter model, it is possible that the premotor 
and motor areas of cortex could be responsive to observed action without 
extensive conceptual understanding but the results of developmental mirror 
system studies indicate that mirror responses in the first post-natal year 
distinguishes between incidental arm movement and goal-directed action 
(Southgate et al., 2010). 
The potentiality that the mirror system is functional before semantic 
processing emerges in infancy points to the possibility that the precise 
correlates used for detection of both semantic processing (the N400) and 
mirror system function (mu desynchronization) might have developmental 
precursors that have not yet been detected or specified. There are additional 
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possible neural correlates of mirror system function measured via ERPs 
(Nyström, 2008) or NIRS (Shimada & Hiraki, 2006). For semantic processing, 
few possibilities currently exist in the literature. Although terms like 
“congruence” are used in the action P400 literature (e.g. Bakker et al., 2015), 
this refers specifically to the congruence between the orientation of a grasping 
hand and a previously displayed object. This is a spatial relationship and 
supports rather than questions or broadens the communicative function of the 
P400.  
Other possible precursor neural correlates exist and could be explored further. 
These include the positive slow wave ERP (seen in 4-month-olds; Hoehl et al., 
2008), alpha desynchronization (seen by 9 months; Hoehl et al., 2014) and 
gamma oscillatory activity (present at 8 months; Reid et al., 2007). The first of 
these is associated with memory encoding, the second with activation of 
networks for semantic retrieval, and the third with action parsing. In 
conjunction with one another, these components could illustrate how 
conceptual aspects of action are encoded in memory, how they are recruited 
to differentiate distinct conceptual stages within action, and how these 
concepts are retrieved in order to generate predictions about how an action 
will continue along semantically congruent parameters. 
Another area within infant action perception and processing research that 
restricts how conclusions can be drawn from the work in this thesis and 
indeed from other work in the field is the discontinuity between results based 
on overt infant behavior and looking patterns, and results deriving from neural 
measurement. The neural components underlying infant perception and 
encoding of action are not fully elucidated. One key example is that the work 
of Daum and colleagues (2011; 2009) that shows, from measurements of 
infant looking time, that infants look longer at grasps on objects that do not 
match the shape of the hand as it reached for the object, and that six-month-
olds who can perform thumb-to-finger grips show this distinction in looking 
time more so than peers who do not perform thumb-to-finger grips. In the work 
presented in Chapter 3, we see that although nine-month-olds perceive 
differences in hand-object relationships, the relationship between pincer grip 
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performance and attentional processes is not seen. There must be another 
neural component that supports the abilities shown by the infants in the Daum 
et al. (2011; 2009) work that is not the Nc, P400 or N400 component. 
In investigating the relationship between semantic and motor processing of 
action, and the neural correlates involved in each system, the work in this 
thesis has attempted to bridge many of the discontinuities in the field’s 
conceptions of the mirror and semantic processing systems. In addition to 
demonstrating the function and development of these systems in relation to 
tool-use actions of varying complexities (grasping, Chapter 3; grasping to act, 
Chapter 4; using dual-function tools, Chapter 2), the work indicates that 
although there are conceptual similarities between semantic processing and 
some aspects of mirror system activation, differences in neural manifestation 
remain. Thus the systems can be considered as distinct, although semantic 
processing also functions as a component of the mirror system that modulates 
motor activation. From the literature review in Chapter 1 onwards, the 
contribution of this thesis to the field has been to examine the conceptual 
similarities between and hierarchies in processing of action from social, 
semantic and motor perspectives. 
5.4.3 Future directions – specific and general 
In addition to the expansion of the paradigms in this study to further age 
groups and the adoption of new measures of motor experience and 
representation described in section 5.4.1, there are some more specific 
questions arising from the work in this thesis. The first is whether the results 
found in Chapters 3 and 4 arise from familiarity with the implicated objects – 
cups and spoons – or whether perceptual, semantic and motor processing of 
grasping actions is more general. Given the presence of specific cues that a 
sequence of movement is an action, such as agency or animacy (Hofer, Hauf 
& Aschersleben, 2005; Pauen & Träuble, 2007) and the achievement of a goal 
(Southgate et al., 2010; Southgate & Begus, 2013; Woodward, 1998), infants 
may apply general expectancies to the sequence. This could be investigated 
by showing 9-month-olds an actor grasping an unfamiliar object with specific 
structural features that indicate how it should be held, and analysing the 
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neural response for the same differences in Nc and P400 components seen in 
Chapter 3, Experiment 2. In addition, the paradigm used in Chapter 4 could be 
adapted for an older age group, sensitive to grasp orientation, to determine if 
infants generally expect that a handled object will be held with a radial rather 
than an ulnar grasp. 
The precise relationship between the developmental trajectories of semantic 
processing and motor activation remains to be found, although work in this 
thesis shows that they are not the same means of processing. The 
correlations found in Chapter 3 promote further work to establish if predictive 
differential processing of congruent and incongruent grasps emerges later in 
infancy, and if there remains a relationship between differential motor 
activation in response to such grasps and motor planning. It could be found 
whether the semantics of these manual aspects of action become 
incorporated into mirror system representations along a similar timeline to the 
emergence of semantic processing of grasp appropriateness, as measured in 
Chapter 2. Such a relationship would add credence to the possibility that 
semantic and motor processing of action are strongly linked, that they operate 
teleologically once overall semantic processing of action goals emerge, and 
that as motor or manual minutiae of actions are incorporated into semantic 
representations they are differentiated in measures of motor activation.  
The re-emergence of infant sensitivity to minutiae of grasping after eleven-
and-a-half months (Chapter 3), and sensitivity to nuanced motor differences in 
how actions are performed (Chapters and 4) remains to be investigated. The 
ability to use one’s hands in precise configurations allows for expert 
manipulations of tools employed by adults in everyday life. From stirring to 
writing to sewing to eating with forks or chopsticks, specific and precise 
means of altering the degrees of freedom of the hand in relation to one 
another that are challenging for infants become necessary and natural in 
adulthood. The exact means of holding and employing a tool for use can 
change its associated function. Just as different orientations of the tool altered 
its intended function in Chapter 2 (despite these orientation differences not 
being encoded by the 16-month-olds), different means of holding a hammer 
can convey delicate or powerful means of hammering, or a different function 
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such as pulling nails out of a wall. Without sensitivity to the means or minutiae 
of performing an action with an object, the ability to use tools is diminished 
and, in relation to action observation, social cues such as when someone is 
handing an object over or performing an action in relation to you may be 
missed. The work in this thesis indicates that although a (narrowly interpreted) 
teleological stance and focus on action end-states may dominate infant action 
processing in the first post-natal year, the ability to process the motor 
subcomponents of actions is important for both performance and observation 
of action and its development ought to be studied further. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The research conducted as part of this thesis links behavioural measures of 
action performance, neural measures of motor activation, semantic processing 
and attentional processing, and eye-tracking measures of associations 
between actors and the tools and tool parts they use to perform their preferred 
actions. Results show that incorporating information about grasp and hand-
object relationships into semantic and mirror representations of tool function, 
grasp appropriateness and congruence of action conclusions is challenging 
for infants. It is possible that as infants begin to form semantic or meaningful 
representations of action, and as these representations become strongly 
linked to motor activation of observed actions, as in the mirror system, infants 
attend only to the most salient, most meaningful aspect of the action – the 
goal. By adulthood, motor minutiae of actions are identified as congruent or 
incongruent with the objects they are executed upon. This is likely driven by 
the strongly entrenched semantic and motor representations of action present 
in adulthood. With greater experience of manipulating objects and planning 
actions, semantic elements of action can be incorporated into motor 
representations, and motor elements into semantic representations. Although 
infants are adept at forming associations between tools, targets, actors and 
action conclusions, the robust processing of precise manual elements of tool-
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